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INTRODUCTION
As almost anyone alive during the past decade knows, this is the era of
the "litigation explosion,"' or there is at least the perception that a litigation
explosion exists. 2 Although all agree that the absolute number of lawsuits has
increased in virtually every comer of the state and federal court systems, there exists
vigorous debate about whether the increase is unusual in relative or historical terms3
and even more vigorous debate about whether the absolute increase in cases
symbolizes the American concern for fairness and justice4 or represents a surge in
frivolous or trivial disputes needlessly clogging the courts. 5 As the debate has
1. See, e.g., Bok, A Flawed System, HARv. MAO., May-June 1983, at 38 [hereinafter Bok] (arguing that larger
proportion of lawyers and lawsuits in America as compared to other industrialized countries such as Japan suggests too
much American reliance on the courts and too much adversarial contentiousness in American dispute resolution); Bork,
Dealing With the Overload in Article IlI Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 233 (1974) (former solicitor general and federal judge
argues that courts are increasingly used because of "self-defeating effort to guarantee every minor right people think they
ought ideally to possess"); Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982) (former Chief Justice argues
that courts are overburdened because aggrieved parties turn to courts for redress when they previously turned to other,
more apt, institutions such as church and family); Pike, Why Everybody Is Suing Everybody, U.S. NEws & Worm RE.,
Dec. 4, 1978, at 50; The Chilling Impact of Litigation, Bus. WK., June 6, 1977, at 58 (claiming that litigation increase
is of crisis proportions and unduly restricts business enterprises from socially useful activity); Note, Plausible Pleadings:
Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARv. L. REv. 630, 631 (1987) [hereinafter Plausible Pleadings]
("Responses to the litigation explosion, including the amendment of rule 11, reflect a widely held view that increased use
of the courts is a negative development."). See also Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. Rev. 767
(1977) (author coins term "hyperlexis" to describe increased resort to courts for failure of or inability to obtain
satisfaction through other political and social institutions, arguing that if not checked, hyperlexis will "drag our whole
legal system into the ground."); Everybody Must Get Sued, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 47. (Mississippi state court trial
judge dismisses tort claim in verse parodying Bob Dylan song "Rainy Day Women Part I," e.g., "everybody must get
sued" in lieu of "everybody must get stoned").
2. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Galanter] (arguing that
the suggestion of a litigation "crisis" is unwarranted, that current per capita litigation activity is not unusual in American
history, and that no evidence exists to support the suggestion that an increased number of court cases lack merit or are
disadvantageous to society as a whole).
3. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 47-53 (referring to historical records showing a greater relative number of
lawsuits in colonial America than at present, and describing a cyclical historical pattern in American resort to courts).
4. See Radhert, Of Impressionists and Rohrschbach Blots (Book Review), 86 Cow.tm. L. REv. 177 (1986)
(in reviewing L. FRimemn, Toar, Jus'ncE (1985), author reads Friedman as suggesting that increased litigation results
from an expansion of rights and remedies, a generally positive development, rather than from an increased litigiousness
or failure of other social institutions); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Ymms L.J. 1023 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss]. Professor
Fiss argues that American willingness to utilize courts is a net positive, demonstrating both a social commitment to
fairness and enforcement of individual rights as well as the courts' capacity to largely fulfill in a satisfactory way the
demands placed upon them.
5. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 1; Burger, supra note 1. The sources cited in note 1 generally argue that court delay
and backlog should be attacked aggressively through greater judicial efficiency and effort, improved lawyer competence,
and use of effective settlement and case management techniques. To be sure, contrasting views can be found. See, e.g.,
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proceeded, the perception of a litigation explosion has spurred adoption of
alternative dispute resolution methods, 6 tougher pleading standards, 7 sterner and
more readily available sanctions for discovery abuse, 8 more comprehensive pretrial
Fiss, supra note 4; Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cia. L. REv. 494 (1986); Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HI-Rv. L. REv. 374 (1982) (arguing that judicial efforts to manage rather than decide cases and the
attendant push for informal pretrial settlement has reduced power of certain litigants, reduced moral authority of courts,
and shielded judicial error from meaningful review).
6. See, e.g., S. GODBER , E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DisprTE RasoumoN (1986); J. Lmiiaassss, TrE LrrOrous Soa-'
(1981). If necessary, these alternative dispute resolution methods may be annexed to the courts. See, e.g., Broderick,
Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way, 69 A.B.A. J. 64 (1983) (describing success of Eastem District of Pennsylvania
court-annexed compulsory arbitration program for certain classes of cases as reducing demands on judicial resources);
Negeiski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. Rav. 787
(1983). See also E. LwD & J. StHAso, EVAWAItoN OF COURT-A,'NNEn D ARB'RnAnoN iN TREE FEDERAL Dissucr CotRrs
(1983).
7. See Plausible Pleadings, supra note 1; Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 Courst. L. REv. 433 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus]. Professor Marcus does not endorse a return to rigidly
required fact or "code" pleading such as that which preceded the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
but notes a trend toward returning to this stricter view of pleadings in the reported federal cases, a trend proceeding largely
sub silentio, with courts dismissing claims by utilizing a fact/code pleading approach while simultaneously giving
ostensible endorsement to the notice pleading approach established by the Federal Rules.
Notice pleading is the concept championed by the Reporter of the Federal Rules, Yale Law School Dean and Second
Circuit Judge Charles Clark, (although he disliked the term, see Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914 (1976)), and established in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which deems a
complaint sufficient when it contains a "short and plain statement" of the claim of injury and a request for relief. Rule
8(a) requires less specificity than did most jurisdictions prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules and is designed merely
to place the defendant on fair "notice" of the dispute rather than to detail the facts claimant must prove to prevail at trial.
In contrast, the prevailing school of legal pleading prior to the Federal Rules required a claimant to state in some detail
all of the facts that it would prove at trial and outline how proof of those facts would set out the elements of or otherwise
demonstrate that the claimant possessed a legal cause of action. See Marcus, supra, at 433-34.
After the adoption of the Federal Rules, key cases stressed the liberal attitude of notice pleading underlying the Rules,
often in language that, if taken too literally, would prevent almost any complaint from being dismissed for failure to state
a claim pursuant to rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (a complaint should not be
dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief"); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). See also Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice
Pleading, and Standing, 65 CoRNELL L. Rev. 390 (1980) (arguing that courts frequently and improperly take a fact/code
pleading approach to dismiss disfavored claims).
8. See, e.g., Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980) (Justices Powell,
Stewart, and Rehnquist dissent from the 1980 amendments, labeling them "tinkering" changes that do not forcefully
address the problem of discovery abuse); Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3 Rv. OF LmGr oiN I
(1982); Rosenberg & King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 579;
Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 I{iv. L. REv. 1033, 1044-45
(1978). See also Cavanaugh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Critical
Evaluation and a Proposalfor More Effective Discovery Through Local Rules, 30 Vii. L. Rv. 767 (1985) (arguing that
while the 1983 amendments were a positive step toward correcting abusive discovery, standing alone they are not enough,
and suggesting that the route toward more effective discovery could be found in the implementation of discovery reforms
found in the local rules); Comment, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 26-Scalpel or Meat-ax? The 1983 Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 O1Ho ST. L.J. 183 (1985) (suggesting that amended rule 26 has not yet achieved
its potential as a curb on discovery abuse, and urging stricter adherence by lawyers and judges to fulfill that potential).
The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were in large part addressed to a perceived need to
increase court authority and willingness to sanction pleading and discovery abuse. For example, rule 11 was amended
substantially to convert the former subjective bad faith standard for determining whether a "pleading, motion, or other
paper" was frivolous to an objective standard. Under the new standard, a paper is frivolous if in the eyes of a reasonable
person it is not
well grounded in fact or not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and or is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Rule 26(g) was amended to state that an attorney's signing of discovery documents constituted a similar certification and
that "[i]f a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative shall impose
.. . an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee." These revisions were made with the goal of increasing
the use of such sanctions for both deterrent and cost-shifting effect. Courts have embraced the new powers provided by
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management of cases, 9 more prevalent fee shifting or adoption of the English Rule, '0
and generally greater ease of pretrial disposition of cases. In 1986, the effect of this
trend upon federal summary judgment practice became apparent.
Historically, the chief devices for disposing of matters without trial have been
the demurrer,' 1 the rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,' 2 and
the summary judgment motion. With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, demurrers were abolished. 13 The liberal pleading standards of
rules 8 and 9, as interpreted by leading cases 14 made rule 12(b)(6) dismissals difficult
to achieve, 15 at least when courts adhered to the letter and spirit of the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in the area. 16 To summary judgment was left the formidable
task of making the federal system "efficient,"' 17 by eliminating baseless claims
before trial, a task many came to view as beyond its capabilities under the controlling
amended rule 11 more quickly than those of amended rule 26. See G. Vairo, Report to the Advisory Committee on
Amended Rule I 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5 (1987) (unpublished manuscript) (number of reported rule
11 cases has increased more than fifty-fold since 1983); SANcnoNs: RuE 11 AND Orma PowEss (E. Epstein, G. Joseph &
C. Shaffer, eds. 1985) (rule 11 has been the most popular sanctioning tool of judges; rule 26(g) seldom used in reported
opinions).
9. See Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix?, 69 Mers. L. Rsv. 1 (1984); Peckham, The Federal
Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAw. L. Rsv. 770 (1981).
10. See Bishop, Let's Adopt the English Fees Award System, 4 CAL. LAw 10 (Feb. 1984); Manse, Winner Takes
All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. Rsv. 26 (1969); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's
Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 Fososns L. REv. 761 (1982); Note, Financial Barriers to Litigation:
Attorney Fees and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 ALB. L. Rsv. 149 (1981).
11. A demurrer at common law or under most codes was a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the complaint. The
demurrer takes as true the facts alleged in the complaint and "asserts that the action should be dismissed because, under
the governing substantive law, no relief should be granted even if the facts were proven." F. JssEs & G. HAzARo, Civn.
PRocEDuRE § 4.2 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter JAtss & HAZARD]. If the demurrer was granted by the court, the case was
concluded on the merits and plaintiff could not amend or refile the complaint. However, the defendant faced some risk,
too, in that its acceptance of the facts pleaded as true precluded the defendant from litigating these facts at trial if the
demurrer was denied. See J. CoutD, J. FiFusnAL., A. Meaim & J. Sm'roN, Cva. PsocEnURs 760-63 (4th ed. 1985)
[hereinafter CoutD]. By contrast, the modem federal defendant raising a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (see
infra note 11) need only admit plaintiff's pleaded facts as true for purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss. See J'.IEs
& HAzus, supra, § 4.2.
12. The rule 12(b)(6) motion has replaced the demurrer, which was specifically abolished by the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. See FED. R. Civ. P. 7(c). The defendant makes the motion, admitting for
purposes of the motion the truth of plaintiff's properly pleaded allegations, and the court determines whether plaintiff has
stated facts that if proven true would entitle plaintiff to relief under the controlling law. See CousnD, supra note 11, at
764-65; Jssts & HAZARD, supra note 11, at § 4.2.
13. See Fan. R. Civ. P. 7(c).
14. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Dioguardi v. Duming, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
15. See 5 C. wum-r & A. Maiu.E, FEDERAL Pscncs AND PRocEnus § 1357, at 598-605 (1979) [hereinafter WViuoir
& Minus] (pointing out disfavored status of motion and relative ease by which many litigants can avoid dismissal for
failure to state a claim through clever pleading even when case is unlikely to succeed at trial).
16. See Marcus, supra note 7, at 434.
17. See JAwsS & HAzARn, supra note 11, at §§ 4.10, 5.19; C. WRor, THE LAw OF FaEM. CouRts 663-70 (4th ed.
1983) [hereinafter VRuGr]; 10 C. WRrr, A. Mem & M. KANE, FEnEtRA PRAcncE AND PRocenuRE §§ 2711, 2713 (1983)
[hereinafter Wpaorr, Mai-t & KANE]. Although these and other commentators have noted the limited utility of summary
judgment for terminating cases, especially when courts take too restrictive a view of the procedure's availability, they also
acknowledge, although sometimes more implicitly than explicitly, that the summary judgment procedure, since it permits
court examination of the fact record after discovery, has more potential and actual ability to terminate cases as compared
to the rule 12(b)(6) motion. The comparative advantages of summary judgment in this regard are especially strong in
jurisdictions that take a liberal view of notice pleading such as that set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957),
and Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). See also Marcus, supra note 7, at 484-91 (arguing that courts
seeking to curb unmeritorious litigation prior to trial should faithfully apply summary judgment procedure as a tool for
effective pretrial termination of weak cases using rule 56(f) to permit nonmovant adequate discovery as a matter of fairness
rather than rule 12(b)(6) motions premised on fact/code theory of pleading).
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precedents. Some argued that language in certain precedents made summary
judgment too difficult to obtain, allowing many obviously inadequate claims to
proceed to trial and needlessly consuming judicial and litigant resources. 18 Some
proposed rewriting rule 56 itself.' 9 Others argued that the deficiency could be
corrected by a substantially altered application of the rule20 or by establishing as
correct the more stringent approach to summary judgment found in some courts.2'
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court issued three decisions that, taken
together, effected major changes in summary judgment doctrine and practice. In
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,22 Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc.,23 and Celotex v. Catrett,24 the Court specifically equated the standard for
granting summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 with the directed
verdict standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). Implicitly, the Court also
expanded a judge's power in the directed verdict context as well. In addition, the
Court's rhetoric in these three cases changed the tone of judicial perspective on rule
56, creating a climate conducive to more frequent use and granting of the motion. 25
This Article views the Court's history and interpretation of precedent as faulty
and ill-conceived in light of the purposes for which the civil litigation system exists.
These cases, particularly Liberty Lobby, effectively rewrote rule 56 without benefit
of the procedures for amending the Federal Rules required by the Rules Enabling Act
of 1934.26 These decisions have influenced lower courts to more readily grant
summary judgment 27 and will likely have a ripple effect in those states with
procedures modeled after the Federal Rules.
This Article argues that the Court's errors and its violation of prudent rulemaking
departed from the generally accepted understanding of the proper role of both summary
judgment and directed verdict. The Court took liberties with accepted judicial practice
to rewrite the rules in a manner that will ultimately produce less accurate adjudication.
Part I summarizes the Court's 1986 trio of summary judgment cases and their apparent
impact.28 Part II analyzes the shortcomings of Liberty Lobby and Matsushita.29 Part
18. See D. HER, R. HAYDOCK & J. S"EswaEL, Morno.,i PRAcncE § 16.1.10 (1985) [hereinafter HEms] (contending that
precedents and dicta suggesting summary judgment should be rarely granted and only in cases free of even the slightest
doubt are in error and that rule 56 has greater utility, a fact recognized by a majority of federal courts); WmGH, Mnsa.
& KANE, supra note 17, at § 2727; Accord Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YA.E L.J.
745, 746 (1974) [hereinafter Louis]; Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary Judgment Context: A
Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. Rav. 774, 779 (1983) [hereinafter Sonenshein].
19. See, e.g., Schwarzer, Summary Judgment: A Proposed Revision of Rule 56, 110 F.R.D. 213 (1986).
20. See, e.g., Sonenshein, supra note 18, at 783-86; Currie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary
Judgments, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 72, 77-79 (1977) [hereinafter Currie].
21. See, e.g., WmiGrr, Muiss & KAE, supra note 17, at § 2727; Louis, supra note 18, at 762-65.
22. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
23. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
24. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
25. See Holzberg, High Court Encourages Summary Judgments, Lrr. NEws, Winter 1988, at 1; Pierce, Summary
Judgment: A Favored Means of Summarily Resolving Disputes, 53 BRoom.N L. Ray. 279, 286-87 (1987).
26. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)).
27. See, e.g., Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct 1570 (1987); Certain
British Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Jet Charter Serv., 789 F.2d 1534 (lth Cir. 1986); Raynor v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1986). See also Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial
Evidence, 40 STAN. L. RE'. 491, 496-500 (1988) [hereinafter Circumstantial Evidence].
28. See infra text accompanying notes 32-79.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 80-328.
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ImI examines the probable systemic effect of the Court's new summary judgment
construct. 30 Part IV concludes with an analysis of proposed changes in pretrial ad-
judication pending before the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.3 t
I. THE TRio OF CASES THAT CHANGED SOME OF THE LITIGATION WORLD
The Supreme Court seldom writes extensively about a federal rule of civil
procedure. 32 Ordinarily, civil procedure litigation is not viewed as raising questions
of constitutional import. Circuit and district court cases that have interpreted the
Federal Rules left comparatively little need for Supreme Court intervention during the
past two decades. One therefore finds it surprising that the Court chose to hear and
decide in one term three cases intimately involving a single federal rule and that the
Court wrote extensively on the rule in all three cases. Knowing nothing more, the
follower of Court advance sheets should immediately suspect something significant
in progress. Such a suspicious, or even curious, reader would not have been
disappointed during 1986.
A. Matsushita v. Zenith
The Court first decided a case that expressly said relatively little about summary
judgment doctrine but presaged the Court's current fascination with disposing of
cases, particularly large cases, without trial. In March 1986, Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.33 reversed the Third Circuit's finding that some
of plaintiffs' claims of antitrust violations were not subject to summary judgment.
Although the five-member Court majority technically did not enter summary
judgment for defendants but remanded the matter to the circuit court with instructions
to review the record for better evidence sufficient to overcome defendants' showing
of entitlement to judgment, the functional result of Matsushita was to end the case. 34
30. See infra text accompanying notes 329-408.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 409-450.
32. Ordinarily the Court's docket is consumed by constitutional questions such as first amendment rights of access,
fourth amendment protections against illegal search and seizure, fifth and fourteenth amendment due process rights,
fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection, and the delicate balance of state and federal authority along with the
separation of powers of the national government.
Frequently, the Court must also interpret recent or previously unexamined congressional legislation even when no
constitutional right is at issue. Indeed, one of the purposes suggested by those favoring a national court of appeals would
be that proposed court's focus on questions of federal statutory interpretation, freeing the Supreme Court to concentrate
more completely on constitutional adjudication. See Baker & McFarland, Commentary: The Need for a New National
Court, 100 IHav. L. REv. 1400 (1987). The Court also seeks to eliminate unacceptable conflicts of interpretation among
the circuit courts of appeals or between state and federal courts. See S. Ct. Rule 17.1. Most proposals for a national court
of appeals are advanced on the grounds that such court would reduce the Supreme Court's caseload in this area as well.
See Baker & McFarland, supra, at 1404-09. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1257 (1982) (providing for appellate
jurisdiction of Supreme Court when the constitutionality of a federal law is called into question).
33. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
34. On remand, the Third Circuit, as one might expect, took the hint from the Supreme Court and affirmed the
entry of summary judgment in favor of all Matsushita defendants. 807 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1955 (1987), but not without questioning the logic and candor of the Court's remand opinion. Said the Third Circuit:
We find [the Supreme Court's] suggestion [that the Circuit Court examine the record for direct evidence of a
conspiracy] somewhat confusing since the Supreme Court had the very same summary judgment record before
it that this court had considered, and does exercise the same plenary review of the propriety of the district court
summary judgment.
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Plaintiffs, a group of American consumer electronics manufacturers, brought
suit against a number of Japanese manufacturers of televisions, stereos, and other
electronic goods alleging that the Japanese companies had sold their products below
marginal cost in the United States consumer market in order to gain a dominant
position in the market and with the intent of driving the American manufacturers from
the consumer electronics business. Plaintiffs and their expert witnesses suggested that
the defendants were able to accomplish the alleged prolonged predatory pricing
because of profits they obtained in Japan through concerted action, backed by
government support, maintaining high prices in the Japanese market.
35
The case, popularly known as Japanese Electronics, began in 197436 and itself
could support a seminar in complex litigation practice. The case has occupied three
federal district judges, resulting in a myriad of reported district court opinions and
court orders.3 7 Following substantial discovery and pretrial practice, the trial court,
after finding inadmissible much of plaintiffs' proffered expert testimony in opposition
to defendants' motion for summary judgment,3 8 granted summary judgment on the
merits of plaintiffs' antitrust claims.3 9 The trial court's exclusion of expert evidence
that permitted entry of summary judgment was heavily criticized by some commen-
tators. 4o The appeals court reversed the trial court, holding that the district judge had
erroneously excluded much of plaintiffs' expert testimony in opposition to the
summary judgment motion by ruling that material relied upon by the expert was
inadmissible hearsay. Once the expert affidavits were of record, the Third Circuit
found a genuine dispute existed as to material facts at issue in the litigation, thereby
Id. at 46. The circuit court also implied that the Supreme Court had in effect overruled earlier evidentiary rulings or had
announced a new rule of law in conclusively holding that the Matsushita defendants had no motive to enter into the alleged
conspiracy. Id. at 47.
35. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
36. Id. at __ n.1, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1351 n.1 (1986).
37. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In re Japanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 388 F. Supp. 565 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1975). In one widely noted opinion, the Third Circuit
reversed a district court ruling that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial in the matter despite the complexity of the case.
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). Cf. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980), overruling In re United States Fmo. Sec. Litig. 75 F.R.D.
702 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (holding that complexity and length of case otherwise subject to seventh amendment right of jury
trial for actions at law do not give rise to due process concerns exempting case from scope of seventh amendment). Other
district court opinions of note examined the occasionally vexing evidentiary questions presented in the case. See Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (excluding as inadmissible large portions
of expert testimony offered by plaintiffs); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (excluding as inadmissible hearsay various government records and reports); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (excluding as inadmissible various business documents offered
pursuant to exceptions in hearsay rule). Many of these district court evidentiary rulings were overturned by the Third
Circuit during the course of its review of the summary judgment question, allowing these items to be admitted into the
record in opposition to the motion. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983).
38. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding much of
the material used in affidavits in opposition to summary judgment and deposition testimony by plaintiff's expert witnesses
to be inadmissible hearsay and not subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 703, permitting expert use of and presentation at
trial of data "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject"
even where it would not, standing alone, be admissible in evidence). The district court's evidentiary analysis and rulings
were strongly criticized in J. W~irs'u4 & M. BERGnR, Wm s's EvmrsrcE 702[02] (1983) [hereinafter WrEuNSTE &
BERGER].
39. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
40. See, e.g., WsrNa & BERGER, supra note 38.
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precluding summary judgment.4' The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the appeals court, remanding the case with a de facto death knell.42 If nothing else,
even a brief review of the history of Japanese Electronics illustrates the maxim that
"the opera ain't over until the fat lady sings." 43
As Justice Robert Jackson once said in describing the Supreme Court's work,
"we are not final because we are infallible but we are infallible only because we are
final.' 44 Having the last word on Matsushita, the Supreme Court delivered a sharply
divided five-four decision in which the majority ostensibly agreed with the Third
Circuit's evidentiary holdings but found summary judgment appropriate on the
evidentiary record before the Court because plaintiffs' theory of the case was
"implausible. "45 Specifically, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, found it
highly implausible as a matter of economic theory and business psychology that the
defendants would sell consumer electronics products below their marginal cost of
production for up to thirty years when these alleged practices had failed to drive
American competitors out of the market. To the majority, these were not the practices
of prudent businesspeople and therefore almost certainly could not have occurred.46
The Court then found the plaintiffs' proffered circumstantial evidence of predatory
pricing, including five expert reports, although admissible, to be insufficient to rebut
the majority's view of rational economic behavior. The Court therefore remanded the
case for further Third Circuit scrutiny in search of any such direct evidence to
overcome the Court's antitrust economic presumptions. 47
Justice White, writing for four dissenters, noted that the expert affidavits and
reports proffered by plaintiffs offered a seemingly plausible rationale for the alleged
extensive dumping by the defendants. 48 Plaintiffs' experts had stated that defendants
were capable of an extended effort to sell products below marginal cost in the United
41. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983).
42. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The Third Circuit affimed the trial
court's judgment as to all defendants. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 807 F.2d 44 (1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1955 (1987).
43. The "fat lady" saying, popularly seen as originating with former Washington Bullets coach Dick Motta's
description of his team's come from behind heroics in winning the 1979 National Basketball Association championship,
seems to have also found a parallel home as illustrating the possibility of eleventh hour litigation victory. See, e.g., HamR,
supra note 18, at § 22.1; D. LYNN, THE APpEUATE LmrAnON PRocsss vii (1985).
44. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
45. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, -, 106 S. Ct 1348, 1358-59, 1361
(1986) (finding "absence of any plausible motive to engage in" alleged antitrust violation).
46. Id. at _ , 106 S. Ct. at 1358-61, 1359 ("[t]he alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the two
decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist").
47. Id. at _ , 106 S. Ct. at 1355 ("issue in this case [is] whether respondents adduced sufficient evidence in
support of their theory to survive summary judgment") (emphasis added); id. at 1356 (if plaintiffs' claim is "implausible"
or "makes no economic sense" summary judgment appropriate); id. at 1359 ("alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its
ends in the two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist").
48. Id. at _ , 106 S.Ct. at 1362, 1364-66 (White, J., dissenting). The plaintiffs' expert affidavits were still
technically of record because the Third Circuit had ruled them admissible and the Court majority had not granted certiorari
as to this holding. The dissent found these affidavits, if credited, to pose a triable issue. For example, the report made
by plaintiffs' expert Dr. Horace J. DePodwin concluded that the defendants' collusive behavior in Japan eliminated
competition in that market and enabled them to expand exports into the United States, that "the American manufacturers
of television receivers would have made larger sales at higher prices in the absence of the Japanese cartel agreements,"
and that the expanded exports brought increased investment to the defendants, resulting in manufacturing plant
modernization and expansion.
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States because it was important to them to maintain and increase market share in
America and elsewhere in order to maintain plant capacity, overall economies of
scale, and the essentially guaranteed employment of its labor force. 49 Plaintiffs'
experts had stated that the defendants' sizable profits in Japan were obtained by
concerted action and were in effect used to subsidize extended predatory pricing in
the American market.5 0 With this evidence in the record, the dissenters argued, it was
logically impossible to declare plaintiffs' theory of the case too implausible to merit
at least a trial on the matter.5 1
B. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,52 the Court granted certiorari to review a
District of Columbia Circuit case granting partial, but denying complete, summary
judgment to media defendants sued for libel by the subjects of two articles. Plaintiffs
Willis Carto, a right-wing publisher, and Liberty Lobby, the organization he headed
that espoused similar right-wing views, were profiled in two articles by The
Investigator, a magazine published by well-known columnist Jack Anderson. The
two main articles were titled: "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey:
Profile of an American Hitler." They were introduced by a third, shorter piece,
"America's Neo-Nazi Underground: Did Mein Kampf Spawn Yockey's Imperium, a
Book Revived by Carto's Liberty Lobby?" In the words of the Supreme Court,
"[lthese articles portrayed the respondents as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and
fascist. 53
Predictably, Carto and Liberty Lobby were somewhat upset when these articles
appeared. They filed a libel suit against Anderson, The Investigator's parent
company, and its chief executive officer. Defendants moved for summary judgment,
which was granted by the district court, successfully persuading the court that the
undisputed factual record left no question that the defendants had acted with requisite
care in researching, developing, and writing the stories.5 4
The circuit court reversed in part on appeal, 55 finding a genuine dispute between
the parties as to whether The Investigator and its reporters had gathered information
in such a way as to preclude a jury determination that they had published some
statements about Carto and Liberty Lobby with "reckless disregard as to their truth
or falsity. "56 The opinion by Judge, now Justice, Antonin Scalia implied that some
49. Id. at _ _, 106 S.Ct. at 1364-66 (White, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. at ___, 106 S. Ct. at 1366-67 (White J., dissenting).
52. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
53. Id. at _ _, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2508 (1986).
54. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201 (D.D.C. 1983).
55. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
56. Because of the chilling first amendment implications of permitting libel plaintiffs to prevail merely because of
errors by the speaker, the Supreme Court has required for the past quarter-century that a defamation claimant who is a
public figure, to succeed, prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defamatory statements at issue were published
with defendant knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Few journalists would print or broadcast a statement they knew to be incorrect. Consequently, in defamation claims
against the media, the crucial issue usually devolves to whether defendant conduct resulting in publication of an incorrect
1988]
104 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:95
aspects of the defendants' methodology bordered on shoddy journalism. In particular,
the circuit court criticized one article's reliance on the work in progress of an
essentially unknown freelance reporter57 and the defendants' reliance on a previously
published article that had been the subject of a libel action. 58
In the Supreme Court, the journalistic craftwork of The Investigator was viewed
more favorably. Viewing the same record upon which the circuit court found room
for reasonable dispute as to the care with which defendants acted, the Court's
six-member majority found nothing actionable. The Court, however, did not rest its
reinstatement of the defendant's summary judgment on an asserted complete absence
of any fact dispute. Rather, the Court's approach and decision established two
significant changes in federal civil procedure. The first was the Court's pronounce-
ment on the question for which certiorari was granted-whether the standard of proof
required at trial must be considered by the court ruling on a summary judgment
motion.5 9 The Court held that the party opposing summary judgment must demon-
strate to the court the existence of a fact dispute that would support a verdict in its
favor applying the substantive standard of proof to be used at trial.60 In Liberty
Lobby, this meant that facts at issue must be such as to support a finding by "clear
and convincing evidence" that defendants had acted with malice since the clear and
convincing evidence standard, rather than the ordinary preponderance of the evidence
standard, was applicable to libel claimants.
The Court's second pronouncement addressed the factual showing required by a
nonmovant to avoid summary judgment. Prior to Liberty Lobby, the general rule and
practice of federal courts had been to deny summary judgment whenever the
respondent demonstrated, through matter that would be admissible at trial, the
existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.61 Ordinarily, this could mean either
that there was a nonfrivolous disagreement between the parties as to the fact (for
example, whether the traffic light was red or green) or that there was an important
defamatory statement was more than mere negligence or unavoidable accident but rose to the level of what the factfinder
deems clear reckless conduct. See e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (libel judgment upheld where
reporter's construction of pleadings and court decision as to grounds for divorce found inaccurate but not intentionally so);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (use of simple negligence standard in public figure libel claims would chill first
amendment by placing intolerable burden on press to guess as to what jury would construe as reasonable care); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (newspaper sued for publishing paid advertisement, not product of news or
editorial staff, that contained some inaccuracies).
57. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1578 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
58. Id.
59. A discussion of the wisdom of incorporating the substantive burden of proof at trial to summary judgment
proceedings is beyond the scope of this article; that portion of the Liberty Lobby opinion will not be criticized except as
it exacerbates the problems created elsewhere in the opinion. However, this part of the Liberty Lobby holding is not
without controversy. Compare id. at 1570 ("Imposing the increased proof requirement [of proof by clear and convincing
evidence] at this stage would change the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search for a minimum of facts
supporting the plaintiff's case to an evaluation of the weight of those facts and (it would seem) of the weight of at least
the defendant's uncontroverted facts as well.") with Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S.
Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986) ("where the First Amendment mandates a 'clear and convincing' standard, the trial judge in
disposing of a directed verdict motion should consider whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude, for example, that
the plaintiff had shown actual malice with convincing clarity.").
60. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).
61. See CouND, supra note 11, at 772-87; Wzmrr, supra note 17, at 663; W~narr, Maies & KANE, supra note 17,
at § 2712.
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uncontested fact or facts that could be interpreted by judge or jury in different ways
affecting the liability determination. 62
The Liberty Lobby Court held that a movant's evidence opposing a properly
made summary judgment motion must be more than merely possible or colorable.
Instead, the Court held that a movant's evidence must be of sufficient probative value
to withstand a directed verdict motion and support the verdict of a reasonable jury.
In dissent, Justice Brennan accused the majority of misreading earlier precedents
and changing the rule 56 standard and approach previously endorsed by the Court.
63
Like Justice Brennan's dissent, part IH(A) of this Article64 argues that the majority
opinion changed summary judgment in all cases, not only libel actions. Justice
Rehnquist and former Chief Justice Burger in a separate dissent criticized the majority
for granting preferential treatment to the press through a change in summary
judgment procedure applicable to libel suits.65
C. Celotex v. Catrett
In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,66 a decision handed down on the same day as
Liberty Lobby, the Court approved a grant of summary judgment for an asbestos
manufacturer whose motion contended that plaintiff, despite discovery, had entered
into the record no evidence that the decedent was exposed to defendant's asbestos
products. The district court in an unreported opinion had granted the summary
judgment motion. The District of Columbia Circuit reversed, 67 holding that it was
incumbent on a summary judgment movant such as Celotex to demonstrate
affirmatively that plaintiff's decedent was not exposed to Celotex asbestos. Taking
certiorari, the Supreme Court was virtually uniform in rejecting the circuit court's
legal analysis. The Supreme Court found no such requirement in rule 56 jurispru-
dence but divided rather sharply over the proper disposition of the case on its facts.
62. Federal Rule 56 speaks of a "genuine issue as to any material fact," a phrase that is often described in
shorthand as a genuine "dispute" of fact, implying that the movant must have one set of alleged facts and the nonmovant
at least one important but different alleged fact. However, a "genuine issue" also exists where the parties agree to the
facts but place a different interpretation upon them. For example, was the driver leaving the scene of an accident running
away, as the plaintiff suggests, or trying to get medical help, as he claims? Both sides agree to the "fact" that he was
driving down Main Street away from the accident but they disagree as to the proper interpretation and attendant legal
consequence of that conduct. The parties' disagreement is one as to what this article terms "fact interpretation" rather
than "fact existence." If, for example, the plaintiff claimed that defendant began to leave the scene and defendant
produced an affidavit from himself or a witness averring that he had never left the accident, this summary judgment issue
would focus on fact existence.
Although the major commentators and articles surveyed for this Article do not appear to use the fact interpretation/
fact existence nomenclature, it is a useful clarifying and organizing device not inconsistent with summary judgment
jurisprudence. See JA.s & HAZARD, supra note 11, at § 7. 10 ("the jury's function may extend to two kinds of questions:
(1) what were the happenings, occurrences, conduct of the parties-i.e., what the parties did and what the circumstances
were-and (2) the evaluation of these "facts" in terms of their legal consequences") (citation omitted). This Article terms
the former category questions of "fact existence" and refers to the latter category as questions of "fact interpretation."
63. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, , 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2515 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 99-121.
65. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, , 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2520 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
66. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
67. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, observed that Celotex's summary
judgment burden required only that it point out in the record the lack of any evidence
to support plaintiff's contention of decedent's exposure to Celotex asbestos. At that
juncture, plaintiff was required to highlight in the record or present by affidavit some
evidence of exposure. 68 Justice White, who provided the fifth vote for the majority,
concurred separately, taking pains to state that the Court's holding in Catrett did not
permit a summary judgment movant to shift the burden of production to the respondent
merely "with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his
case.'69
Justice Brennan, joined by former Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
dissented, 70 not so much disputing the majority's restatement of the law of summary
judgment as criticizing its application to the facts of the case. Specifically, these
dissenters found sufficient evidence in the record to create a genuine issue of material
fact that required a jury determination on the question of whether plaintiff's decedent
was exposed to Celotex asbestos. 7 1 Justice Stevens dissented separately, finding a
district court venue error in reading the record and concluding that the Court should
"affirm the [circuit court's] reversal of summary judgment on that narrow ground. "72
On remand, the Circuit Court, applying the Supreme Court methodology, again
reversed, finding plaintiff's submissions to have created a genuine issue of material
fact.73
That the Catrett case engendered a close and contested vote of the Court seems
surprising in light of the more far reaching but less divided Liberty Lobby decision.
All nine justices appeared to agree on the technical legal issue in Catrett-the
showings movant and nonmovant must make to satisfy the summary judgment
burdens of production. The Court's collective conclusion on this point seems not to
declare any substantial change in the law of summary judgment but rather clarifies
any ambiguity that might have existed in lower court cases.
D. The Trio as Trend
Amid the shifting votes and rationales of Matsushita, Liberty Lobby, and
Catrett, perhaps the major common thread is that the majority opinions read like an
ode to the wonders of summary judgment. 74 In Catrett, for example, Justice
Rehnquist wrote:
68. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, , 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986).
69. Id. at _ , 106 S. Ct. at 2555 (,Vhite, J., concurring).
70. Id. at _ _, 106 S. Ct. at 2556.
71. Id. at _ _,106 S. Ct. at 2559-60.
72. Id. at _ , 106 S. Ct. at 2560 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Note, Civil Procedure-Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett: Lessening the Moving Party's Burden for Summary Judgment, 17 MFa. ST. U.L. REV. 293, 316 (1987).
74. I borrow this apt characterization from Professor Vairo's discussion of the Catrett majority opinion in G. Vairo,
New Trends in Summary Judgment Practice [hereinafter Vairo] (paper in progress; copy on file with the Ohio State Law
Journal). I view this description as rightly applied to a collective reading of Matsushita, Liberty Lobby, and Catrett as
well. Accord Pierce, supra note 25, at 286-87.
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Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut,
but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed "to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." . . . Rule 56 must be
construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses
that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also
for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner
provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.
75
Courts viewing summary judgment motions in the aftermath of this trio of cases
have listened to their music, even if not pausing long enough to hear the words. The
essential message of the Supreme Court has been: "Loosen up. Forget old dictum too
solicitous of nonmovants. Court congestion is a problem. If trial courts start
aggressively granting summary judgment, we are reluctant to second-guess them as
might less-enlightened circuit panels." Taking the cue, district and circuit courts
have entered summary judgment in tough cases, 76 have declared their allegiance to
the Liberty Lobby dicta,77 and have invited litigants to make summary judgment
motions, suggesting that courts will usually grant them. 78 Although system-wide
empirical data is not readily available, it seems likely that the momentum of these
cases, particularly Liberty Lobby, is having an effect on federal court practice,
75. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, __ , 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986).
76. See, e.g., Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Liberty Lobby
for the proposition that summary judgment "mirrors" directed verdict and that a court must assess nonmovant's evidence
and inferences to determine whether they could persuade a reasonable jury); Lichtie v. U. S. Home Corp., 655 F. Supp.
1026, 1028 n.j (1. Utah 1987) (Liberty Lobby cited as court grants summary judgment in case hinging on motivation and
state of mind of defendant who discharged plaintiff; court finds insufficient evidence of self-interest to permit jury
consideration or support reasonable jury's verdict); New York v. Bowen, 655 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (partial
summary judgment granted for plaintiff challenging validity of state disability per se rles; court, citing Liberty Lobby,
evaluates state's expert medical testimony and documentation as insufficiently probative to support a reasonable jury's
verdict).
But see McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (taking narrow
reading of Liberty Lobby, court reverses summary judgment granted Science magazine for allegedly defamatory
statements about expert witness in Bendectin drug cases; "court simply has no warrant to dismiss a libel suit because it
doubts that a jury will ultimately return a verdict for the plaintiff"). The McBride court's holding seems impossible to
square with Liberty Lobby but for the possibly inadequate discovery opportunity afforded plaintiff, whose counsel
additionally appears not to have performed well. See id. at 1210-11. The article attacked by Dr. McBride had stated the
rate of his expert witnesses fees for Bendectin trials and those of other expert witnesses. McBride's claim was that these
juxtaposed figures made him appear a "hired gun" since his fees were substantially higher than the others set forth in the
article. Without belittling McBride's claim, one can safely say that these statements pale in comparison to the negative
impact of those at issue in Liberty Lobby. However, the latter were found conclusively not to have been made with
reckless disregard despite evidence of record of questionable editorial practices. The former were allowed to continue
toward trial despite apparent absence of any actions by the defendant that might give rise to an inference of reckless
disregard or knowing falsity.
77. See Childress, A New Era For Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183,
193-94 (1987) [hereinafter Childress]. See also Slaughter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 857, 861 (5th Cir. 1986);
Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 1986); Berg. v. First Am. Bank Shares, Inc., 796 F.2d 489, 497
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Richardson v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 595, 607 (D.D.C. 1986).
78. See Knight v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987); Pierce,
supra note 25.
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making summary judgment easier to obtain79 and involving trial judges in more
activities that look suspiciously like pretrial factfinding.
II. CRACKS IN THE MIRROR: THE COuRT's ERRORS OF HISTORY,
PRECEDENT, AND ANALYSIS
The Court's holdings and pro-summary judgment rhetoric were more than
information communicated to lower courts about the fine points of an existing rule.
Rather, the trio of cases convey a banner message from the Court to judges and
attomeys in the federal courts that a tougher summary judgment rule holds the key to
easing needlessly mounting pressure on federal court dockets.
Matsushita unwarrantedly strengthened summary judgment by expanding the
courts' authority to foreclose from the factfinder certain interpretations of facts and
to declare a plaintiff's theory of the case impossible as a matter of law. Liberty Lobby
equated summary judgment with directed verdict and suggested that judges may
assess the probative worth of competing evidence at either the summary judgment or
directed verdict stage of proceedings. The Catrett decision may have overlooked
important aspects of the case record in its zeal to see summary judgment entered as
well as extolled.
Matsushita and Liberty Lobby run counter to the intent and the language of rule
56, cut against prevailing federal court summary judgment practice from 1938 to
1986, change rule 56 practice sufficiently to amount to a rewriting of the rule without
following the amendment procedures set forth in the Rules Enabling Act, expand too
greatly the power of the bench at the expense of the jury, and will result in less
accurate adjudication by removing too many disputes from the probative crucible of
trial.
A. Re-Examining Matsushita and Liberty Lobby
1. An Analysis of Matsushita on Its Facts and Law
The different philosophies and practices of Japanese and American business
have received such widespread attention during the past fifteen years that many of the
facts supporting plaintiffs' contentions and those of the dissent seem at least as
plausible as the economic theory of the majority.80 Much has been made of the
79. See Childress, supra note 77, at 193; Pierce, supra note 25; Vairo, supra note 74; Project, Leading Cases, 100
I-Rv. L. Rav. 100, 250-58 (1986) (Liberty Lobby "likely to increase the frequency with which courts grant sum-
mary judgment"; Catrett and Liberty Lobby "should encourage courts to grant summary judgment more freely"). The
case report also analyzed Liberty Lobby as not restricted to defamation cases and viewed Liberty Lobby as moving the
summary judgment inquiry away from the need to characterize issues as "factual" or "legal" and toward a direct court
analysis of the worth of nonmovant's evidence. Id. at 256.
80. The rules of evidence provide that a federal court may take judicial notice of a fact if it is "one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable
of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FE. R. Evro.
201(b). While the many articles, studies, and anecdotes available concerning the different approaches of American and
Japanese business, see infra note 81, may not quite rise to the level of uncontestable fact fit for judicial notice, these
widely perceived facts at least suggest that the Matsushita plaintiffs' theory of the case and supporting expert opinion
should not be easily dismissed as implausible.
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longer term, multiple market view of Japanese business as contrasted to American
business practice. Equally noted in popular trade culture is the Japanese policy in
favor of lifetime employment and against layoffs as well as Japanese concern for
maintaining efficient, modem plant production, for achieving economies of scale,
and for focusing on expansion into new markets.$'
In spite of these differences, the Court rushed to apply an assumed American
motivational construct to the Japanese. The Court presumed that because American
businesses usually lack the patience and cooperation to engage in successful
predatory pricing, Japanese businesses must lack it too. The Court also freely
assumed that any general business community aversion to delayed profits was also
shared by the defendants. As to the question of whether the alleged dumping strategy
had achieved results, the majority opinion itself provides some plausibility for
plaintiffs' theory of the case. Plaintiff National Union Electric Corp. was a corporate
successor to Emerson Radio Co., which sold television sets until 1970, "when it
withdrew from the market after sustaining substantial losses." '8 2 On the record before
the Court, at least some diminution of the American manufacturing presence in the
small home electronics market had occurred. Although the majority opinion stressed
that plaintiffs Zenith and RCA were still the largest sellers of television sets in the
American market, it seemed unimpressed that the defendants' collective share of this
market rose from less than twenty percent to nearly fifty percent during the 1970s.8 3
In addition, the number of American firms manufacturing television sets declined
from nineteen to thirteen, a fact the majority dismissed as merely continuing "a trend
that began at least by 1960, when petitioners' sales in the United States market were
negligible. "84 Perhaps these changes were not the result of any illegal pricing activity
by the Japanese manufacturers. Perhaps no antitrust activity occurred. Nonetheless
the record of circumstantial and expert evidence before the Court seemingly required
a factfinder to decide the issue.
81. See, e.g., T. OZAWA, JA'AS's TECoAOICL CHAENGE To mE W= 1950-74: MOTIVAION AND Acco.mpmusxr
100-20 (1974) (Japanese merchants have inferiority complex toward West regarding industrialization, modernization,
business success and seek to overcome this by surpassing Western nations in industrial performance and marketing); Y.
Tsutmsoa, THE JAPANEsE ARE Co.MrIG 217-42 (1976) (Japanese businesses and workers have different relationships, bonds
of loyalty than American counterparts; Japanese merchant class has utilized variant of Samurai ideology of Japanese
feudalism to spur worker productivity, willingness to accept lower pay to achieve expanded business success to honor
Japan; business success equated with patriotism). A glimpse of the differing psychology at work in Japan is demonstrated
in the company anthem of Matsushita:
For the building of a new Japan
Let us put our strength and mind together
Doing our best to promote production
Sending out goods to the people - "5. world,
Endlessly and continuously
Like water gushing from, .... n.
Id. at 230. In addition to providing an almost humorous contrast to the American manufacturing plant (one cannot imagine
even gung-ho workforces like those of Texas Instruments lining up each day to sing a similar anthem), the Matsushita
theme song stresses production and export rather than profitability, an emphasis that seems intuitively distinct from the
American mindset. See also Marx, Book Review, 86 YA. L.J. 1509 (1977) (highlighting differences in American and
Japanese society regarding criminal law, entertainment, and social behavior).
82. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, , 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1351 (1986).
83. Id. at __ , 106 S. Ct. at 1358.
84. Id. at _ n.14, 106 S. Ct. at 1358 n.14.
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Instead of permitting a factfinder to determine the reasons for the decline in
American consumer electronics sales, the majority dismissed as unconvincing the
admitted evidence supporting plaintiffs. The Court said that only additional direct
evidence of a conspiracy would suffice to overcome the presumption in favor of
defendants created by the Court's economic and psychological theories. This view
runs counter to the general rule in litigation, both civil and criminal, that an element
necessary to a claim may be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence. 8 5 In
civil litigation, in which the claimant must make its showings by a preponderance of
the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, circumstantial evidence alone
frequently suffices to achieve a claimant's victory.8 6
The majority's assertion that plaintiffs' economic argument is highly implausible
also seems too much in light of the expert sources offered by plaintiffs to support their
contention of defendants' concerted activity and long-term commitment to market
acquisition through below cost pricing. For example, plaintiffs proffered the
economic expert reports of Dr. Horace J. DePodwin, Dean of the Graduate School of
Business Administration at Rutgers University,8 7 Kozo Yamamura, Professor of
Economics and Asian Studies at the University of Washington,88 Gary R.
Saxonhouse, Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan,8 9 and John 0.
Haley, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Washington. 90 All of these
experts expressed the view that plaintiffs' theory of the case was plausible in terms
of economic theory and Japanese business practices as reflected in documents
proffered by the plaintiffs. Professor Yamamura's report suggested that plaintiffs'
theory of the case could well describe the export marketing practices of many
Japanese industries. 91
The district court excluded most of this material as based on inadmissible
hearsay, irrelevant, or more prejudicial than probative. The circuit court reversed
these most crucial trial court evidentiary rulings. The Supreme Court majority simply
treated these experts' views as insufficient to disturb its preferred economic theories.
Of the approaches of the three courts, the Supreme Court's approach to the expert
submissions seems the least intellectually honest. Moreover, the Court's approach is
inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure in that when
faced with conflicting testimony and interpretation, the Court chose the interpretation
it preferred, often drawing that interpretation from scholarly writings not in the record
of the case. The Court thereby assessed the probative value of each side's evidence
in a manner not customarily viewed as appropriate in deciding a summary judgment
motion. If, for example, Justice Powell had sat on the tenure and promotion
85. A point may be proven at trial by either direct or circumstantial evidence. See J. MAGuS, J. VEINSTEIN, J.
CHrsAoUm4 & J. MANSFJEUD, CASES AND MATERUALS ON EvmmcE 867, 875, 882-84 (6th ed. 1973).
86. The use of circumstantial evidence to prove a claim is especially common in civil litigation where to obtain
relief, the claimant need ordinarily prove its case by a "preponderance of the evidence" rather than a more stringent
standard such as "clear and convincing evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt." See id. at 882-84.
87. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1334, 1362 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
88. Id. at 1364.
89. Id. at 1376.
90. Id. at 1378.
91. Id. at 1364-65.
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committees of Rutgers, Washington, or Michigan, he may well have been entitled to
conclude that the thoughts of DePodwin, Yamamura, Haley, and Saxonhouse were
unimpressive. As an appellate judge, he should not have been so quick to discredit
their views as "implausible."
In the main, Matsushita seems more an opinion restricting the use of antitrust
claims than an opinion on summary judgment. Summary judgment was merely the
vehicle by which the Court rid the judicial system of an antitrust claim disfavored by
five of the Court's members. As to summary judgment doctrine itself, the Court did
not make vast doctrinal pronouncements. The majority did, however, through its
application of rule 56, signal a changed perspective on the degree to which rule 56
permits a court to eliminate a claim because of the judge's view of human motivation.
The Supreme Court majority in Matsushita, in effect, stated that without direct
evidence a plaintiff alleging predatory pricing in violation of the antitrust law could
not possibly be entitled to relief in situations in which a majority of the reviewing
judges believed that the alleged predatory pricing could not have occurred without
achieving more tangible success. 92
92. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, -, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1359-60,
(1986) (Justice Powell delivers his view of economic reality: "The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the
two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist," and outlines a likely
chain of business behavior and list of things that must occur for predatory pricing to deliver economic reward to the
predators). Somewhat surprisingly, Justice Powell makes these assertions, so important to terminating the case, without
a single citation of authority or empirical evidence to support his view of economic reality.
To be sure, earlier in the opinion, Justice Powell cited extensively the writings of noted academics. Id. at
__ , 106 S. Ct. at 1357-59. In overwhelming degree, however, these authorities are all leading disciples of the
"Chicago School" (see Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. Rsv. 925 (1979)) of economics,
a group that largely proceeds from the premise that the very existence of most of American antitrust law is unwise. For
example, the Matsushita opinion cites as incontestable economic authority R. Bop., THE AsTrmeusr PARaox 145 (1978);
Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Hlv. L. Rev. 697,
699 (1975); Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1984); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies, 48 U. Cin. L. Rv. 263, 268 (1981); Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study,
4 A smesr L. & Eco.. Ray. 105 (1971); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J. L. & Eco.
137 (1958); and McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. L. & Ecos. 289, 295-97 (1980).
Although these authors and studies are all notable, they may not represent the mainstream of American economic
thought, and certainly do not represent the only stream of American economic thought. Some of these sources have been
persuasively criticized as simply being "wrong" in some of their major premises. See, e.g., Fox, The Politics of Law and
Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust As a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 564-65, 578 (1986) (arguing
that Judge Bork erred in characterizing the congressional intent behind Sherman and Clayton Acts as only encouraging
the most efficient production of goods and lowest prices to consumers in the aggregate); Orland, The Paradox in Bork's
Antitrust Paradox, 9 CARnozo L. REv. 115 (1987) (concluding that Judge Bork ignores or disregards congressional intent
of antitrust laws). Accord Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, in Awmusr Poucy u; TRAlsMoN: THE CovMeeDcE
oF Lw AD Eco.ioiias 56-57 (E. Fox & J. Halverson eds. 1984) (hereinafter A sren-ust Poucv] (other possible goals of
antitrust law include dispersed economic power, free and multiple choices by producers and consumers, equal
opportunity, equitable income distribution, and fairness, but these goals are usually accommodated through antitrust
interpretation that focuses on "effective competition which maximizes consumer welfare"); Pitofsky, The Political
Content ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. Rev. 1051 (1979) (arguing that antitrust laws were passed not only to minimize product
costs to consumers or to prompt efficient markets but also to prevent excessive concentrations of economic power, to
reduce chances of concentration requiring greater state involvement in the future, and "to enhance individual and business
freedom by reducing the range within which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of
all"); Spivack, The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of Monopoly Power: A Response, in Asemrusr
Poucy, supra, at 83, 85 (finding additional antitrust goals of fostering local ownership of business and lessened
inequalities in economic conditions).
In adopting the "Chicago School" approach of "efficiency and lowest price uber alles," the Court concluded that
defendants could not have engaged in the 20-year predatory pricing scheme because it was "economically irrational" in
that it forced defendants to incur a prolonged period of losses in the American market for only the hope of one day
recouping these losses through monopoly profits when its American competitors, such as plaintiffs, had been driven from
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Matsushita is disturbing as well in that it implicitly suggests that the economic
or social theories accepted by the Court majority, even if not based on facts of record
in the proceeding, can justify a court ruling for a summary judgment movant as a
matter of law when the dispute between the parties is one of fact rather than law. In
essence, the Court in Matsushita held that, as a matter of law, predatory pricing is so
rare and so unlikely when multiple firms are allegedly involved in a conspiracy over
an extended period of time that the defendants accused of such a scheme must prevail
as a matter of law unless the claimant has direct evidence of illegal activity.
Circumstantial evidence, even good circumstantial evidence, and expert opinion,
even good expert opinion, seem insufficient to defeat summary judgment under the
implicit rationale of the Matsushita majority.
The Anglo-American judicial system has long permitted courts to preclude the
possibility of some disfavored fact findings at trial by characterizing some items as
"matters of law" rather than "questions of fact" since the former were under the
control of judges and the latter subject to the occasional vagaries of juries.93 Although
the market. The Court looked only at the financial motives of the defendants in the American market, neglecting to
consider the possibility that defendants' worldwide rational economic motives could be served by expanded sales in the
United States, even at some loss per sale. The Court disregarded the significant possibility that the defendants could derive
a rational gain from increased penetration into the American market even if the losses of cost-cutting were never recouped.
See supra note 81.
Although many lawyers and economists would generally agree with the authorities cited by the Court for the
proposition that predatory pricing will rarely succeed and will seldom realistically threaten either consumers, competition,
or competitors, there are other voices in the debate far less skeptical of predatory pricing theories and case histories. See,
e.g., Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust, 13 J. L. & EcoN. 223 (1970) (in reviewing federal
government's successful action against Gunpowder Trust of the late 1800s, author is unable to conclusively refute
allegations of predatory pricing and, while agreeing with Professor McGee that predatory pricing cases should be a low
antitrust enforcement priority, finds it more of a threat than does McGee); Scherer, Book Review, 86 Y~ALE L.J. 974,
980-81 (1976) (reviewing R. PoSNER, ANmusT LAw: AN EcoNomac PE~stcnvE (1976)); Scherer, Predatory Pricing and
the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 -ARv. L. Ray. 869, 890 (1976); Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments,
15 J. L. & EcorN. 129 (1972) (suggesting that predatory pricing is not as unlikely as contended by Professor McGee and
citing the English shipping cartel for trade with China during the late 1800s as an example). See also Fox, Discovering
An Economic Consensus, in Amrrusr Poucy, supra, at 107, 108 (finding disagreement among both lawyers and
economists as to whether concentration is likely to produce collusive pricing and the likely stability of any such cartel).
Another failing of the Matsushita majority's economic analysis is its implicit view of the certainty of the predictions
and explanations proffered by an economic theory, even one as influential as that of the Chicago School. Many lawyers
and economists have questioned the infallibility of the predictive theories put forth by the Chicago School or any branch
of legal economic thought. See, e.g., L. Tnuuow, DANGERous Cusasr: Tim STATE OF EcoNoWcs (1983); Millstein,
Economics: Use and Misuse-A Response to Professor Areeda, in Armrmusr Poucv, supra, at 61. A further shortcoming
of the Matsushita opinion is its contribution to what former Yale Law School professor and antitrust expert Gordon
Spivack has termed "an increasing tendency for commentators, litigants, enforcement officials, and even some courts to
perceive antitrust law as a completely malleable set of rules whose content is governed principally by the decision-maker's
concept of the public good" rather than the criteria set forth by statute, rule, or case precedent. See Spivack, The Chicago
School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of Monopoly Power: A Response, in Armrrmusr Poucv, supra, at 83. Spivack,
writing in 1984, concluded that few courts had been lured onto the rocks of judicial activism by the siren song of the
Chicago School. Matsushita has now enshrined this ad hoe judicial policy-making approach to both antitrust and to
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by reinterpreting summary judgment in order to eliminate an
antitrust claim viewed as unlikely to succeed and a waste of judicial resources. In effect, the Court enshrined as
indisputable the frequently narrow perspective of an often controversial group of writers with whom many disagree. The
Court's conclusion that the alleged conspiracy was too implausible to merit trial is also belied by the view of seven
(Supreme Court dissenters White, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens plus Third Circuit Judges Gibbons and Seitz and
Second Circuit Judge Meskill) of the thirteen judges (district, now Third Circuit, Judge Becker and Justices Powell,
Burger, Rehnquist, Marshall, and O'Connor) considering the matter who concluded that trial was required.
93. Generally, the reasonableness or negligence of behavior is "construed as invoking the community standard of
what the reasonably prudent person would do in the circumstances, and the application of this standard is committed to
the community's representatives on the jury." JAws & HAzARD, supra note 11, at § 7.10 (citation omitted). This realm
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some "matters of law" had substantial factual components in that the behavior at
issue was subject to characterization as "negligent," "justifiable," and the like, they
were nonetheless committed to the bench because of the fear that juries would decide
these fact-based matters with too much sympathy or emotion and too little rationality.
Rather than openly acknowledge this, the system (i.e., a critical mass majority of
judges) concluded that some factual inferences were so unlikely that a jury's finding
of them would constitute a grave injustice. Consequently, juries were not permitted
to decide such issues, which were determined by the bench "as a matter of law." 9 4
In much the same vein, the Supreme Court majority in Matsushita, in effect,
stated that a plaintiff alleging predatory pricing in violation of antitrust law could not
possibly be entitled to relief in situations in which a majority of the reviewing judges
believed in economic theories that posited that the alleged predatory pricing could not
have occurred without achieving more tangible success. Having so decided, the
majority then declared plaintiffs' theory of the case implausible as a matter of law95
unless contradicted by direct evidence, essentially knowing that there was no such
evidence in the record to be discovered on remand.
of questions of fact finding, interpretation, and characterization establishes the boundaries of the "province of the jury."
The courts nonetheless place some outer limits on the fact finding, interpretation, and characterization of the jury. As
examples: the courts will not permit the jury to find that the sun rose in the west (fact finding contradicted by
overwhelming evidence or which court could take judicial notice), or that a reasonable pedestrian would not look at all
before crossing a busy street (such behavior, as a matter of law, is not permitted to be characterized as reasonable). See
id. at § 7.10.
94. See generally F. HARuER, F. J.mms, & 0. GRAY, 3 TmE LAw oF Toes § 15.1-15.4, at 339-68 (2d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter HAPE, JA. ms & GRAY]; W. PRossER, HANDSOOK FTil LAw OF Toms § 35, at 188-90 (4th ed. 1971); H.
Sne,,wm, F. JAm .s & 0. GRAY, CArsAN MAi oN TORTS (3d. ed. 1976).
Thus, in torts, the 19th century jury was often prohibited from rendering a verdict for an injured factory worker who
reached into moving machinery. The worker was found contributorily negligent as a matter of law and was thereby barred
from recovery. This result did not arise because there was really any "legal" issue about his actions; in actuality the
actions were laden with the possibility of differing factual evaluations. See HAER, JAMiEs & GRAY supra, at § 15.1-15.4.
However, some possible fact interpretations were deemed legally incognizable. The bench, socioeconomic cousins of
those who owned the mills, uniformly viewed the worker's conduct as more at fault than those who made the machinery
or managed the factory and declined to permit some juries to decide otherwise. See generally L. Fk.,tm, A HIsToRY OF
A.ucasN LAw 261-64, 409-27 (1973); M. HoRowrrz, THE TR&NsroRmAes oN OF k cAe LAw 94-99 (1977); Friedman, Civil
Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th Century, 1987 Am. B. FouND. Ran. J. 351,369-70. See also L. KAuAAN,
LanAL REAusm AT YALE 1927-60, at 24 (1986) [hereinafter KAmAt] (torts scholar Fleming James concluded that tort
doctrine of "last clear chance" was often used to deny recovery as a matter of law for plaintiffs who were contributorily
negligent). But see Schwartz, Tort Law & Economy in 19th Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YAIu L.J. 1717
(1981) (based on analysis of 19th Century California and New Hampshire cases, author disputes view that legal rules
changed to favor rising commerce, finds most courts submitted all issues of care to juries in actions at law).
Other commentators have labeled this dichotomy one of "historical fact" (e.g., was the light green?) and "legal
fact" (e.g., was the defendant negligent?). See Circumstantial Evidence, supra note 27, at 493-94; Schwarzer, supra note
19, at 226-28. This Article does not quarrel with the definitional construct of these authors but contests their view of the
freedom of courts to take questions of "legal fact" from the jury.
95. The Matsushita result underscores the essential accuracy of the observation that "[c]ourts [have not] shown any
inclination to fashion decisions which can serve as useful guidelines [as to differentiating questions of fact from law].
Mhe typical appellate opinion today does no more than label the question as one of law or of fact, perhaps citing some
authorities which are equally devoid of any more detailed consideration of the point." Weiner, The Civil Jury and the
Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAu'. L. Ray. 1867, 1867-68 (1966).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In light of the complex happenings at issue in Matsushita, the majority's
conclusion that no trial judge or jury could believe plaintiffs' explanation looks
suspiciously like the justices have made fact findings, a role traditionally forbidden
them under rule 56. This is not to say that courts are powerless to eliminate cases
based on distorted views of the world. Declaring some fact findings precluded "as a
matter of law" serves valid purposes. It is one thing, however, to grant summary
judgment against a plaintiff who claims that a jury should be permitted to find no
negligence in his driving 150 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone. It is quite another to decide
without benefit of trial that Japanese corporations possess the same patience (or lack
thereof) generally found in American companies and that despite their rising
consumer electronics market shares and expert opinion of concerted predatory pricing
activity plaintiffs' claims of predatory pricing are so implausible as to prevent even
the beginnings of trial testimony. 96
Indeed, the dissent correctly makes this very point:
[The majority states] "courts should not permit factfinders to infer conspiracies when
such inferences are implausible .... ." This language invites the trial judge to go beyond
the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the weight of the
evidence favors the plaintiff.... No doubt the Court prefers its own economic theorizing
to [plaintiffs' experts] but that is not a reason to deny the factfinder an opportunity to
consider [the expert's] views on how [defendants] alleged collusion harmed [plaintiffs] .97
In essence, the dissent viewed summary judgment as a judicial exercise to determine
whether the parties' versions of material fact conflicted, not a process of adjudicating
which side's version was more probable. 98
2. An Analysis of Liberty Lobby on Its Facts and Law
The District of Columbia Circuit's denial of complete summary judgment in
Liberty Lobby illustrates the classic application of what had been standard summary
judgment practice. Plaintiffs did not contest whether certain defendant conduct had
occurred; they argued that the conduct was of such a nature that the factfinder could,
in light of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, find these facts to
constitute actual malice-reckless disregard for the truth of negative statements about
plaintiffs-and that a jury trial was therefore required. The existence of the facts
96. According to one succinct and sensible definition, "questions admitting of only one answer are characterized
as questions of law," whereas matters capable of more than one legitimate or legally acceptable determination are
questions of fact. See Zuckerman, Law, Fact, or Justice?, 66 B.U.L. Ray. 487, 493 (1986). Although useful, this
distinction does not tell the whole story. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
97. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, -, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1363, 1365
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
98. In the Agent Orange cases, one apparently effective tactic in encouraging settlement of the class action was the
district court's suggestion that it was inclined to grant summary judgment or directed verdict for defendants based upon
an insufficient showing of a causal connection between exposure to dioxin and subsequent disease. The court subsequently
entered summary judgment against plaintiffs who opted out of the class action settlement. See In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); see generally Marcus, Book Review, 85 MlcH. L. Rav. 1267, 1275 (1987) (reviewing P. Suucx, AomEr ORm-nE ox
Tkust: MAss Toxic DisAsTms iN Tm Couprs (1986)). Some commentators have criticized the court's view of the weight of
plaintiff's circumstantial evidence as too strident and an incursion into the jury's sphere of decision making. See, e.g.,
Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factflinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U.L. REv. 521 (1986).
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themselves may not have been in dispute, but the interpretation of the facts was hotly
disputed. Recognizing this, the circuit court denied summary judgment. 99
The Supreme Court's approach was different and departed from the traditional
summary judgment methodology. To the majority, disputes over either fact existence
or fact interpretation were not "genuine" within the meaning of rule 56 and did not
require even initial trial proceedings unless "the evidence [in favor of the nonmovant]
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 100 In
other words, the judge must conclude that the fact subject to differing interpretation
or the fact subject to differing claims as to its existence would be resolved favorably
to the nonmovant and adequately support a verdict for the nonmovant. Prior to
Liberty Lobby, most courts confined their role to merely ascertaining whether the
record showed a nonfrivolous fact existence or fact interpretation dispute.' 0 1
The Supreme Court in Liberty Lobby evaluated what it felt was the probative
value of the facts under interpretative debate. The Court concluded that even the
glaringly bad journalistic practices that induced the circuit court to deny complete
summary judgment were not, in the majority's estimation, matters that a reasonable
jury could find to be clear and convincing evidence of reckless disregard.10 2 In other
words, the Court removed from the jury one of its traditional roles in litigation-to
interpret conduct and decide whether it was "reasonable," "negligent," "reckless,"
"intentional," "indifferent," "fraudulent," "knowingly false," and the myriad of
other fact interpretations that have traditionally been reserved to the jury pursuant to
the seventh amendment and traditional federal court practice. 0 3
The majority denied that it was permitting too much judicial intervention in the
fact-sifting process historically left to the jury. Justice White wrote:
[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence
and determine whether there is a genuine issue of trial.... Where is no issue for trial
unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict
for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted. 104
This passage alone illustrates the majority's internal contradictions and alteration
of the summary judgment rule. On one hand, the Court states that judges should not
weigh facts in the course of deciding summary judgment motions. A sentence later,
the Court states that ajudge must find "sufficient" evidence favoring the nonmovant
99. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1572-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
100. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 243, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 122-91. Typical of the traditional approach of denying summary judgment
when there are fact inferences to be made is Paul E. Hawkinson Co. v. Dennis, 166 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1948) (when
"conflicting inferences may be drawn ... the matter was not one for summary judgment").
102. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, -, 106-S. Ct. 2505, 2512-15 (1986).
103. See J'AS & HAzAso, supra note 11, at §§ 8.1-8.3; WraGr, supra note 17, at 605-18, 627-33 (historic role of
the jury under seventh amendment in cases at law was not only to determine what facts existed or were true but also to
interpret and characterize the actions of the parties pursuant to the applicable legal standard). Although the judge may,
for example, in an automobile accident case determine that a defendant was negligent as a matter of law (e.g., when the
driver admits doing 80 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. zone), the jury in these cases traditionally determines not only fact existence
but also fact interpretation issues of negligence, recklessness, causation, and the like.
104. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986) (citations omitted).
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before denying the motion and that only "significantly probative" evidence will
accomplish this. How, one may ask rhetorically, can the court determine whether the
nonmovant's evidence is sufficient or significantly probative unless the court weighs
the evidence? Making the determination more problematic is the Court's insistence
that the "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof be employed at the
summary judgment stage. The majority never attempts to answer this or other queries
raised in its decision. Indeed, the majority also equates the summary judgment
standard with that of the directed verdict, 05 further suggesting that the Supreme
Court has now invited trial courts to evaluate the worth of evidence, a function
previously reserved to the jury. As more fully discussed in part II(C), 106 the standards
for granting summary judgment and directed verdict had previously, been viewed as
distinct in important respects. In addition, the manner in which the Liberty Lobby
majority itself evaluated the worth of given facts in rendering the summary judgment
itself probably went beyond the discretion customarily accorded trial judges in ruling
on directed verdict motions. 107
Reading the circuit court and Supreme Court opinions in Liberty Lobby, one
wonders whether these are reports of the same libel suit and summary judgment
motion. The Supreme Court opinion makes no mention of the undisputed facts upon
which the court of appeals based its decision and that seemed, to the circuit court, of
sufficient weight that the factfinder might find reckless disregard for the truth and
hence actual malice under New York Times v. Sullivan. 0 8 The facts deemed im-
portant by the circuit court but unmentioned by the Supreme Court were not merely
conceded by the defendants, they were proffered by the defendants. 10 9
The circuit court specifically noted two primary areas of the case in which it saw
a jury issue. One was the author's reliance on a twelve-year-old article published in
True magazine that provided the Investigator piece with several statements alleged to
be defamatory. The True article was the subject of an earlier libel suit by plaintiffs
Carto and Liberty Lobby. According to the circuit court, "[t]he lawsuit ended with
a settlement under which True paid Carto a sum of money and published a favorable
article about Liberty Lobby.''10
To thicken the plot, one of the co-authors of the tainted True article was an editor
of The Investigator and was deemed by the circuit court likely to know about the
article's post-publication history."' The court of appeals held "that a jury could
reasonably conclude that defamatory statements based wholly on the True article
were made with actual malice" because of the prior defamation action likely known
105. Id. at , 106 S. Ct. at 2511 ("petitioners suggest, and we agree, that [the summary judgment] standard
mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)").
106. See infra text accompanying notes 314-28.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 323-28.
108. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
109. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1567 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (facts upon which D.C. Circuit
found sufficient evidence of actual malice were contained in defendants' affidavits and depositions submitted in support
of defendants' motions for summary judgment).
110. Id. at 1566.
111. Id.
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to the defendants. 112 Said the circuit court, "[w]hether the particular statements relied
on were false and whether the appellees were actually aware of that falsity are mat-
ters for a jury to determine.- 1 1 3
A second principal area in which the District of Columbia Circuit found facts
that a jury could find constituted subjective actual malice involved the author's
reliance, as detailed in his own affidavit in support of summary judgment, upon a
single phone conversation and a draft article by a freelance writer unknown to him. 114
The Investigator article in question was written largely by staff reporter Charles
Bermant. According to the court of appeals:
[One of Bermant's] major sources was Robert Eringer, a freelance journalist; several of the
allegedly defamatory statements were based solely on Eringer's claims. Bermant never met
Eringer and [Bermant's] deposition recounts only one telephone conversation with him.
Eringer sent Bermant a draft of an article containing some information about Liberty Lobby.
That draft has since been lost, probably "thrown away."... Eringer never identified any
of his sources to Bermant, nor did Bermant inquire. [Investigator editor Jack] Anderson
testified that it did not matter to him whether Eringer was reliable, for "[w]e did not intend
to use his material."" 5
The circuit court found, however, that at least five allegedly defamatory
statements contained in the article were "based solely upon the conversation with
Robert Eringer."11 6 The court concluded:
We find that a jury could reasonably conclude that Bermant made these allegations with a
disregard for their truth or falsity that constituted actual malice. For one thing, there is only
Bermant's word for the fact that Eringer ever said anything that supports these state-
ments .... Moreover, Bermant's dealings with Eringer display a much lesser degree of
care, despite the scurrilous allegations for which he [Eringer] is the sole source. Bermant not
only did not inquire how Eringer came to know these details of Carto's operation; he never
even looked the unknown Eringer in the eye until after the story was published, but spoke
to him only once over the telephone. Anderson admits that he did not care whether Eringer
was reliable. These actions came close to the hypothetical case of actual malice the Supreme
Court described in St. Amant [v. Thompson]: a story "based wholly on an unverified
anonymous telephone call." Eringer was identified by name, but he was in all other respects
unknown to the appellees. These allegations, which defendants claim were based solely on
Eringer's assertions, should have gone to the jury. 117
Despite then-Judge Scalia's obvious outrage over what he implicitly regards as
sloppy journalism, the point is well taken. A factfimder viewing the circumstantial
evidence of the Bermant-Eringer connection might well conclude that Bermant or
others for whom defendants were vicariously liable had a reckless disregard
concerning the truth of the Eringer-based statements used in the article. The circuit
court panel, which also included Circuit Judge Harry Edwards and District Judge
Stanley Harris, sitting by designation, went so far as to find the use of the Eringer
112. Id. at 1578.
113. Id..
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1567.
116. Id. at 1578.
117. Id. at 1578-79 (citations omitted).
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statements sufficient evidence that a "reasonable jury" could find actual malice and
render a plaintiff's verdict. 11 8 The circuit court's discussion is brief on this point, yet
it is not unlikely the circuit court saw the Eringer and True problems as sufficient to
defeat a directed verdict motion. "9 Since the court of appeals specifically refused to
incorporate the "clear and convincing" evidence burden of proof into the summary
judgment stage of trial,120 one wonders why the Supreme Court chose to reverse
completely the circuit court decision rather than remand for a determination of
whether the True and Eringer material would preclude summary judgment under the
test enunciated by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's willingness to scrutinize
the record and find remand inappropriate in Liberty Lobby is especially odd in light
of its choice of remand in Matsushita, a case in which the Court presumably "knew"
that plaintiffs' search for direct evidence of a conspiracy would be futile.
Overall, the Liberty Lobby circuit court opinion is a model of careful,
case-specific adjudication. It examines the alleged defamatory statements by cate-
gory, with special attention given to particular statements at issue in the motion.
Defendants obtained summary judgment from the court of appeals on the bulk of the
statements at issue. With precision, the circuit court detailed the statements for which
summary judgment was not justified on the record. More important, the panel was
sensitive to the record and the differing types and sources of the articles' statements.
The Supreme Court was not.' 2'
118. Id. at 1578.
119. The District of Columbia Circuit Court opinion can be read as employing at least that part of the Supreme
Court's Liberty Lobby opinion that equated summary judgment with directed verdict. If this is so, it would support those
who contend these two standards were always the same. However, this Article rejects that argument and finds the two
standards to be theoretically and practically distinct. See infra text accompanying notes 272-328.
Furthermore, even assuming the circuit court operated under the assumption that it was assessing whether the crucial
facts to be interpreted could support a reasonable jury's finding of malice, this only illustrates the infirmities of importing
directed verdict doctrine to the summnary judgment motion. The circuit panel clearly found the plaintiff's evidence worthy
of a reasonable jury's deliberation, as well might the three dissenting Supreme Court justices were they to have reached
that issue in their dissents. The six-member Supreme Court majority was so unimpressed that it would have granted a
directed verdict despite the evidence surrounding the True article and Eringer as sources.
If reasonable federal judges can split so strongly in their evaluation of the probative value of evidence, how can there
not exist an evidentiary dispute requiring jury consideration? The history of Liberty Lobby itself suggests that the Liberty
Lobby summary judgment standard enables courts to remove from juries matters quite legitimately at issue to reasonable
people.
120. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1575-78 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
121. The most charitable construction that can be placed upon the Liberty Lobby approach and result is one that
strains to isolate Liberty Lobby to only the defamation context-a hard task in light of the broad dicta of the majority
opinion. However, one defending the narrow view could argue that in Liberty Lobby, as in Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), the Court was faced with a mixed question of law and fact-
whether the defendant acted with "actual malice"-upon which the Court must make an independent determination in
order to protect the first amendment interests at stake.
So charged, the Liberty Lobby Court could have then argued that it had reviewed the record on the actual malice issue
and determined as a matter of fact evaluation, weighing, and interpretation that defendants could not be found by clear
and convincing evidence to have acted with actual malice. This approach may have been taken by the Court sub silentio.
However, the Court's opinion fails to acknowledge this and instead elects broad language favoring court evaluation and
characterization of proofs at the summary judgment stage while simultaneously protesting that it is not endorsing judicial
weighing of the evidence. At a minimum, the Liberty Lobby opinion seems to lack candor.
Even if Liberty Lobby had been open and explicit about its endorsement of pretrial fact finding and evaluation by the
judge, the opinion would nonetheless be subject to criticism as having made these determinations at too early a stage in
the proceedings and upon too inadequate a record. See infra text accompanying notes 386-408. In Bose Corp., for
example, the Court's re-evaluation of the factual issue came after a jury verdict and trial judge consideration of post-trial
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a. Reviewing the Precedents Employed by the Liberty Lobby Majority
To support its view that summary judgment and directed verdict had always been
as one, the Liberty Lobby majority relied upon a number of previous Supreme Court
cases.122 Yet as Justice Brennan observed in dissent, the majority's legal conclusions
appear to have "been reached without the benefit of any support in the case law." ' 23
His statement, like almost any other attempt at a black letter pronouncement about
summary judgment, goes too far. The majority's citations can be read, albeit in
strained fashion, as supporting its conclusions, but do not, if read as a whole and in
context, go nearly so far as the pronouncements in Liberty Lobby and the treatment
of the claim in Matsushita. At the minimum, the majority's support in the cited
precedent is less than compelling. Some of the cases cited by the majority were
actually directed verdict cases that are not directly on point to the summary judgment
inquiry. 124 Others have dicta taken out of context by the majority. 125 Others have
holdings and doctrinal pronouncements that are misstated if not twisted outright in the
majority opinion. 126 In addition, the majority inadequately distinguishes the prece-
dent it acknowledges is adverse to its holding. 127
The majority, for example, cites Dombrowski v. Eastland28 and First National
Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co. ' 29 as supporting the majority's conclusion that
the rule 56 nonmovant must not only set forth evidence of material fact conflicting
with that of the movant but also that this evidence must be "significantly probative"
to defeat a directed verdict motion and to support a trial verdict for the nonmovant.
A neutral reading of these cases produces no such conclusion.
Dombrowski in fact said and implied something quite different regarding
summary judgment than the Liberty Lobby majority. Dombrowski, a procedural
tangent of its better known decision concerning federal court injunctive power,1 30
motions, a much richer record upon which an appellate court can review fact or mixed questions of law and fact
determinations.
122. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (per curiam); Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S.
53, 62 (1949); Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944); Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476 (1943);
Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1872). However, Brady, Wilkerson, and Munson were directed
verdict cases, not summary judgment cases (in fairness, the Court majority does not suggest they are summary judgment
cases but uses them to detail the directed verdict standard) and they discuss only directed verdict doctrine with no mention
of summary judgment. Far from buttressing the majority's conclusion equating rules 50 and 56, the absence of any
mention of summary judgment in these three directed verdict decisions should lead one to believe that the courts rendering
them saw no such intertwinement.
123. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, __ , 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2516 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
124. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949); Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944); Brady
v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476 (1943); Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1872).
125. See First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968); Dombrowski v. Eastand, 387 U.S.
82 (1967) (per curiam); Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944).
126. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (per curiam); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368
U.S. 464 (1962); Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944).
127. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464
(1962). These cases are generally seen as "high water marks" of Supreme Court jurisprudence taking a restrained
approach to summary judgment. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 154-59, 183-91 and accompanying text.
128. 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
129. 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
130. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 Ymat L.J. 1103 (1977).
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reversed a lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the chairman and
counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
The lower courts had found these defendants immune from damages resulting from
the arrests and searches challenged by the plaintiffs, political activists.' 3' The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the plaintiffs had raised a factual contention that
the counsel had collaborated with the group that actually conducted the arrest, search,
and seizure of records.' 32 Paying deference to the "factual refinement which can
occur only as a result of trial,' ' 3 3 the Court reversed the summary judgment as to the
subcommittee counsel, finding that plaintiffs' contentions, if proved at trial, would
make legislative immunity inappropriate for the counsel.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not discuss in detail the nonmovant's
evidence of collaboration and hardly treated it as compelling, taking pains to
distinguish the showing necessary to avoid summary judgment with that required to
defeat a directed verdict. Said the Court:
There is controverted evidence in the record, such as the date appearing on certain
documents which respondents' evidence disputes as a typographical error, which affords
more than merely colorable substance to petitioners' assertions as to respondent [committee
counsel]. We make no comment as to whether this evidence standing alone would be
sufficient to support a verdict in petitioners' favor against respondent [committee counsel],
or would require a verdict in his favor. But we believe that, as against an employee of the
committee, this showing is sufficient to entitle petitioners to go to trial.'a-
The Court, however, did affirm the grant of summary judgment as to committee
chairman Senator Eastland, finding that "[t]he record does not contain evidence of
his involvement in any activity that could result in liability."' 135 Dombrowski cannot
fairly be read not as equating summary judgment and directed verdict but as
distinguishing them. The Dombrowski Court's view was that evidence that is more
than merely colorable will withstand summary judgment but that this threshold
probably falls below the directed verdict standard requiring nonmovant evidence
sufficient to support a reasonable jury's verdict.
Cities Service was an antitrust suit 36 brought by an independent crude oil seller
and continued by the executor of his estate 37 against several oil companies alleging
a conspiracy against him in his efforts to sell Iranian oil in the United States. The
American oil operations in Iran had been nationalized in 1951 by the new government
of Premier Mossadegh, who was later deposed by the return of the Shah of Iran. The
131. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 83-84 (1967).




136. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1969). Commentators cite Cities Service for the
proposition that affidavits opposing summary judgment must have at least some probative value. See, e.g., Hmrr, supra
note 18, at § 16.1.5; Wiain-r, MruE & KImn, supra note 17, at § 2738. This suggests that a nonfrivolous fact conflict
will avoid summary judgment, and that the nonmovant's facts need not be as "substantial" as generally required to
withstand a directed verdict motion. See infra text accompanying notes 272-328.
137. Plaintiff Gerald B. Waldron, the oil seller, filed his complaint in 1956 and died in 1964 prior to the Court's
decision in Cities Service. The executor of his estate, the First National Bank of Arizona, was substituted as plaintiff. First
Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 259 n.1 (1968).
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American companies owning these operations objected to Iran's failure to compen-
sate them for this seizure and loss of property. According to plaintiff and others 138
these companies sought along with others to boycott American purchase of Iranian oil
until they were adequately compensated. Defendant Cities Service, one of the smaller
"major" oil companies, was alleged not to be an architect of this boycott but rather
a participant that at first was interested in buying Iranian oil to which plaintiff held
the rights but then backed off as a result of its decision to cooperate with the alleged
boycott.
Cities Service moved for summary judgment introducing evidence that it elected
to purchase oil from other sources, principally Kuwait, due to the fruit of
long-standing negotiations that predated its discussions with plaintiff. One Cities
Service official also testified that the company had actively resisted the boycott and
gone so far as to seek Justice Department intervention against the boycott. 139 In
response, plaintiff's primary evidence was the showing of the boycott, some
ambiguous documents that could perhaps be read as running counter to the company's
testimony, and the contention that since plaintiff's oil was offered at an attractive
market price, and defendant initially showed interest but then withdrew, a jury could
infer from this circumstantial evidence that Cities Service lost interest in plaintiff's
oil because of its cooperation with the antitrust conspiracy. 140
The Court found this matter insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
precluding summary judgment. 141 In so holding, the Cities Service Court provided
some useful rhetoric for the Liberty Lobby majority. A reading of Cities Service in
light of the peculiar facts of the case, however, suggests that even Cities Service, the
Court's pre-Liberty Lobby high water mark of aggressive summary judgment
doctrine, did not go so far as Liberty Lobby. In Cities Service, the Court described in
detail the slow, tortuous path of the litigation that had consumed more than eleven
years. 142 It also implied that plaintiff's counsel had been less than diligent in
prosecuting the matter; 143 the obvious inference was that plaintiffs lackadaisical
counsel had kept a very weak case alive in hopes of obtaining a favorable settlement
from a well-heeled corporate defendant.
As to the quality of the evidence actually of record, the Cities Service Court,
although using language invoking the occasionally fact-evaluative task of the directed
verdict, seemed to have concluded that plaintiff's evidence of a conspiracy was not
even colorable within the meaning of Dombrowski and other Court summary
judgment precedents such as Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System. 144 To be sure,
Cities Service gives comfort to the Liberty Lobby majority with language stating that
138. The United States Justice Department had commenced an antitrust action against the alleged major organizers
of the alleged conspiracy, a group ofoil companies that did not include Cities Service. See also id. at 258-62 (setting forth
the complex facts of this case).
139. Id. at 267.
140. Id. at 260-61.
141. Id. at 299.
142. Id. at 258-62.
143. Id. at 264-68.
144. 368 U.S. 464 (1962). For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 183-91.
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what is required for a nonmovant to avoid summary judgment is that "sufficient
evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 145 Even this language,
however, which can be read as suggesting some significant trial judge authority to
evaluate the probative force of nonmovant's facts, does not suggest that the
nonmovant's facts must be so strong that they would support a reasonable jury's
verdict. Cities Service said only that the nonmovant must show facts in sufficient
conflict to begin a jury trial.
The opinion can as easily be read as suggesting that even evidence seen as weak
by the judge would create such a conflict. For example, other portions of the opinion
state that the plaintiff had exhibited a "total failure ... to produce any evidence
tending to show Cities' participation in a conspiracy to boycott him," 1'46 that plaintiff
was "unable to point to any benefits to be obtained by Cities from refusing to deal
with him," 147 and that plaintiff was not entitled to a "full-dress trial" in "the
absence of any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint."143
Those who wish to read Cities Service as did the Liberty Lobby majority may likewise
point to portions of Cities Service that refer to the degree of persuasiveness of
nonmovant's evidence and whether the inferences sought by nonmovant are logical
and plausible. 149
Cities Service, then, has something for everybody in the summary judgment
debate. On the whole, though, the opinion does not give sufficient support to the
Liberty Lobby majority. Cities Service did not overrule Poller v. Columbia Broad-
,casting System, an opinion that decidedly did not equate rule 56 and rule 50.150 Cities
Service was itself a five-three decision and must be considered close in light of Justice
Douglas' absence and the vigorous dissent by his frequent allies, Justices Black,
Brennan, and Chief Justice Warren. Although not directly attacking the majority's
dicta on summary judgment doctrine, the dissent pointed to other aspects of the trial
record and argued essentially that the Court had overlooked meaningful factual
conflicts and the absence of discovery to defer to the trial judge while eliminating a
long and complex antitrust trial. 15 1
If hard cases make bad law, they also perhaps make poor precedent. The Cities
Service case is generally treated by commentators not as an extension of summary
judgment doctrine but rather as a statement limiting the dicta in Poller .152 As to the
quantum of evidence required by a nonmovant to avoid summary judgment, Cities
Service is generally treated by the commentators as standing for the proposition that
145. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968).
146. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 288-89.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 183-91.
151. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co. 391 U.S. 253, 300-04 (1968).
152. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. Tutnm, Amrmusr LAw § 316, at 58-65 (1978); WiouGr, MuiER & KaNE, supra note 17,
at § 2732.1 ; Sonenshein, supra note 18, at 791-92; (suggesting that Cities Service was primarily an effort to limit Poller
from discouraging too much the use of summary judgment in antitrust cases).
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a nonmovant's affidavits or other facts must have at least some modicum of probative
value, but not that the probative force must be sufficient to resist a directed verdict
motion or that the judge may assess the persuasiveness of the nonmovant's
evidence. 153
In addition, the Liberty Lobby majority cited Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 154
along with Dombrowski and Cities Service, as supporting its view of summary
judgment as congruent with the directed verdict. A fair reading cannot stretch Adickes
so far. Adickes was an action brought by an Alabama teacher under 42 U.S.C. section
1983 alleging that her groundless arrest on charges of vagrancy upon leaving a
segregated lunch counter after being refused service when in the company of her
black students resulted from a conspiracy between store management and the
police. ' 55 The district court granted defendants' summary judgment motion based on
affidavits from the arresting officer and store manager denying the existence of a
conspiracy. Plaintiff had presented in opposition to the motion an affidavit stating that
the policeman was in the store prior to the arrest and had opportunity to confer with
store management. 156 Plaintiff argued that this presented sufficient evidence from
which a jury could infer concerted action and conspiracy. The Fifth Circuit disagreed,
affirming the grant of summary judgment.' 57 The Supreme Court, however, found
plaintiff's argument persuasive and reversed the summary judgment. 158
The facts of the case were not so much in dispute as they were capable of
multiple interpretations. In essence, the Court concluded that picking the "correct"
interpretation was the jury's job. From the facts and law of Adickes, one is hard
pressed to see how this case, which vested substantial fact interpreting power in the
jury, supports the Liberty Lobby (and Matsushita) majority view that a judge may
decide rule 56 motions by rejecting certain fact interpretations as insufficiently
probative or by finding certain facts favoring the nonmovant insufficient in magnitude
to overcome the movant's evidence.' 5 9
The Liberty Lobby Court then cited several cases as to the standard for deciding
directed verdict motions. 60 The majority took no liberties with those cases.
153. See HERR, supra note 18, § 16.1.5, at 350 (Cities Service cited for proposition that affidavits opposing summary
judgment must have at least some probative value and must be admissible in evidence, but not reading Cities Service as
permitting a court to compare probative value of nonmovant's evidence with that of movant); Wiauon, MeLE & KANE,
supra note 17, at § 2738.
154. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505,
2510-11 (1986).
155. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 146-49 (1970).
156. Id. at 153.
157. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 409 F.2d 121 (25th Cir. 1968).
158. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 161 (1970).
159. From the case reports, it appears that Adickes' strongest evidence of a conspiracy to deprive her of her civil
rights was the presence of a police officer in the store and the chance that the officer and the store manager may have
collaborsted. Adickes avoided summary judgment in 1970. In 1986, plaintiff Liberty Lobby detailed several concrete
items of admissible evidence showing that some of the defamatory comments in the challenged articles came from what
a reasonable person might regard as suspect sources. See supra text accompanying notes 110-21. Liberty Lobby, of
course, lost the case on summary judgment. Unless one accepts the view that the plaintiffs' identities affected the results
(i.e., civil rights-oriented teachers win and right-wing organizations lose), the disparity of the records and results shows
how much the Court's attitude toward summary judgment has changed in 16 years.
160. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511-12 (1986) (citing Brady v.
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Nonetheless, it seems odd for the Court to have devoted so much discussion to
directed verdict jurisprudence when it was faced with a summary judgment motion in
the instant case. If, as the majority asserted, the standards governing the directed
verdict and summary judgment motions are really (and always have been) the same,
one may legitimately ask why the majority did not cite any bona fide summary
judgment cases enunciating the "evidence sufficient that a reasonable jury could so
find" standard. The short answer is that the Court had no such summary judgment
cases to cite. Only directed verdict cases were available for the task because only in
directed verdict cases was the "what a reasonable jury could find" standard
employed. Prior to Liberty Lobby, this analysis did not figure prominently in
summary judgment jurisprudence.
The closest such precedent cited by the Liberty Lobby majority was a footnote
in a little known case, Bill Johnson's Restaurant v. NLRB,161 which the majority cited
as suggesting that the primary differences between summary judgment and directed
verdict were the times at which they are ordinarily made and the type of evidence
upon which they are made. 162 This statement itself suggests significant differences
between the two motions in that one is usually based on documentary evidence and
the other upon testimonial or other trial evidence. While the Liberty Lobby majority
Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943); Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 62 (1949); and Improvement Co. v.
Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1872)). None of these cases involved review of a grant of summary judgment. None
of them offer any legal argument affirming the Liberty Lobby majority. Furthermore, a persuasive case can be made that
Brady was wrongly decided and that Wilkerson argues against the result in Liberty Lobby and Matsushita.
The basic legal standard for the directed verdict in Brady is well-known. The Court stated that a directed verdict is
proper "[w]hen the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can be but one reasonable
conclusion as to the verdict." Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479 (1943). On the merits, however, Brady was
a judgment n.o.v. case, reversing a jury's finding for the plaintiff and against defendant railroad for negligence. As
demonstrated by Justice Black, writing for four dissenters, the Court clearly determined credibility issues in a manner
adverse both to the claimant and to the jury's finding by disregarding plaintiff's expert testimony concerning negligence.
Indeed, the Court made its own determination as to the proximate cause of plaintiff's death, disregarding as well
plaintiff's fact witnesses about common railroad activity. Id. at 485-89.
In Wilkerson, the Court, this time with Justice Black writing the majority opinion, reversed a directed verdict in favor
of the defendant railroad because the directed verdict was granted in the face of conflicting evidence that might justify
either a plaintiff's or defense verdict. The Wilkerson Court adopted a view contrary to Matsushita and Liberty Lobby,
stating that "[i]t is the established rule that in passing upon whether there is sufficient evidence to submit an issue to the
jury we need look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to support the case of a litigant against whom
a peremptory instruction has been given." Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949). There were no dissents,
although the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter could be mad as stopping short of the sweeping pro-jury thrust of
Justice Black's opinion. However, Justice Douglas' concurrence, joined by Justices Murphy and Rutledge, all dissenters
in Brady, can be mad as going further than the majority in its distaste for aggressive directed verdict doctrine. Justice
Douglas noted with apparent approval the Court's use of certiorari grants to curb excessive court zeal in taking FELA
cases from the jury. Id. at 69-70 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Munson set forth the well-known dictum, quoted at length in Liberty Lobby (see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)), that a judge was not required to submit a question to the jury
merely because there was some scintilla of evidence in claimant's favor but that there must be sufficient evidence favoring
claimant to support a reasonable jury's verdict. Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1872). Other
than its historical role as marking the Court's transition from the "scintilla" rule to the "substantial evidence" rule for
directed verdicts, Munson has little to offer the modem debate over summary judgment.
The Liberty Lobby Court also cited Pennsylvania Ry. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933); Coughran v. Begelow,
164 U.S. 301 (1896); and Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116 (1875), all directed verdict cases, as supporting its
contention that the summary judgment and directed verdict standards were equivalent. None of these cases supports the
assertion of the Liberty Lobby Court.
161. 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.ll (1983).
162. Id. at 745-46 nn.ll-12.
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treated the distinctions as trivial, trial lawyers and judges appreciate the difference. 63
In addition, Bill Johnson's characterized the rule 56 and rule 50(a) standards as "very
close" 164 but it did not equate them as did the Liberty Lobby Court. To the extent that
the Bill Johnson's footnote overlooked the judge's inability to weigh credibility of
witnesses or the probative value of facts at the summary judgment stage of trial, it
was in error.
The Liberty Lobby majority also cited dicta from Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas
Corp.,165 to the effect that "summary judgment should be granted where the evidence
163. As discussed in section 11(D), see infra text accompanying notes 386-408, the quality of documentary and
testimonial proof is quite different and the later timing of the directed verdict motion provides a much richer data base
upon which a court can base its decision. Claims that look weak on paper or seem counterintuitive when first pleaded can
begin to look compelling when established by real witnesses just as seemingly plausible defenses can crumble under trial
cross-examination.
164. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.l1 (1983). The Bill Johnson's Court also
proclaimed that "[iln the civil context, most courts treat the two [directed verdict and summary judgment] standards
identically, although some have found slight differences." Id. (citing WRarmrr, Mains & KANE, supra note 17, at §§ 2532,
2713.1 and J. MooRE & J. LucAs, Moos's FEoRA. PRAcnc 50.0314], 56.04[2] (1982) [hereinafter MooRE]). This
statement is at best only half correct. As discussed in section II(C), see infra text accompanying notes 272-313,
commentators such as Wright, Miller, & Kane and Moore had noted the theoretical similarities between directed verdict
and summary judgment but had also noted significant practical differences in the way courts decide the motion. Neither
of the sources cited in the Bill Johnson's footnote states or even intimates that "most courts" equate the two standards.
On the contrary, both of these commentators can be more fairly read as suggesting that most courts treat summary
judgment and directed verdict dissimilarly.
Read as a whole, Bill Johnson's gives little real support to the Liberty Lobby majority and can be easily read as
antithetical to the Liberty Lobby holding. Bill Johnson's involved a labor dispute in which a waitress who had filed an
unfair labor practice claim and picketed against a restaurant claimed that the restaurant's subsequent suit against her for
defamation was retaliatory and baseless. She sought National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) intervention and protection
against the suit. After a hearing, an NLRB administrative law judge (AL) examining the evidence in support of the
employer's claim found the claim baseless and enjoined the employer from further prosecution. According to the Court:
The ALI reached his conclusion that petitioner's state suit lacked a reasonable basis "on the basis of the record
and from [his] observation of the witnesses, including their demeanor, and upon the extensive briefs of the
parties." In the view of the AL, the "evidence fail[ed] to support" the [employer's] complaint's allegations
that the picketers clogged the sidewalks, harassed customers, or blocked entrances and exits to the restaurant.
The libel count was deemed baseless because "the evidence establisheld] the truthfulness" of everything stated
in the leaflet.
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 736 (1983) (citations omitted).
The NLRB adopted these findings with minor exceptions and enjoined the employer's suit. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the Board's order. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1981). The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the order, finding that the AL and the NLRB had conducted too searching an inquiry into
the merits of the employer's lawsuit. Rather, the Court stated that the Board's role in determining whether such litigation
was sufficiently "baseless" to warrant injunction was akin to a trial court's approach in deciding a motion for summary
judgment.
Specifically, the Board should not deem an action baseless "if there is a genuine issue of material fact that turns on
the credibility of witnesses or on the proper inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts. ... Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744-45 (1983). To go beyond this inquiry would, according to the Bill
Johnson's Court, "usurp the traditional factfinding function of the state-court jury orjudge." Id. at 745 (citation omitted).
In other words, the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson's, although equating the summary judgment and directed verdict
standards in dicta, displayed an understanding of "genuine issue of material fact" quite a bit more restrictive than that
shown in Matsushita and Liberty Lobby.
To the Bill Johnson's Court, a tribunal applying the rule 56 standard could not evaluate the facts in conflict, could
not pass on witness credibility, and could not deem a requested inference or theory of the case "foreclosed as a matter
of law" or "otherwise frivolous" if "there is any realistic chance that the plaintiff's legal theory might be adopted." Id.
at 746-47. Applying this standard, could one really conclude with such certainty that there was no realistic chance that
a factfinder would find a long-term conspiracy in Matsushita or view some of the Liberty Lobby defendant's actions as
displaying reckless disregard for the truth of the articles in question? I think not, and the Bill Johnson's Court's elaboration
suggests it thought not as well. See id. at 746 n.12.
165. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986) (quoting Sartor v.
Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 624 (1944)).
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is such that it 'would require a directed verdict for the moving party."' 166 Although
this statement standing alone provides aid and comfort to the Liberty Lobby majority,
the Sartor case as a whole contradicts the Court's approach in Liberty Lobby. Sartor
involved a mineral lessor's claim that the lessee had underpaid him royalties due for
the extraction of natural gas from his property. Whether the plaintiff had received the
proper royalty amounts turned on the issue of the correct wellhead price for natural
gas at the time it was extracted from plaintiff's property. 167 The case had an unusual
procedural history. After the initial claim, a jury trial verdict for plaintiff found the
wellhead price for the time in question to be four and one-half cents per thousand
cubic feet rather than the three cents per thousand upon which defendant had paid
plaintiff. 168 The resulting judgment for plaintiff was reversed in part by the circuit
court on statute of limitations grounds and the case remanded for a determination of
wellhead price for a redefined time period.
On remand, the defendant moved for summary judgment that the wellhead price
as established by a defined market did not exceed three cents per thousand cubic feet
during the time in question. The motion was supported by affidavits of eight persons,
all either employees of the defendant or employees of other natural gas companies
with similar interests to those of the defendant company. These same affiants had
testified, apparently unpersuasively, in the preceding trial. Defendant also proffered
documents from the Federal Bureau of Mines that showed the lower market wellhead
price for the state as a whole and also produced other contracts suggesting the lower
wellhead price. 169 From the case reports, it appears that the plaintiff offered in
rebuttal of the motion only the affidavit of its attorney, contending that the jury could
infer a higher wellhead price from the contracts in question and other circumstances.
The trial court granted summary judgment, 170 which was affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit, 17 1 on the ground that, as a matter of law, the market wellhead price would
control if it was established that a market price existed. The district and circuit courts
found no dispute in the record that a market price existed and that the market price
never exceeded three cents per thousand cubic feet during the time in question. The
Supreme Court reversed.
Aside from the lawyer's affidavit, it appears from the case reports that plaintiff
submitted next to nothing in opposition but rather rested upon pointing out the
interested character of defendant's affiants and the portions of the earlier trial record
in which plaintiff's "evidence," whatever it may have been, was sufficient to
convince a jury of the higher wellhead price. From the descriptions in the case
reports, the admissible evidence favoring the nonmovant in Sartor seems less than
that supporting the nonmovants in Matsushita and Liberty Lobby. Nonetheless, the
Sartor Court, which supposedly was employing the approach of the Liberty Lobby
majority, found nonmovant's contentions sufficient to avoid summary judgment. The
166. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 621 (1944).
167. Id. at 621-23.
168. Id. at 624-26.
169. Id.
170. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 46 F. Supp. 111 ''.D. La. 1942).
171. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 134 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1943).
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Sartor Court, in an approach similar to that of the Adickes Court, placed considerable
emphasis on the interested status of the movant's affiants 172 and the need for trial
proceedings to allow an informed decision of whether these interested affiants were
telling the truth. 173 Said the Court:
There are many things sometimes in the conduct of a witness upon the stand, and sometimes
in the mode in which his answers are drawn from him through the questioning of counsel,
by which a jury are [sic] to be guided in determining the weight and credibility of his
testimony. That part of every case, such as the one at bar, belongs to the jury, who are
presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of men
and the ways of men; and, so long as we have jury trials, they should not be disturbed in their
possession of it, except in a case of manifest and extreme abuse of their function.
It may well be that the weight of the evidence would be found in a trial to be with defendant.
But it may not withdraw these witnesses from cross-examination, the best method yet
devised for testing trustworthiness of testimony. And their credibility and the weight to be
given to their opinions is to be determined, after trial, in the regular manner.174
The Sartor Court cited a string of earlier Supreme Court cases to the effect that
affidavit "opinions thus offered, even if entitled to some weight, have no such
conclusive force that there is error of law in refusing to follow them. This is true of
opinion evidence generally, whether addressed to a jury . ..or a judge. . . or a
statutory board." 175 The Court also approvingly quoted earlier language that "if the
court admits the testimony, then it is for the jury to decide whether any, and if any
what, weight is to be given to the testimony."' 176
The Sartor dissenters, Chief Justice Stone and Justice Reed, did not dispute the
majority's solicitude for the jury or its general summary judgment analysis. Instead,
they viewed the record quite differently, as revealing no evidence of damages
favorable to the plaintiff. 177 The dissent also took a different view of movant's
evidence, finding only some of it to be sufficiently interested to be disbelieved by the
jury on that ground alone. 178 Since there was disinterested evidence for the movant
and no contrary evidence for the nonmovant, the dissent saw no genuine issue of
material fact and would have affirmed the summary judgment. Nowhere does the
dissent suggest that the trial or appellate courts may deem one side's evidence more
persuasive than the other's or that the judge must believe one side's affiants because
their testimony is more plausible than that of the nonmovant. The Supreme Court
172. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 624-26 (1944).
173. Id. at 627-28 (citation omitted).
174. Id. at 628-29 (citation omitted).
175. Id. at 627 (citation omitted).
176. Id. at 627 (quoting Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1878)). Spring Co. was a directed verdict case.
The Sartor Court's approving quotation of Spring Co. for the proposition that even in this context the evaluation of
conflicting facts was for the jury rather than the judge can be read as evidencing the Court's view that the directed verdict
standard, although empowering the judge to conclude that no reasonable jury could find for the claimant, restricted the
judge's ability to reach that conclusion for cases in which the nonmovant had actually submitted evidence in conflict with
that of the movant. In other words, one can read the directed verdict jurisprudence of Sartor, as well as its summary
judgment jurisprudence, as barring the judge from evaluating conflicting facts and forming conclusions as to which facts
were stronger or more probative.
177. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 629-30 (1944).
178. Id. at 631.
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dealt not at all with the issue of greatest concern to the lower courts: whether an open
market price, if established, must be accepted as the controlling price as a matter of
law.
Thus, despite the single bit of dicta referring to directed verdict, Sartor simply
cannot be fairly read as supporting either the express Liberty Lobby or the implicit
Matsushita approach. Sartor, read as a whole, fits more comfortably within the
Adickes and Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System 179 line of summary judgment
cases as well as pro-jury cases such as Beacon Theatres v. Westover' 80 and Dairy
Queen v. Woodl8l that placed great importance not only on the litigant's right to a
jury trial but also upon the possibility that a jury, at trial, could evaluate questions of
fact, interpretation, and liability differently than a judge scanning a paper record.
The Liberty Lobby majority, in its primary discussion of summary judgment and
directed verdict, 182 fails to mention a leading Supreme Court case, Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting System. 183 Later in the opinion, 84 the majority acknowl-
edges Poller by reference to plaintiffs' reliance on the case. The majority then
proceeds to misstate both the import of Poller and the application of Poller to the
facts of Liberty Lobby. Poller was an antitrust case in which plaintiff alleged that
CBS and others had conspired to monopolize television broadcasting. After discov-
ery, defendants moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district
court 85 and affirmed by the District of Columbia Circuit. 186 The Supreme Court
reversed, denying summary judgment in a five-four decision that many criticized as
too deferential to nonmovants, 187 particularly the Court's statement that summary
judgment "should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation."' 188 The Poller
opinion was, nonetheless, the law. Furthermore, although commentators saw little
justification for different application of rule 56 in large, complex, or antitrust cases,
most agreed with statements in Poller that summary judgment was generally less
appropriate in cases in which motive and intent were important, in which the proof
was largely in the possession of the defendants where it was likely to remain despite
discovery, in which a factfinder's trial-based assessment of credibility was likely to
be useful in determining truth, and in which the grant of summary judgment meant
absence of jury consideration. 89
According to the Liberty Lobby majority, plaintiffs relied on Poller to suggest
that a plaintiff may defeat a defendant's properly supported motion for summary
judgment in a conspiracy or libel case, for example, without offering any concrete
179. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
180. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
181. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
182. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, , 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510-12 (1986).
183. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
184. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, , 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2514 (1986).
185. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 174 F. Supp. 802 (D.D.C. 1959).
186. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
187. See, e.g., Wiuorr, Mausu & Kasr, supra note 17, at § 2725 n.27 (including Poller among group of cases
requiring a clear showing of truth before summary judgment granted).
188. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). See also WiuGur, mnzR & KA E, supra note
17, at § 2732.1.
189. See Wicjrr, Mase & KAE, supra note 17, at §§ 2725, 2732, 2732.1.
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evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor and by
merely asserting that the jury might, and legally could, disbelieve the defendant's
denial of a conspiracy or of legal malice.190 According to the circuit court, plaintiffs
had pointed to concrete evidence of defense conduct that a jury could deem in
reckless disregard of information published by defendants. 19 1 In short, the cases
employed by the Liberty Lobby majority, although adding the cosmetic authority of
italics to the Court's opinion, do not support the Court's assertions or its departure
from accepted rule 56 practice.
B. The "Real Meaning" of Rule 56
1. The Text of the Rule
Although interpretation of a written text is often difficult, 192 lawyers, scholars,
and judges for the most part have agreed upon the ground rules and approaches that
should govern interpretation. In particular, the proper modes of interpreting statutes
and rules that can be relatively easily amended (compared to a constitution) are
generally widely held. When interpreting a rule of procedure, a court normally begins
with the text of the rule and the "plain" or ordinarily understood meaning of its
words. 193
190. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2514 (1986).
191. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1577-79, (D.C. Cir. 1984). "We find that a jury could
reasonably conclude that defamatory statements based wholly on the True article were made with actual malice." Id. at
1578.
192. See G. Ca.ma.msi, A CoMo. LAw FOR m AGE oF STAurTEs 31-43 (1982). Textual interpretation is especially
difficult and controversial in the context of the federal Constitution. For example, after 200 years, the debate continues
to rage regarding the apt method for interpreting the Constitution. Compare Monahan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 374-75 (1981) (arguing that constitutional language should be interpreted as the words were
intended to be understood by Framers and that the "language contitutes the best evidence of original intentions") with
Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv.
551 (1983) (arguing that factors other than language have a vital role in constitutional interpretation). The controversy
occasioned by the Reagan Administration's originalist view of constitutional law has hinged more on disputes over the
means and difficulty of discerning intent (see, e.g., Rakove, Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, AmA_,nc MovmLy, Dec.
1986, at 77, 85) and differing views of the nature of a constitution as opposed to statutes in light of their different purposes
and the longer time period in which constitutional language will remain unchanged. Nonetheless, Attorney General
Meese's campaign notwithstanding, few legal scholars have embraced a strict "originalist" interpretation of the
Constitution. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory lnterpretation, 135 U. PA. L. Ray. 1479, 1480-81 (1987) (most authorities
agree that constitutional interpretation should be "dynamic" in adjusting to developments since 1787 but attempt to
preserve basic intent of the provision under scrutiny).
193. See G. CsAst.sr, supra note 192, at 31-34. See also Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law:
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 Hxv. L. REv. 892 (1982) (discerning Supreme Court trend to look
primarily at "plain meaning" of a statute under construction and to base interpretation on this alone unless language
ambiguous, also finding less Court concern for legislative history or other indices of intent when language is reasonably
clear). But see Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. Ray. 800, 808
(1983) (suggesting that beginning at the text is the officially recognized method of construction but that "more often than
not the judge-the good judge as well as the bad judge-in fact begins somewhere else").
Dean Calabresi endorses a jurisprudence that would permit courts, in certain circumstances, to overrule or modify
statutes inconsistent with the "legal topography" rather than twist language, legislative history, or other factors in order
to achieve a "better" interpretation but one that is at bottom inconsistent with that of the legislature that enacted the
statute. Professor Eskridge stops short of endorsing the Calabresi approach but argues for sufficient judicial freedom to
infuse interpretation with values gleaned from intervening legal developments. His proposed "dynamic" interpretation of
statutes seems quite consistent with the Calabresi view of a judicial role for both updating statutes and avoiding unfair or
absurd results through literal intentionalism.
Of course, the rules and process of interpreting statutes or any other text are hardly as cut-and-dried as this Article
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Although rule 56 is divided into seven subparts, 194 the substantive "heart" of
the summary judgment rule is found in rule 56(c), which states:
suggests in approaching the interpretation of rule 56. A complete discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Although
different approaches abound, there exists sufficient consensus to state broad ground rules for attempting to discern the real
meaning of the summary judgment rule. This Article suggests that for purposes of construing rule 56, interpreters should
first examine the plain meaning of the rule's text, then (if necessary) its legislative history, then (if necessary) the
environment in which the rule was formed, including contemporaneous writings by its drafters and application by courts.
As the analysis in the text shows, interpretation of rule 56 by these methods does not result in the construction of rule 56
reached by the Court in 1986. The logical next step of interpretation is to ask whether the rule 56 enacted in 1938 and
updated in 1963 is inconsistent with the current legal topography. For reasons discussed in part III, see infra text
accompanying notes 329-408, this Article concludes that the rule remains vibrant as originally intended. Were it not, the
Court could amend rule 56 rather than misconstrue it.
Some may argue that this approach is incorrect and that another method of text construction is more apt to the inquiry.
However, my proposed methodology is consistent with both the "plain meaning" rule that the Court appears to have
embraced in other contexts and the prevailing legal process methodology of construing texts according to the intent of the
drafters as discerned from textual language, legislative history, and other reliable indicia of intent. G. CarASl, supra
note 192, at 31-43, 204-15. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss: BAsic PeOaL.s IN THE MAmN uAND ArsicAroN
oF LAw 1200, 1410 (1958). Although placing a slightly different emphasis on the relative importance of language vis-a-vis
other evidence of intent, most commentators are in accord with the Hart and Sacks approach. See, e.g., R. KEEroN,
Vsrnmmo To Do Jusricg 78-97 (1969); Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HAv. L. REv. 1, 30 (1957); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YA.a L.J. 221, 262-65 (1973).
More recent writings concerning interpretation do not suggest a compelling need to diverge from what I term the
"basic" approach for purposes of understanding rule 56. For example, Ronald Dworkin, in LAw's D.pmri 313-54 (1986),
suggests that statutes should be interpreted similarly to common law with courts finding the optimum meaning in light of
current circumstances and the case at hand. Dworkin's approach deals with statutes, not rules largely made by the court
and updated on a virtually rolling basis as are the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, like Calabresi's, his view
has been criticized as vesting too much power in courts in derogation of the legislature. See Eskridge, supra note 192,
at 1479-82. Eskridge envisions a judicial role more constrained by textual language and other clear showings of intent
than do Calabresi and Dworkin. Recent law and economics scholarship that tends to view lawmaking as the result of a
bargain between interest groups and the legislature, see, e.g., Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLtm. L. Rav. 223 (1986), seems inapposite to an analysis of the
Federal Rules, which are not sui generis laws resulting from classic, overt political activity as are most statutes. Similarly,
deconstructionist or Critical Legal Studies approaches to interpretation seem similarly inapposite to discerning the proper
interpretation of rule 56. For rule 56, like the vast majority of construction problems, the basic text-legislative
history-other evidence of intent trilogy should suffice to illuminate both meaning and the wise result in particular cases.
This Article suggests that the Federal Rules, because they are largely court-made as well as being regularly revised
and capable of relatively easy specific revision present a less compelling case for interpretation according to any method
requiring more pronounced judicial attempts to be dynamic, update the rule, or reach out to complete gaps in the rule.
See infra text accompanying notes 331-44.
194. Rule 56 is divided into seven major subparts. Rule 56(a) and 56(b) are essentially ministerial and technical,
establishing the timing by which claimants and defendants may operate in seeking summary judgment. Rule 56(a)
provides that a claimant, counterclaimant, cross-claimant, or declaratory judgment applicant may seek to recover via
summary judgment, but must wait until 20 days after commencement of the action. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v.
National Molasses Co., 540 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1976). Rule 56(b) provides that a party defending a claim may move for
summary judgment at any time after commencement of the claim. See HER, supra note 18, § 16.13, at 345. A portion
of rule 56(c) also regulates timing, requiring that the motion be served upon the opposition at least ten days before a
hearing on the motion is held or a decision is rendered. The language of rule 56(c) implicitly suggests that a hearing is
required prior to decision on the motion. Cases interpreting this portion of the rule have found that the "hearing" need
only be an opportunity for oral argument by the parties and that an evidentiary hearing replete with live, sworn witnesses
is not required. See Spark v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (no need for hearing on rule 56
motion when court finds sufficient information in pleadings, motions, supporting papers, and no utility in holding a
hearing). See also Smart v. Jones, 530 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1976) (informal conference in chambers satisfies hearing
requirement of rule 56); HEm, supra note 18, § 16.14, at 348. But see Pierce, supra note 25, at 291 (noting that courts
may hold hearing pursuant to rule 43(a) to resolve factual issues and then apply rule 56 analysis to determine the facts).
In the vast majority of cases, the summary judgment hearing consists only of oral argument and the possible submission
to a court of additional affidavits or documents. Another part of rule 56(c) specifies that summary judgment as to liability
alone is interlocutory in character and thus does not constitute a final trial court order that would be immediately
appealable as a matter of right. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides that only final orders are appealable as of right unless they
involve injunctive relief. Although interlocutory review is permitted by the federal courts under certain circumstances (see
HEn, supra note 18, § 25.9, at 589-91), these exceptions to the final order rule are seldom applicable to denials of
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[After the making of the summary judgment motion] the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.195
Rule 56(e) also contains a substantive passage, which must be read in conjunction
with rule 56(c), and provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment,
if appropriate, shall be entered against him.196
The bulk of cases deciding summary judgment motions have focused on whether
there exists on the record a "genuine issue as to any material fact." ' 197 Specifically,
courts have worried about the meanings of the words "genuine" and "material."
Increasingly in recent years, courts have also closely examined rule 56(e) to
determine whether a nonmovant's submissions really state admissible facts opposing
the motion or whether they are merely redressed allegations of the complaint. 198
Courts have also recently begun to focus on rule 56(e)'s language requiring the
summary judgment or entry of partial summary judgment as to liablity alone. The remainder of rule 56(c) deals with the
substantive standard for granting the motion and is discussed below.
Rule 56(d) provides for partial summary judgment as to select facts or claims. A part of rule 56(e) establishes the
proper format for the submission of affidavits and documents in connection with summary judgment motions. The more
substantive portion of rule 56(e), like that of rule 56(c), is discussed below. Rule 56(f) authorizes the court to grant the
nonmovant additional time and discovery in order to have fair opportunity to make a record in opposition to the motion.
Rule 56(g) provides that when an affidavit is made in bad faith or for delay, the offending party may be held in contempt
or required to reimburse the opposition for expenses incurred, including attorney's fees, because of the offending
affidavit.
195. FE. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). To some extent, the technical requirements of rule 56(e) as to affidavit form can also
be crucial. Rule 56(e) provides that affidavits must be made on personal knowledge by one competent to testify, must
include legitimated copies of documents referred to in the affidavit, and must set forth facts that would be admissible in
evidence.
A nonmovant's affidavit may state, for example, many "facts" that would militate against summary judgment.
However, if those averments are not admissible at trial, summary judgment may nonetheless be entered against the
nonmovant. Because the bulk of summary judgment affidavits are made by parties to the litigation or their representatives,
the question of admissibility infrequently affects the court's decision. In more involved cases, however, it may be crucial.
For example, in Matsushita, see supra text accompanying notes 33-51, the summary judgment question turned on, at least
for the district and circuit courts, whether the facts contained in the affidavit of plaintiffs' proposed expert witnesses were
(a) inadmissible hearsay discussion of documents [the trial court's view]; or (b) admissible evidence reasonably relied
upon by experts [the appellate court's view].
197. See, e.g., Lunden v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1966) (no material issue regarding decedent's intent to
change insurance beneficiary); Streeter v. Erie R. Co., 25 F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (issue as to whether plaintiff was
employee at time of injury). See also M. RosENBEG, H. SMrr & H. KoRN, ELumis or Cvn. PsocnuRE 689-90 (4th ed.
1985) (what constitutes genuine issue of material fact is apt to be one of "most perplexing" summary judgment questions
for courts).
198. See e.g., Therrien v. United Air Lines, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Colo. 1987). The district court applied
this focus in granting the summary judgment that was eventually upheld in Matsushita. See Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1139-44 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Although this approach is not new and to
some extent predates the 1963 amendment to rule 56(e) (see Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952)), courts
appear to be focusing on rule 56(e) to a greater extent by requiring nonmovants to produce not only evidence in
controversy but evidence that requires the further adjudication of trial.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
nonmovant to show that there exists "a genuine issue for trial" as evidence that the
summary judgment standard closely resembles that for directed verdict. 199
Although the universally accepted interpretation of the word "hearing" 20 0 in
rule 56 as meaning only "oral argument" rather than "evidentiary hearing" shows
that courts do not focus with tunnel vision on only the text of a rule, most respected
legal analysts agree that the text of a rule is the proper place to begin interpretation
and that the plain and commonly understood meaning of words used in the text
deserve great deference. Such an inquiry will reveal that the Court has strayed
markedly from the ordinary and plain meaning of the text of rule 56 (c). 20 1
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines "genuine" as "actually
produced by or proceeding from the alleged source or author" and "sincerely and
honestly felt or experienced" and "actual, true. "202 Although these descriptions do
not provide an iron-clad definition of the word genuine, none of them suggests that
genuine means "convincing to a judge hearing a pretrial motion," the definition of
the term essentially adopted by the Supreme Court in Matsushita and Liberty
Lobby.203
The Court's lexicon also differs from Webster's concerning the meaning of
"dispute," which according to Webster's is a "verbal controversy" or a "quar-
rel. '" 2°4 In ordinary parlance, then, a genuine dispute of material fact is an actual
quarrel over an important fact, a definition quite distinct from that implicitly applied
by the Supreme Court in its trio of cases. Instead, the Court suggested that genuine
meant "sufficiently probative to defeat a directed verdict motion.''205 Applied to
interpretations of agreed upon circumstantial facts, the Court's definition of "genu-
ine" appears to be something like "sufficiently plausible to the Court."
"Genuine," as applied to written instruments, means that "they [the instru-
ments] are truly what they purport to be, and that they are not false, forged, fictitious,
simulate, spurious, or counterfeit. "206 Obviously, a proffered fact can be unconvinc-
ing to a judge or jury without being false or forged, again suggesting that the Court's
interpretation of rule 56(c) does not square with common understandings of the words
used in the rule. If the Court interprets "genuine" to mean "true" in the ultimate or
199. See, e.g., White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1987); Joiner v. City of Ridgeland,
669 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (both citing Supreme Court trilogy). Courts often discuss this in terms of whether
the factual conflict between movant and nonmovant poses a "triable" issue as opposed to a dispute that, although clearly
existent, admits of only one resolution. See, e.g., Boeing v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969). In bench cases, some
courts have applied this approach to permit a grant of summary judgment where "trial would not enhance [the court's]
ability to draw inferences and conclusions." Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir. 1978). This
approach is generally endorsed by Advisory Committee Member U.S. District Judge William Schwarzer in his proposed
rewriting of Federal Rule 56. See Schwarzer, Summary Judgment: A Proposed Revision of Rule 56, 110 F.R.D. 213,
226-28 (1986). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1139-44 (E.D. Pa.
1981). This Article questions the wisdom of the approach and suggests that further proceedings will significantly
illuminate a legitimate factual dispute in all but a few cases. See infra text accompanying notes 409-50.
200. See supra note 194.
201. See supra note 193.
202. Wasirm's Ne-m New CouLrLoA DicnorARY 512 (1983) [hereinafter WEssrx's].
203. See supra text accompanying notes 80-121.
204. Weasm's, supra note 202, at 733.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 80-121.
206. W -srm's, supra note 202, at 366.
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final sense, the Court must then envision courts as weighing and evaluating
competing facts to decide a summary judgment motion. Similarly, Black's Law
Dictionary defines a material fact as one which "is essential to the case, defense,
application, etc." 20 7 and defines dispute as "a conflict or controversy; a conflict of
claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one side, met by
contrary claims or allegations on the other.' '208 Again, the Court cannot be said to
have derived its view of a genuine dispute of material fact from the dictionary.
As to rule 56(e)'s language that avoiding summary judgment requires a showing
of a "genuine issue for trial," this language does not compel or even support the view
that the summary judgment standard mirrors the directed verdict standard or that
judges are permitted to treat a movant's facts as more persuasive than a nonmovant's
when facts conflict. As with the plain text of rule 56(c), the "genuine issue" in rule
56(e) is an actual dispute. "For trial" means only that if there is a conflict over fact
existence or fact interpretation, the motion must be denied, and that the case must
proceed toward trial. Neither rule 56(e) nor the Advisory Committee Notes mention
the directed verdict motion, which cannot occur until at least the middle of trial and
usually is not likely to be granted until the end of presentation of the evidence. To
suggest that a "triable" issue is not merely one requiring trial to begin but also one
ajudge expects to survive directed verdict motions at two junctures during trial strains
too much the meaning of the text.
Of course, the Court did not claim to be blending dictionary terms; it suggested
it was deriving the meaning of the words of rule 56(c) from case precedent and doctrinal
thought and development. As discussed in subsection II(C),209 the Court's approach
in this area is unsatisfying. My point in comparing the Court's lexicon with actual
dictionaries is not to oversimplify the legal process but rather to underscore how far
interpretation of rule 56(c) by the Court, which ordinarily pays great deference to the
text of a statute or rule,2 o even at the expense of the drafters' intent, has diverged from
the ordinary and plain meaning, even the legalistic ordinary and plain meaning, of the
key words in rule 56(c). Furthermore, because the Court's task is to faithfully apply
the rule, it is legitimate to ask whether the Court is doing so when measured against
the bare text of the rule or whether the Court's pronouncements have placed a "judicial
gloss" on the rule that was not placed there in the rulemaking process.
2. The "Legislative Intent" Behind Rule 56
When the text to be interpreted lacks sufficiently plain meaning to end the
interpretative inquiry, commentators generally agree that the next area of explanation
should be the legislative history of the rule or statute. 21 ' Unfortunately, the original
Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules provided little official guidance
207. Bicx's LAw Dicno-ARY 618 (5th ed. 1979).
208. Id. at 881.
209. See infra text accompanying notes 272-328.
210. See supra note 193. See also Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986) (giving strict construction to the text
of rule 15(c)); Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 McH. L.
R-v. 1507, 1514-21 (1987).
211. See supra note 193.
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in this area. The Committee Notes for the most part merely restate the language of
rule 56(c) and point to the motion's use in England, New York, and Michigan. The
reader who remains interested is told: "For the history and nature of the summary
judgment procedure and citations to state statutes, see Clark and Samenow, The
Summary Judgment (1929), 38 Yale L.J. 423."212 The Court in adopting the Federal
Rules did not elaborate on the Committee comments. 213 Clark and Samenow's article
in essence stands as the expanded Committee comment on the intent behind the
original Rules. 214
When the official voice of those writing the rule-the Advisory Committee
Notes-is not authoritative, it is apt to examine the statements of members of the
committee or other body authoring the rule or statute. 215 This approach requires
greater care, however, in that individual members may attempt to partially rewrite the
collective product or otherwise pursue their own agendas through separate statements
or writings. 216 With some caution, then, an examination of the writings of the
212. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Advisory Committee Notes, reprinted in 12 VIu'irr & M.smER, supra note 15,
app. C at 498.
213. Rules of Civil Procedure for the Dist. Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
214. The most important amendment to the Rules in this area was the 1963 amendment to rle 56(e), which resulted
in the current language requiring a nonmovant to introduce by affidavit or facts otherwise admissible in evidence and not
to rest only on averments in the pleadings in order to successfully oppose summary judgment. The Advisory Committee
Notes stated that this requirement was textually added "to overcome a line of cases, chiefly in the Third Circuit, which
has impaired the utility of the summary judgment device" by denying summary judgment on the basis of well-pleaded
allegations alone. Report of Proposed Amendments to certain Rules of Civil Procedure for United States Dist. Courts, 31
F.R.D. 621, 648 (1963). The Advisory Committee specifically noted, however, that "the amendment [is not] designed
to affect the ordinary standards applicable to the summary judgment motion." Id. at 648. The Supreme Court adopted the
1963 amendments without further elaboration concerning the meaning of the changes in text. Amendments to the Rules
of Civil Procedure for the United States Dist. Courts, 374 U.S. 861 (1963).
215. See C. Nurrr, S. Ewuorr & R. DicKrESoN, LeoisLATION: CASEs Ams MAa-mums 413-15 (4th ed. 1969) (floor
speeches, debates and, more problematically, post-passage views of statutedrafter may be considered in interpreting
statute); H. READ, J. MAcDoNALD & J. FoRnanm, Lous~ALor: CAsms AND OnER MATEssAts 976-77, 996-99 (2d ed. 1959);
de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. RFv. 527, 552-55 (1940); Nutting, The
Relevance of Legislative Intention Established by Extrinsic Evidence, 20 B.U.L. Rav. 601, 602 (1940).
Although floor debates, speeches, and testimony are accepted parts of a statute's legislative history, they are
generally accorded less interpretative weight than committee reports. There is some dispute over the propriety of attaching
special significance to the views of the statute's author since others supporting the legislation may have held different
views. Some authorities caution against it unless the drafter's views were made clear to the legislature at the time of
passage, preferrably through official channels such as hearing testimony or recorded floor proceedings. See A.
SumnuAN,, STATuroRy CoNsrucnoN §§ 48.10, 48.12, at 318-19, 327 (2d ed. 1948). Clark's views in the Clark and
Samenow article, available to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, the Court, and Congress, as well as incorporated
into the official Advisory Committee Note are, although not a perfect analogy, suggestive of hearing testimony or floor
explanations by the chief author of congressional legislation.
216. See Smith, supra note 7, at 914 n.1. See also Resnick, supra note 5, at 498-500 (1986) (rejecting notion of
an Advisory Committee consensus or "collective intent" regarding interpretation of the Federal Rules but finding that the
Rules as a whole have a pro-claimant orientation).
The transcripts of the Advisory Committee meetings, although not conclusive, suggest that the Committee took a
view of rule 56 quite different than that taken by the Court in Liberty Lobby and Matsushita. Some members of the
Committee initially suggested summary judgment language that would have used the "substantial evidence" standard of
directed verdict precedent. Other members opposed this, noting possible problems with undermining the role of the jury.
The Reporter was asked to draft language resolving this problem, suggesting at a minimum that current rule 56 is not a
mirror image of the directed verdict. The Committee meeting comments as a whole suggest that a majority of the group
thought summary judgment inappropriate whenever the respondent had introduced any honest evidence in opposition to
the motion. See Transcripts of Advisory Committee Meetings of February 1, 1936, at 25-26; Transcripts of Advisory
Committee Meetings of February 22, 1935, at 808-21; Transcripts of Advisory Committe Meetings of November 18,
1935, at 1572-639, Charles E. Clark Papers, boxes 97, 96, and 95 (respectively) (on file at the Yale University Sterling
Library Archives and Special Collection room).
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Advisory Committee members is in order, particularly those of Committee Reporter
Charles C. Clark, then Dean of Yale Law School and later a Second Circuit judge.
Clark is generally viewed as the prime author of the Federal Rules.
Clark's writings are not crystal clear on the "real" meaning of rule 56. On
balance, however, his statements, particularly those contemporaneous with the
propounding of the Federal Rules, suggest that both the original Advisory Committee
and the Court that accepted the Committee's proposed rule 56 held a distinctly
different view of summary judgment than did the 1986 Supreme Court. The many
other works of the Advisory Committee members are unhelpful in that they do not
speak directly to the issue.
a. The Summary Judgment Articles
Dean Clark's most thorough discussion of the summary judgment mechanism
came in two articles aptly titled The Summary Judgment. One was written with a
co-author and preceded the 1938 Federal Rules by nearly a decade,2 17 the other was
published fifteen years after the adoption of the Rules. 2 18 Taken together, these pieces
suggest that Clark viewed rule 56 summary judgment as a device for adjudicating
cases without trial when the material facts were not contested by either party to the
dispute. 21 9 Clark seems to view the typical record upon which summary judgment
may be granted as the virtual equivalent of stipulation by the parties as to the facts.320
The language and tone of his public writings do not suggest that he considered a fact's
existence or interpretation in dispute only when a judge was unsure which side's
assertions were more worthy of belief.221
217. Clark & Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423 (1929) [hereinafter Clark & Samenow].
218. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MaiN. L. REv. 567 (1952) [hereinafter Clark].
219. See Clark & Samenow, supra note 217, at 423.
220. See id.
221. See Clark & Samenow, supra note 217; Clark, supra note 218. This Article takes the view that this
interpretation of Judge Clark's views on summary judgment is more consistent with other views he expressed regarding
the spirit and thrust of the Federal Rules, particularly those concerning notice pleading. See, e.g., CLARK, Coe PLEADING
(2d ed. 1947). This Article subscribes to the view that Judge Clark, as at least a fellow traveller of the legal realism
scholars dominating his Yale Law School faculty (see Clark, The Function of Law in a Domestic Society, 9 U. Cm. L.
Rav. 393, 394-95 (1942)), was willing to apportion a substantial role for the lay jury in deciding cases, even with
occasional error, rather than prevent the occurrence of trial and jury decision through stringent technical requirements in
the roles. See e.g., Plausible Pleadings, supra note 1, at 644-51 (author critical of amended rule 11 as running counter
to notice pleading theory of the Federal Rules and legal realist spirit that informed the rules in general). But see Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law. The Federal Rules of Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909
(1987) [hereinafter Subrin]. Professor Subrin argues that the 1938 Rules' adoption of many procedures of the equity courts
was also part of an effort to increase the power of the trial judge at the expense of the jury, a view this Article considers
overstated, at least as applied to the Drafters' willingness to constrict the role of the jury in adjudicating cases.
Although there is no disagreement that Clark was a legal realist and little disagreement that the legal realists in
general preferred less formal pleading requirements, less is certain about the view held by Clark and the realists regarding
the degree to which summary judgment grants might permissibly adjudicate cases that would receive jury consideration
if the motion was denied. Subrin and others have observed that Clark was not particularly impressed with jury
determinations, regarding them as needlessly time consuming and costly. See KLmm, supra note 94, at 21 ("Clark seems
to have preferred equity to law simply because of the opportunity it offered to avoid jury trial."). Kalman's only citation
to support this assertion, one quite a bit broader than Professor Subrin's, is a textual note explaining that the seventh
amendment required jury trial to be preserved in actions at law. Clark's view of jury trials as slower and more expensive
than bench trials is quite well-documented. See, e.g., Clark, Comment, 32 YAsE L.J. 711 (1923); Clark & Shulman, Jury
Trial in Civil Cases-A Study in Judicial Administration, 43 YALE L.J. 882 (1934). Because of Clark's apparent
confidence in the wisdom of judges and his efficiency concerns, writers such as Kalman suggest that he was willing to
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The 1929 article by Clark and Samenow is perhaps the authoritative Committee
interpretation as to the intent behind rule 56. While Clark's other writings should not
be completely disregarded, the Clark and Samenow article is most probative because
it was officially incorporated into the Advisory Committee Notes and because it
preceded the issuance of the rule, suggesting that it represents Clark's views during
the drafting and adoption of the rule. To the extent that Clark's later scholarly or
judicial writings conflict with the thrust of the Clark and Samenow article, the Clark
and Samenow article should be viewed as the "true" quasi-legislative document.
Clark's later writings could well have been influenced by later developments that did
not affect the Committee, Court, and Congress in promulgating the rule. Personal
differences between Clark and other judges may also have influenced Clark's later
writings. 222
Clark's articles, particularly the one co-authored with Samenow, praise the
English practice of permitting summary judgment and implicitly suggest that
American practice would do well to follow the English model. 22s It does not seem
farfetched to conclude that Clark and consequently the Advisory Committee had in
mind something close to the English model when rule 56 was drafted. An
examination of Clark's description of English practice and cases cited in his writings
thus sheds some light on the Advisory Committee's probable "original intent" in
drafting rule 56.
According to Clark, England officially adopted summary judgment in 1855. 224
The 1855 Act was designed to make it easier for creditors to collect on business and
consumer accounts by permitting entry of judgment in the creditor's favor when the
plaintiff creditor could demonstrate no dispute as to the agreement to provide goods
or services, provision of the services, and nonpayment. 225 In 1873, a successor rule
was adopted, specifically providing for special endorsement of the plaintiff's claim
employ summary judgment to abrogate jury trials. Kalman cites Clark's summary judgment articles as support for this
proposition. See K uim, supra note 94, at 21, 244 n.91. As the discussion in this Article demonstrates, a fair reading
of these articles supports no such conclusion.
Another argument suggesting a tough summary judgment standard and elimination of a substantial number of jury
trials can perhaps be made by examining the transcripts of the meetings of the first Advisory Committee. The members'
debate, often more of a loose discussion, occasionally makes disparaging references to the wisdom of laymen and juries.
However, there appears to be nothing in these transcripts, on file at Yale's Sterling Library, see supra note 216, which
suggests that the Committee intended to address the perceived shortcomings of lay participation by permitting judges to
adjudicate competing facts and inferences in the context of summary judgment motions. Rather, the Committee, although
perhaps questioning the wisdom of the seventh amendment, appears to have accepted it as a given and a roadblock to any
such "strong" summary judgment or directed verdict rule. A fairer reading of the Committee transcripts is not
inconsistent with this Article's thesis that the drafters intended rule 56 to decide claims with no factual dispute rather than
to resolve fact disputes.
222. See Smith, supra note 7, at 954 (Clark's dislike for Second Circuit Judge Jerome Frank may have fueled Clark
to favor a stronger interpretation of rule 56 than that favored by Frank).
223. See Clark & Samenow, supra note 217, at 424-35.
224. Id. at 424.
225. Id. at 424-26.
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in the summons and complaint. 226 This variant of the modem verified complaint
shifted the production burden, requiring the debtor defendant to submit affidavits
contravening these facts as a prerequisite to further defense on the merits. 227 The
English court then examined the plaintiff's documents and verified assertions in
juxtaposition with the defendant's affidavits to determine whether there was a valid
defense to the claim and whether facts were in conflict. 22s
Although portions of Clark's descriptions can be viewed as suggesting a more
active role for the judge, 229 they do not ultimately describe judicial conduct any
different from that prevailing during the 1938-1986 United States federal court
application of rule 56.230 In addition, examining the cases cited by Clark on English
practice shows that they describe situations in which a court refrains from granting
summary judgment whenever the nonmovant has introduced contrary facts, particu-
larly when the nonmovant has put forth additional facts that would deny recovery to
plaintiff (e.g., when a debtor claims the failure of a product purchased from a creditor
226. Id. at 424.
227. Id. at 430-31.
228. The 1873 Act also increased the number of actions in which summary judgment was available. It allowed
summary judgment in any "actions for recovery of debts or liquidated demands in money" or in "actions between
landlord and tenant for the recovery of land." Id. at 425. The 1855 Act had permitted summary judgment only in debt
collection actions. The limited number of actions in which summary judgment was available, even under the 1873 Act,
suggests that the British model, of which Clark urged American emulation, required ajudge only to ascertain the existence
of conflicting facts and gave a court no pretrial authority to assess the comparative likelihood of either side's proffered
facts or theory of the case. The actions in which summary judgment was permitted are actions in which the "paper trail"
of the litigants' dispute often leaves no disagreement as to the basic facts.
For example, the 1873 Act only permitted summary judgment in nondebtor actions for a money judgment when the
demand was "liquidated." Id. Debt collection actions usually have a contract, billings, correspondence, checks, receipts,
and other tangible memorials of the facts. Landlord-tenant actions also usually have contracts, leases, payment records,
and correspondence. The nature of the litigation is especially suited to a high proportion of agreed-upon facts. One may
ask why, if the British wanted judges to evaluate facts in a summary judgment context, they limited the cases in which
the motion could be used. The answer seems more than rhetorical: it is most likely that the English motion for summary
judgment, upon which rule 56 was modeled, was considerably less aggressive than that endorsed by the Supreme Court
in Liberty Lobby and thus was restricted to classes of cases that frequently involved no need to weigh and evaluate
differing facts or theories of causation.
229. For example, in part of his discussion of the English practice, Clark approvingly quotes a procedural rule
stating that a judge ruling on a summary judgment motion must see that the defendant
by affidavit, by his own viva voce evidence, or otherwise, shall satisfy him [the judge] that he [the defendant]
has a good defense to the action on the merits, or disclose such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him
to defend, make an order empowering the plaintiff to enter judgment accordingly.
Id. at 430 (citing Order XIV, Rule I(a) (in the same form as in the Revision of 1893); AxsuAL PRAcncE 156 (1928); 1
YeALy PRAcncE 141 (1928)). The English practice to which Clark and Samenow refer dealt almost exclusively with cases
that plaintiffs could prove by a reference to unquestioned, conclusive, irrefutable documents, since the procedure was
limited to actions involving bills of exchange, promissory note, and checks. Since the parole evidence rule and the judicial
orientation of the time made it virtually impossible to modify or refute such documents with oral evidence or other
circumstantial evidence, there was ordinarily no fact conflict at all in the English cases. See Bauman, A Rationale for
Summary Judgment, 33 ha. L.J. 467, 473 (1958). To the extent that the English courts did weigh and decide issues of
credibility and probative value of the facts, this occurred because of the unusual deference given these documents, some
of which were in effect pre-dispute stipulations by the parties similar to today's confessions of judgment. Id. at 474.
However, even under these circumstances, it appears that a debtor defendant could avoid summary judgment if it produced
"some affirmative evidence" in contradiction of the document. Id.
230. Reading the Clark and Samenow article as a whole and reading the cases cited, it becomes apparent that the
English judges satisfied themselves that the defendant had a good defense whenever the defendant offered nonfrivolous
admissible evidence in contradiction of either the creditor's facts (e.g., whether payment was made) or legal theory of
liability (e.g., whether defendant's nonpayment was justified by fraud, inferior quality of goods, etc.).
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for which the debtor has admittedly withheld payment from the creditor).23 1
According to Clark, summary judgment was denied in England "where the defendant
shows a defense entitling him to trial. Such a situation arises when a conflict in the
affidavits raises an issue of fact or difficult questions of law, or where the defendant
brings the case within the prohibitions of a salutary law." '2 32
The Clark and Samenow article also discusses summary judgment practice in
various states and continues to suggest that summary judgment cannot be granted in
cases in which the facts conflict, even when the movant appears to have the better of
the argument. His description of New York procedure most clearly captures this as
he concludes that "[i]ssue-fimding, rather than issue-determination, is then the key to
the [New York summary judgment] procedure." ' 233 Furthermore, "situations of
doubt" were to be "resolved in defendant's [nonmovant's] favor.' ' 4
The New York cases cited by Clark and Samenow echo the approach of the
English courts, often citing British precedents.2 35 However, the New York cases are,
if anything, more solicitous of nonmovants than the English cases because of the
influence of the seventh amendment and a similar state constitutional provision. 236 In
general, the New York cases cited in the article consistently refuse summary
judgment whenever the nonmovant has submitted a nonconclusory affidavit estab-
lishing any facts to support its case, even if the facts appear unlikely to persuade the
trier of fact.237
231. See Clark & Samenow, supra note 217, at 431-34 nn.73, 74. See also Jones v. Stone, 70 L.T.R. 174 (1894);
Saw v. Hakim, 5 T.L.R. 72 (1888). An examination of the English cases cited by Clark and Samenow shows the praised
English practice to closely resemble the American application of rule 56 prior to Matsushita and Liberty Lobby on the
sometimes vexing question of when a genuine factual dispute is presented. In general, the English cases denied summary
judgment when the nonmovant put forward any evidence to support a defense or to contradict an element of the movant's
claim. See, e.g., Codd v. Delap, 92 L.T.R. 510 (1905) ("There is an affidavit by the person sued that he has a good
defence. I am not satisfied that he has not a good defence. I do not say that he has. I know nothing more about it than
this: that in the state of conflict which there is between the parties, with the allegation that the judgments relied upon have
been obtained by fraud, there is a question to be tried. ... (by Chancellor Halsbury, reversing lower court grant of
summary judgment)); Jacobs v. Booth's Distillery Co., 85 L.T.R. 262 (1901) (summary judgment reversed when
nonmovant defendant affidavit claims misrepresentation of liability consequences of note admittedly signed by
nonmovant); Jones v. Stone, 70 L.T.R. 174 (1894) (question of existence of triable issue or dispute of fact is to be
determined "on the face of the affidavits"). Accord Daubuz and Another v. Lavington, 13 Q.B.D. 347 (1884) (summary
judgment appropriate when nonmovant puts forth no defense on the merits); Thompson v. Marshall, 41 L.T.R. 720 (1879)
(summary judgment rule intended to be applied to "clearly undefended causes"); Groom v. Rathbone, 41 L.T.R. 591
(1879).
The Canadian cases cited by Clark and Samenow take the same approach. See, e.g., Davey v. Sadler, 1 O.L.R. 626,
627 (1901) (nonmovant "may not be able to support and establish his defence at the trial, but, in my judgment, he has
disclosed facts [on the face of his affidavit] sufficient to entitle him to defend the action"). Accord F.J. Castle Co. v.
Kouri, 18 O.L.R. 462 (1909); Canadian Gen. Elee. Co. v. Tagona Water & Light Co., 6 O.L.R. 641 (1903).
232. Clark & Samenow, supra note 217, at 433-34.
233. Id. at 449.
234. Id. at 450.
235. See, e.g., Dwan v. Massarene, 199 A.D. 872, 192 N.Y.S. 577 (1922) (citing Jacobs v. Booth's Distillery Co.);
Peninsular Transp. Co. v. Greater Britain Ins. Corp., 200 A.D. 695, 193 N.Y.S. 886 (1922) (citing Jacobs v. Booth's
Distillery Co., Jones v. Stone, and Codd v. Delap).
236. See N.Y. Cors. art. I. § 2.
237. See Dwan v. Massarene, 199 A.D. 872, 192 N.Y.S. 577 (1922); Peninsular Transp. Co. v. Greater Britain Ins.
Corp., 200 A.D. 695, 193 N.Y.S. 886 (1922) (court may not try issues of fact posed by affidavits but is limited to
ascertaining if affidavits place facts or interpretations of conduct at issue; court may not enter summary judgment even
when nonmovant's claims appear unlikely to be proven at trial). Accord Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 A.D. 504, 196 N.Y.S.
43 (1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 534, 139 N.E. 724 (1923); Ritz Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co. v. Ditmars, 203 A.D. 748,
197 N.Y.S. 405 (1922).
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Clark suggests the same view in his discussions of summary judgment in New
Jersey,238 the District of Columbia, 239 Delaware,24° and Indiana. 241 He also noted
that in most states summary judgment was only available in limited actions, usually
those sounding in contract, and particularly debt collection, and that this was the
trend in its perceived expanding use in more states. 242
The Advisory Committee Notes cite England and New York as examples of the
summary judgment practice envisioned by the drafters of rule 56.243 Coupled with the
absence of any more definitive statements in the Notes contrary to any statements in
the Clark and Samenow article, the inevitable conclusion is that the Advisory
Committee's understanding of rule 56 was that of the Clark and Samenow article. At
least at the time the Federal Rules were promulgated, Clark and the Committee placed
greater limits on granting summary judgment than did the Supreme Court in 1986.
Interestingly, the references in the English and pre-Federal Rules American
cases as well as the Clark and Samenow commentary speak of a nonmovant avoiding
summary judgment by demonstrating that it has shown a "need for trial." The
Supreme Court in Liberty Lobby interpreted this phrase to mean a "need to submit the
case to the jury or other factfimder after the close of the evidence."244 This view
stretches the meaning of the word "trial" and the apparent intent of the pre-Rules
history of summary judgment too much.
A trial is simply the initiation of courtroom proceedings: motions in limine, jury
selection, opening statements, and so on. A litigant can receive a trial without having
jury deliberations punctuate the proceeding. Federal rules 41 and 50 specifically
envision that a substantial number of litigants will have cases that merit the beginning
of a trial but not its completion by jury verdict or written findings of fact and
conclusions of law by the trial judge.245 Consequently, the better view is that the
238. Clark & Samenow, supra note 217, at 442-44 (court has power to overlook sham or frivolous defenses and to
search for "bona fide" fact disputes---the presence of facts sufficient to defend; New Jersey courts find such facts on the
basis of affidavit showing factual conflict, even when nonmovant's facts not persuasive to the court).
239. Id. at 457 n.235 (quoting National Metro. Bank v. Hitz, 11 App. D.C. 198, 199 (1879)) (summary judgment
intended to eliminate need to try case when debtor defendants are merely interposing "formal denials of pleading" that
Court implied could not be set forth in good faith sworn affidavit). See also Clark & Samenow, supra note 217, at 459
(citing Gleason v. Hoeke, 5 App. D.C. 1, 7 (1894), for the proposition that "[t]he fact that the defense appears
unreasonable cannot affect the defendant's right to trial.").
240. Clark & Samenow, supra note 217, at 461 & n.272 ("The defendant's affidavits are usually considered
true.").
241. Id. at463 (citing Holland v. Fletcher, 621nd. App. 149,112 N.E. 847 (1916) (sumnary judgment denied when
record, and in one case interrogatory answers, failed to "unequivocally show that the [defendant's] pleading was
false").
242. Clark & Samenow, supra note 217, at 470 (at time of the Clark and Samenow article, only Indiana and Virginia
made summary judgment available in all civil actions).
243. The Committee's original Advisory Note on the Rules stated that summary judgment "has been extensively
used in England for more than 50 years and has been adopted in a number of American states. New York, for example,
has made great use of it." See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Advisory Committee Notes, reprinted in 12 Wranr &
Masu, supra note 15, app. C at 498.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 99-121.
245. Rule 41 provides that the court may order a matter involuntarily dismissed in a bench trial or that plaintiff and
defendant may stipulate to involuntary dismissal at any stage of the proceedings. Rule 50(a) provides that the court may
direct a verdict for any party at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief or at the close of the evidence before the case is
submitted to the jury. Rule 52 provides that a judge acting as the trier of fact shall in making her decision set forth written
or transcribed findings of fact and conclusions of law or an equivalent memorandum explaining that decision.
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litigant opposing summary judgment need only demonstrate a sufficient fact dispute
to warrant the beginning of trial and need not prove to the court in advance of trial
that it would survive a directed verdict motion. To some extent, the purpose of the
directed verdict motion is to permit the judge to decide on the basis of the evidence
as it develops at trial whether a case is too weak to send to the jury.
Clark's 1952 article is less revealing in that it devotes much of its time to
summarizing relatively uncontroversial aspects of rule 56 and discussing the role of
summary judgment without directly addressing the thornier question of judicial fact
evaluation. Nothing in the article is inconsistent with the Clark and Samenow piece
written more than twenty years earlier, which is cited approvingly. 246 Clark again
approvingly cites New York, New Jersey, and Michigan cases as he did in the Clark
and Samenow article. 247
According to Clark's 1952 article, summary judgment may be granted when "no
defense is shown or when the defense appears to be sham or frivolous." 248 Rather
than permitting a judicial evaluation of the probative worth of facts and requested
inferences, Clark views summary judgment as relying upon uncontested facts and
gaining its ability to efficiently terminate litigation before trial by going beyond the
pleadings and requiring the nonmovant to submit affidavits rather than merely rest
upon averments. Clark anticipates the 1963 amendment to rule 56(e) in that his view
of a "strong" summary judgment rule is one that requires the nonmovant to introduce
evidence in opposition to the motion-not highly probative evidence, not evidence
more persuasive than that of the movant, but merely some evidence that creates a
factual dispute. 249
b. Judge Clark's Second Circuit Opinions
At the close of the 1952 article, Clark criticizes the notable Second Circuit
opinion from which he dissented, Arnstein v. Porter o0 He attacks the "slightest
doubt" test allegedly created by his circuit court rival, Judge Jerome Frank.251
Although some may regard this as Clark's endorsement of a stronger rule 56, his
views in Arnstein and other Second Circuit cases do not place him in harmony with
the Matsushita and Liberty Lobby majorities. 252 To Clark, summary judgment is
designed to eliminate cases in which the claimant has "no case at all," ' 3 not to
dismiss claims in which the claimant's case appears weak in the eyes of the judge.
Although Clark finds the relationship between summary judgment and directed
246. Clark, supra note 218, at 567 nn.2, 3.
247. Id. at 567, 569. The Michigan case law concerning the judge's role in summary judgment was not well
developed but suggested that the court must deny the motion so long as the movant's affidavits aver conflicting facts rather
than mere allegations. See Warren Webster & Co. v. Pelavin, 241 Mich. 19, 216 N.W. 430 (1927).
248. Clark, supra note 218, at 568. This phrase appears often in the New York and English cases cited by Clark and
Samenow.
249. Id. at 566, 571.
250. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
251. Clark, supra note 218, at 576, 578.
252. See Schick, Judicial Relations on the Second Circuit 1941-51, 44 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 939, 941-47 (1969)
[hereinafter Schick]; Smith, supra note 7, at 930, 952.
253. Clark, supra note 218, at 578.
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verdict to be "a suggestive and at times fruitful analogy," 25 4 he views it only as an
analogy and "not a rule of thumb." 25 5
In Arnstein, composer Ira Arnstein sued well-known composer Cole Porter,
contending that Porter had copied portions of Begin the Beguine and Night and Day
from works by Arnstein's. 256 At his deposition, Porter denied copying. Arnstein's
deposition suggested he was somewhat disturbed and given to flights of fantasy
concerning his compositions and attempts to steal them. He had an extensive past
history of multiple copyright infringement suits against other composers. 257 Judge
Frank, writing for the majority, found Arnstein's theory of the case highly
improbable but held this insufficient to support a grant of summary judgment, ruling
in essence that the nub of the case was a credibility contest between Arnstein and
Porter that must be decided by a jury.25 8 In language that became a red flag for the
decision's critics, Frank wrote that summary judgment must be denied when there is
the "slightest doubt as to the facts." 25 9
Clark subsequently ridiculed Frank's "slightest doubt" language. 260 Over the
years, these two giants of American jurisprudence continued the battle on a
professional and personal level 261 as to the appropriate approach to summary
judgment. In time, the commentators embraced Clark's perspective rather than
Frank's, criticizing the so-called "slightest doubt" test and advocating a more
aggressive approach to summary judgment.262
254. Id. at 579.
255. Id.
256. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 1946); Smith, supra note 7, at 930.
257. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
258. Id. at 470.
259. Id. at 468 (citing Doehier Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945), a case in which
Frank's view of the merits prevailed over Clark's dissent in reversing a grant of summary judgment). In Arnstein, Judge
Frank's precedent cited in support of the "slightest doubt" language-Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas. Corp., 321 U.S.
620 (1943)-illustrates the confused nature of summary judgment law and the tendency for the same cases and language
to be interpreted differently according to the eyes of the beholders. In Arnstein, Judge Frank cited Sartor for the
proposition that summary judgment could be granted upon only the clearest and most compelling record. Forty years later
in Liberty Lobby, Justice White cited Sartor for the proposition that the summary judgment standard was identical to a
directed verdict standard that permitted judges to assess the worth of each side's evidence and grant summary judgment
in a larger number of cases. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,-, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).
260. See, e.g., Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VmD. L. REv.
493, 504 (1950) ("[A] slight doubt can be developed as to practically all things human.").
261. See Smith, supra note 7, at 954 (although Clark "heartily endorsed Judge Frank's appointment to the Second
Circuit, he gradually came, I believe, to dislike Frank"). Professor Smith suggests that to some extent the personal
animosity between Clark and Frank fueled their doctrinal disagreement rather than vice versa. Id.
262. See, e.g., ius , supra note 18, § 16.5, at 355; Wasrr, Mains & KANE, supra note 17, § 2727, at 174-78.
A re-examination of Arnstein suggests that Judge Frank, whose overblown dicta in denying summary judgment was
indeed unfortunate, was to some extent unfairly maligned by the critics and that Judge Clark's dissent in Arnstein was
premised on something quite different than endorsement of any fact weighing by judges deciding summary judgment.
Judge Frank noted that Arnstein's composition had sold more than a million copies, making Porter's access to the works
undisputed. Armastein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). In order to prevail upon a claim of copyright
infringement, the plaintiff must prove (1) access by the defendant to the protected work; and (2) substantial similarity
between the works. See id. at 468-70. As to whether Porter could have copied Amstein, Frank noted that the record did
show series of identical notes in each composition and that given the diametrically opposed testimony of the parties,
credibility, a matter traditionally for jury determination, was at issue in the case. Id. at 470.
On this basis, Judge Frank, joined by Learned Hand, hardly a judge lacking in intellectual capacity or intestinal
fortitude, found summary judgment precluded. Frank in fact referred to the directed verdict in his analysis and concluded
that a directed verdict could not be granted on the same record at the close of trial. Id. Judge Frank went out of his way
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Judge Clark's dissent is generally discussed as though it contested with the
majority only upon the issue of whether a credibility contest between witnesses
precluded summary judgment.263 From such discussions, one may erroneously
derive the impression that Clark advocated judicial authority to resolve credibility
determinations in ruling on summary judgment motions. In actuality, Clark's dissent
focused on expert opinion stating that many compositions would have in common a
short string or strings of identical notes but that such similarity was coincidental and
did not in the expert's opinion constitute plagiarism.2 64 The majority deemed this
expert opinion, which had been obtained by Clark ex parte but not submitted by the
parties, "utterly immaterial," a characterization with which Clark took strong
issue. 26 5
Clark also argued that upon so little evidence of overlap in notes or uses, the court
could find as a matter of law a lack of substantial similarity between the Arnstein works
and the Porter works, thereby removing the case from jury consideration without the
need to weigh credibility.2 66 Although Clark's view of the fact/law distinction in
Arnstein may have shown some latent sympathy for the Matsushita approach of
disfavoring certain theories of a case as well as some lack of enthusiasm for the jury,
it also clearly shows that Clark's Arnstein dissent, usually seen as the high water mark
of his campaign for a stronger summary judgment rule, rejected Liberty Lobby's
suggestion of judicial assessment of the probative value of evidence.2 67
to limit the Arnstein holding, suggesting an example of when summary judgment would be apt to prevent a "farcical"
trial. Id. at 470-71, 473. Judge Frank wrote:
We agree that there are cases in which a trial would be farcical. If, in a suit on a promissory note, the defendant,
pleading payment, sets forth in an affidavit his cancelled check to the order of the plaintiff for the full amount
due on the note and a written receipt in full signed by the plaintiff while plaintiff in a reply affidavit merely states
that he did not receive payment and suggests no other proof, then to require a trial would be absurd; for
cross-examination of the defendant in such circumstances clearly would be futile.
Id. at 470-71 (citation omitted).
In other words, Judges Frank and Hand, below the surface of the regrettable "slightest doubt" language, were
taking, in general, a mainstream view of summary judgment. To them, a "genuine dispute" under rule 56 was one in
which the nonmovant's evidence was not clearly fabricated by the nonmovant, self-contradicted, at odds with the laws
of nature or other unquestionable sources, or so woefully improbable as to be a sham. For example, the Arnstein majority
also agreed that summary judgment could be granted in a copyright infringement claim that was so improbably ridiculous
as to be dismissed as a matter of law, for example, when "Ravel's 'Bolero' or Shostakovitch's 'Fifth Symphony' were
alleged to infringe 'When Irish Eyes Are Smiling.'" Id. at 473. To Frank, "fi]n such a case, the complete absence of
similarity would negate both copying and improper appropriation." Id. at 473 n.23. At some outer boundary, then, even
Judges Frank and Hand were willing to grant summary judgment in the face of an ostensible issue of fact existence or fact
interpretation by resolving the issue as a matter of law. Their view of when this was appropriate, however, stopped far
short of that in the Matsushita and Liberty Lobby Courts.
263. See, e.g., Wsrorr, Mumsn & KAw, supra note 17, at § 2727; Smith, supra note 7, at 930.
264. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 476-78 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 478. See also Schick, supra note 252, at 944.
266. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 480 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
267. Perhaps realizing that his case-specific suggestion for eliminating a claim most regarded as a waste of judicial
resources might be misinterpreted, Judge Clark took pains to restate his allegiance to the seventh amendment. "I am not
one to condemn jury trials, since I think it has a place among other quite finite methods of fact-finding." Id. at 479
(citation omitted). In addition, Clark noted that the claimant may not even have a jury trial right in light of his substantive
claim. Id. Most commentators suggest that Clark was in general receptive to jury trials. See Smith, supra note 7, at 917
("Clark would have gone further to ensure against appellate reversal, allowing the judge to order jury trial in all cases
regardless of the parties' rights. . . .Clark contended that [jury trial right] ought to . . .be determined as to each claim
presented rather than by characterizing the action as a whole.") (citing Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure
I1, 44 YArx L.J. 1291, 1297-98 (1935)); Plausible Pleadings, supra note 1, at 645-47. Clark's position on the right to
a jury trial in a multi-claim case in a merged system of law and equity was essentially adopted by the Supreme Court in
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Clark's writings as a Second Circuit judge in favor of a stronger interpretation
of rule 56 may be cited by some as evidence that the Matsushita and Liberty Lobby
approaches are consistent with the letter and spirit of the 1938 Rules. While it is true
that during the 1940s, Clark did dissent from several well-known Second Circuit
refusals to grant summary judgment, 68 a closer examination of these cases, however,
shows that Clark's advocacy of a "strong" summary judgment was limited to arguing
for an interpretation of rule 56 that has since been codified in rule 56(e), requiring the
nonmovant to respond to the motion with admissible material rather than merely
resting upon contrary averments of fact. 269
Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). But see Subrin, supra note 221, at 961-74 (arguing that the 1938
Federal Rules of Procedure demonstrate distinct anti-jury and pro-judge bias).
268. See Smith, supra note 7, at 928-31. Although Professor Smith, like most commentators, characterizes Clark
as one advocating that summary judgment "be granted liberally," Smith's discussion and the cases cited therein make
no mention of judicial fact assessment but primarily discuss Clark's efforts to require the nonmovant to offer "specific
proofs rather than general allegations" in opposition to the motion. Id. at 928. The cases marshalled by Smith are the
infamous Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), and other cases decided during the period, some of which are
cited nearly as often, but seldom as extensively discussed, as Arnstein: Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d
Cir. 1943); MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1944); Madeirese do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick
Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945); Dochler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States,
149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945); and California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
In Engl, Judge Clark wrote for the majority and read into the former rule 56 a requirement that the nonmovant meet
the motion with specific proofs, a requirement now made explicit in rule 56(e), added in 1963. Rule 56(e) states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Du Maurier was a copyright infringement allegation brought against the author of a popular novel by the author of
an obscure novel alleging some plot similarities between them. The majority denied sumrnary judgment despite suggesting
it unlikely that plaintiff would prevail at trial. Judge Swan, normally an ally of Clark's on summary judgment matters (see
Smith, supra note 7, at 929), joined by Judge Learned Hand, found that a finding of plagiarism was not so unreasonable
as to preclude trial. In dissent, Clark argued that the majority erred because plaintiff "chose to rest upon a purely formal
allegation of copying, with no specification of actual access" (MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F.2d 696, 702 (2d Cir.
1944) (Clark, J., dissenting)), a grave shortcoming according to Clark in light of plaintiff's burden of proof. Although
Clark hints that the plaintiff's claim was perhaps sufficiently unreasonable to be rejected as a matter of law (id. at 703),
he does not go so far as Matsushita in this regard and never suggests, as does Liberty Lobby that a judge could enter
summary judgment if she finds the record one-sidedly in favor of the movant.
On its record, Du Maurier is a close case with persuasive arguments on both sides. Although the plaintiff had relied
on allegations, it also appears that the defendant had made her motion without supporting affidavits or discovery materials.
In a sense, the defendant may have been merely claiming that the plaintiff had no support for its case without pointing
to specific failure of an essential element. As Justice White's concurrence in Catrett illustrates, such a motion may not
succeed even under the post-1986 Supreme Court view favoring a strong rule 56. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
__ , 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986) (White, J., concurring). Clark's dissent, although well-taken, hardly seems as
though he were writing "as if summary judgment itself were at stake" as stated by Professor Smith. Smith, supra note
7, at 929.
In Stulman-Emrick, Clark wrote an opinion upholding summary judgment in a contract case in which the contract
contained clear written language specifying shipment terms consistent with both evidence of trade usage and common
sense. Madeireuse do Brasil SIA v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399, 401-05 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
86 (1945). Doehler Metal Furniture involved somewhat less clear contract language and events, prompting the panel
composed of Frank, Chase, and Learned Hand to deny summary judgment. The dicta announcing the "slightest doubt"
test for granting summary judgment, rather than the holding, made Doehler Metal Furniture controversial to Clark. See
Smith, supra note 7, at 930. In California Apparel, Clark wrote for a panel granting summary judgment because
plaintiff-nonmovants had failed to "disclose in their affidavits what they do intend to rely upon [at trial]." California
Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893, 900 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947). The affidavits
even suggested obvious weaknesses in their claims. Id..
269. See, e.g., Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1943) ("mere formal denials or general
allegations which do not show the facts in detail and with precision are insufficient to prevent the award of summary
judgment"); Madeirense do Brasil SIA v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399, 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:95
Clark's criticisms of reluctance by his colleagues to grant summary judgment
never suggested that judges assess the worth of either side's evidence in ruling on
summary judgment motions. Rather, he viewed his brethren as occasionally too timid
in finding that a nonmovant had no legally material facts in support of its case or in
failing to reject a nonmovant's contention as foreclosed as a matter of law. 270 One
should also remember that the popular notion of Clark as a summary judgment
"hawk" battling with summary judgment "doves" on the Second Circuit stems from
only a handful of cases given notoriety because of the prestige and occasionally
combative relations of that bench.2 7' In sum, the writings of Dean Clark, Reporter
Clark, and Judge Clark tend to support a view of summary judgment at odds with
Matsushita and Liberty Lobby.
C. Prevailing Summary Judgment Practice and Scholarship Prior to
Liberty Lobby
1. Prior Commentator Consensus and Precedent
Prior to the Liberty Lobby opinion, some scholars had endorsed much of the
approach taken by the Court, particularly the use of the directed.verdict standard as
the summary judgment standard, 272 but they had written as though this were not
U.S. 861 (1945) (plaintiff-nonmovant made "no attempt, or even suggestion of an attempt, to 'condescend upon
particulars"' in opposition to motion as required by rule 56); California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d
893, 901 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
270. Although Clark's seeming tendency to want to reject claimants' theories of the case as a matter of law in
copyright cases may seem similar to the Court's approach to the antitrust claim in Matsushita, Clark refrains from
characterizing the claims as implausible or suggesting that different evidentiary standards apply to theories less popular
to the bench. Rather, Clark's "matter of law" suggestions seem more at the core of substantive law. For example, in
Arnstein he suggested that the court interpret copyright law to require more than a few consecutive notes of similarity to
constitute infringement, presumably even if the few notes had been copied. Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 477, 480
(2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
271. During the 1940s, the Second Circuit was clearly the preeminent federal appeals court, composed of
well-known and respected judges such as Clark, Frank, Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, and former Yale Law School
Dean Thomas Swan. The occasional clashes of these formidable personalities, especially the feud between Clark and
Frank, has received significant scholarly comment. See generally M. SciecK, LaAsmm HArm's CourT (1970); Schick, supra
note 252; Smith, supra note 7.
272. See Currie, supra note 20; Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional
Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. Rav. 707 (1984) [hereinafter Actual Malice]; Louis, supra note 18; Pollak, Liberalizing
Summary Adjudication: A Proposal, 36 HAs=Grs L.J. 419 (1985) [hereinafter Pollak]; Sonenshein, supra note 18.
Both in its view of the authority of the judge to evaluate facts in a summary judgment motion and its holding that
the "clear and convincing" evidence standard of proof applied to summary judgment as well as trial in defamation
actions, the Supreme Court in Liberty Lobby essentially adopted the approach urged by Professor Louis in his Yale Law
Journal and Southern California Law Review articles. Professor Louis suggested in the Yale article that courts ruling on
summary judgment motions should take into account whether the movant bore the burden of proof and the quantum of
proof required to sustain a claim. See Louis, supra note 18, at 748. Movants without the burden of proof should therefore
be able to prevail when they presented virtually uncontested or substantially probative evidence negating an essential
element of the nonmovant's claim. Id. at 748-50. A summary judgment "motion is closely analogous to the [moving]
party's motion at trial for a directed verdict on the same issue." Id. at 748. When-nonmovant does not bear the burden
of persuasion, "the summary judgment evidentiary standard should be relaxed." Id. at 749. Focusing specifically on
defamation cases in the Southern California Law Review article, Professor Louis argued that the nonmovant defamation
claimant must have "a realistic chance to reach the jury" in opposition to a directed verdict motion if the court is to find
a genuine issue as to actual malice (see Actual Malice, supra, at 719). In other words, under the Louis approach, as
essentially accepted in Liberty Lobby, the defamation claimant opposing summary judgment must place in the record
reasonably strong circumstantial evidence of malice that could support a reasonable factfinder's finding of malice by clear
and convincing evidence. Professor Louis did not go as far as the Liberty Lobby Court. He counseled denial of summary
judgment when the claimant can realistically show a possibility of obtaining additional evidence before trial and also
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universal summary judgment practice. Regardless of one's views concerning the
wisdom of merging the rule 56 and rule 50(a) standards, one is hard pressed to
demonstrate that these legal scholars were simply wrong about the state of the law.
They recognized that in modem federal practice, many, probably most, courts treated
summary judgment as different from and harder to obtain than a directed verdict.
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court majority indirectly told those
promoting reform that the millennium had not only arrived but had been in
place for nearly fifty years. To the reformist critics of pre-Liberty Lobby sum-
mary judgment and to lawyers generally, these pronouncements must have
seemed to describe a legal world unlike the one within which they moved. To be
sure, courts had taken inconsistent approaches to both summary judgment and
directed verdict motions, making the commentators' assessments of the state of
the law contradictory in part. Despite this, the major treatises on federal prac-
tice-Wright and Miller,273 Moore's Federal Practice,274 and Wright's Law of
Federal Courts-,2 75-as well as the most respected general treatises on civil
counseled that courts should also consider claimant's lack of access to evidence, the relative expense of claimant proof
through trial subpoenas rather than depositions, and "any facts which call into question the defendant's denials or
explanations of the challenged conduct." See id. at 720. Professor Louis also noted the importance of the trial atmosphere,
cross-examination, and proper inferences suggesting disbelief of the movant's affidavit claims of no malice. See id. at
716-22. As detailed in this Article's critique of Liberty Lobby,see supra text accompanying notes 99-121, the Court gave
rather short shrift to these factors counseling restraint in granting summary judgment and instead embraced essentially
only the pro-defendant, pro-summary judgment rationale of Professor Louis's writings.
273. See WJuGtr, MiuxR & KsE, supra note 17, at §§ 2713, 2725, 2727.
274. See MooRE, supra note 164, 56.02[10], 56.04[2]. Professor Moore equated the theoretical bases of summary
judgment and directed verdict in that both provided for decision where there was no issue of fact existence or fact inference
requiring jury consideration. In reading Moore, it seems his concept of the directed verdict did not permit the judge, even
after the close of the evidence, to assess the relative probative worth of conflicting evidence. Id. at T 56.04[02]. Rather,
the required inquiry examined whether there was a fact conflict.
In deciding a summary judgment question, the judge was cautioned by Moore that "it is not the trial court's function
to pass upon credibility in evaluating the evidentiary material in support of and in opposition to the motion." Id. at
T 56.02[ 10]. Moore also noted the obvious difference in the timing and data bases of the motions and cites with approval
Denny v. Seaboard Laquer, Inc., 487 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1973), which stated that "[e]ven in cases where the judge is of
the opinion that he will have to direct a verdict . . . he should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct a verdict rather
than attempt to try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 491. Moore also cited Ryan v. Glenn,
336 F. Supp. 555, 558 (N.D. Miss. 1971), in which the court stated that is was "not required at [the summary judgment]
juncture to determine whether defendant's evidence is sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict" (emphasis
the court's). Perhaps the most interesting ease cited by Moore for the proposition of theoretical similarity between
summary judgment and directed verdict is Arstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), the famous "slightest doubt"
case denying summary judgment and engendering heated and continuing debate between Judges Clark and Frank.
Normally, of course, Arnstein is not viewed as a case consistent with the Matsushita and Liberty Lobby approaches. To
some extent, then, Professor Moore, like other commentators makes a comparison between rule 56 and rule 50 but on
closer examination seems to suggest that courts have correctly applied them in distinct ways. Moore, like the other cases
and commentators, provides only superficial support for the Supreme Court's actions in Matsushita and Liberty Lobby.
275. See Wiueir, supra note 17, at 662-66. Professor Wright's description of the tasks before the court in deciding
summary judgment motions demonstrates the difference between the traditional approach and that advocated by the Court
in 1986. To Wright, the summary judgment motion "argues that as a matter of law upon admitted or established facts the
moving party is entitled to prevail." Id. at 664. No mention is made in this leading treatise of a summary judgment movant
prevailing because its facts are more probative or persuasive or plausible or that the evidence is "so one-sided." See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986).
Professor Wright quotes approvingly the statement in Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940), that
the purpose of a summary judgment motion "is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have
evidence which they will offer on a trial, it is to carefully test this out, in advance of trial by inquiring and determining
whether such evidence exists." According to Professor Wright, "[o]n a motion for summary judgment, the court cannot
try issues of fact. It can only determine whether there are issues to be tried." WiuGrr, supra note 17, at 664. In addition,
a "party opposing the [summary judgment] motion is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:95
procedure276 and lesser known commentators277 had all concluded that summary
judgment and directed verdict were quite distinct in practice and distinct in theory as
well. Not even those finding the closest nexus between summary judgment and
directed verdict contended that the standards for the two rules "mirrored" one
another as the Liberty Lobby Court held. The leading law school civil procedure
texts, focusing primarily on federal procedure, also suggested both that the summary
judgment and directed verdict standards were not congruent and that the directed
verdict inquiry did not permit assessment of the probative value of competing
facts. 278
whether a genuine issue exists." Id. at 666-67 (citations omitted). He also endorses in large part the view that summary
judgment is generally inappropriate in cases involving conspiracy and state of mind. Id. at 665-66. Matsushita involved
an alleged conspiracy. Liberty Lobby turned on the state of mind of the defendants. "That it may be surmised that the
non-moving party is unlikely to prevail at the trial is not sufficient to authorize summary judgment against him." Id. at
668 (citations omitted). A fair reading of Wright seems clearly at variance with the Court's 1986 approach to summary
judgment. See also CouN, supra note 11, at 10 ("in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the judge does not decide
which side is telling the truth.... [S]ummary judgment will not be appropiate even though the judge is fTmiy convinced
that [an affiant opposing summary judgment] is lying."); Jws & HAZARD, supra note 11, § 5.19 at 273 (summary
judgment "not intended to resolve issues that are within the traditional province of the trier of fact, but rather to see
whether there are such issues."); WrGur, mui & KANE, supra note 17, at § 2712 (grant of summary judgment when
there are "no disputed facts" as opposed to when facts are "so one-sided" or vastly different in probative force according
to court's perception.
The force of these authorities weighs particularly strongly against the outcomes in Matsushita and Liberty Lobby,
especially with regard to the "traditional province of the trier of fact." According to James and Hazard, "the trier offacts
may have two distinct and different functions: to find what the facts were, and to evaluate those facts in terms of legal
consequences. . . . Summary judgment should be denied 'even where there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts but
only as to the conclusions to be drawn therefrom.'" JA .s & HAzARo, supra note 11, § 5.19, at 273 n.5 (quoting Pierce
v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910, 915 (4th Cir. 1951)) (other citations omitted).
276. See, e.g., JAsss & HAZARD, supra note 11, § 5.19; J. Fpruasrm., M. Kams & A. Mrrin, Civir, PROc URE
§ 9.3, at 439-41 (1985).
277. See R. HAvuocK, D. HERR & J. Sr-eem, FutDAmsrrAs s oF PRimviAL mroAnoN § 16.1.10 (1985) [hereinafter
HAvoocK]; HIRR, supra note 18, at 52 (1987 Supp.), in which the authors endorsed the merger of summary judgment and
directed verdict doctrine, viewing this as a substantial change in the status quo. The authors endorsed and cited the
Sonenshein article, supra note 18, and stated: "Because courts generally feel themselves empowered to direct verdicts
where the case for the nonmovant is weak but more than nonexistent, this would generally tend to make summary
judgment somewhat more available, a trend favored by the authors." The instant author now, obviously, holds a different
view. The opinions expressed herein are my own and not necessarily those of Mr. Herr or Professor Haydock.
See also Note, Summary Judgment in the Federal Courts, 99 U. PA. L. Rav. 212, 215-16 (1958) (suggesting that
the proffering of any conflicting evidence by nonmovant precluded summary judgment; "fact that the truth of
[nonmovant's] affidavits is less probable, or that he has failed to introduce statements of disinterested parties, or that his
evidence is equivocal does not authorize the court to grant summary judgment against him.") (citations omitted).
278. See, e.g., CousiN, supra note 11, at 10, 772-79, 919-27. As previously noted, the Cound textbook states at its
outset the traditional rule that judges may not make credibility assessments to resolve a motion for summary judgment and
must deny the motion where affidavits put a fact in issue "even though the judge is fimly convinced that [the] affiant
is lying." Id. at 10. This seems quite a different standard from that enunciated in Liberty Lobby, in which the judge is
invited to grant summary judgment in the face of a conflicting affidavit that the judge finds to be insignificantly
convincing. One summary judgment case excerpted by Cound, (Lundeen v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1966)),
makes the theoretical comparison between summary judgment and directed verdict but suggests that beth motions may be
granted only when there is no conflict in the material evidence (CouND, supra note 11, at 776). The directed verdict cases
excerpted by Cound, (Denman v. Spain, 242 Miss. 431, 135 So.2d 195 (1961); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S.
500 (1957)), hold the same view of the directed verdict.
See also M. RosrnERo, H. SMrr & H. KoRN, Ea sVrers OF Cvnr. PRocErDuR 686-707, 962-91 (4th ed. 1985) [hereinafter
RosmERG]. Cases excerpted by Rosenberg include the well-known Arnstein v. Porter, with a discussion of the Second
Circuit's eventual abandonment of the "slightest doubt" test in favor of the more rigorous but non-fact assessing approach
of Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952). Another excerpted case, Di Sabato v. Soffes, 9 A.D.2d 297, 193
N.Y.S.2d 184 (1st Dept. 1959), treats summary judgment as apt only when the nonmovant completely fails to controvert
evidence and suggests that a grant of the motion is inapt when the uncontradicted facts would support divergent inferences.
See RosENBEo, supra, at 701-05 ("In personal injury actions the issues of negligence and contributory negligence are
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Generally, someone consulting these sources would have been told that
summary judgment was appropriate under rule 56 when the moving party demon-
strated no divergence in the parties admissible proof of important facts but that a
conflict in these factual "stories" of the parties precluded summary judgment.279
Thus, when the defendant/movant in a claimed breach of contract for the sale of
goods introduced evidence that the value of the alleged contract was more than five
hundred dollars and the purported contract was not memorialized by a writing signed
by the defendant, the defendant had articulated a winning summary judgment motion
on statute of frauds grounds if the plaintiff stood idly by, resting on merely its
averments that a contract existed.
If, however, the plaintiff/nonmovant had submitted an affidavit by the plaintiff
stating that defendant had orally made the contract and that plaintiff, in reasonable
reliance on the oral agreement, entered into obligations with suppliers and that
defendant was aware of plaintiff's consequent exposure and contract obligations,
plaintiff had stated a possible situation of detrimental reliance that could vitiate the
statute of frauds defense. There existed a fact conflict as to whether the statute of
frauds defense could be applied. No matter how many affidavits submitted by
defendant disavowing conduct giving rise to reliance, no matter how skeptical the
judge about plaintiff's claim, the case could not be disposed of by summary judgment
under the prevailing view.
Only in rare circumstances could summary judgment result from the fact
scenario outlined above. If, for example, plaintiff had given deposition or other
sworn testimony inconsistent with its affidavit claiming estoppel and reliance,
defendant could produce this and a court could find that plaintiff's creation of the fact
dispute was not "genuine" within the meaning of rule 56 because of plaintiff's
apparent eleventh hour fabrication of facts to meet an unexpected legal argument. The
general rule is that affidavits submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion
may explain statements made in deposition or hearing but will not be heard to
generally not resolved by a summary judgment. They ordinarily evoke conflicting testimony and the 'reasonableness' of
the actor's conduct, both of which are traditionally for the jury to determine. " Id. at 705.).
See also J. LArNDERs & J. MARmI, C ,. PRoCEDURE 31-32, 615-30 (1981) (most courts consider conflicting affidavits
to create genuine issue of material fact even if movant produced more or better affidavits). This text also discusses the
"most famous summary judgment case" ofArnstein v. Porter and also excerpts Conrad v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d
914 (7th Cir. 1974), in which the court denied summary judgment to a movant whose affidavits denied having the requisite
mental state required by the statutory claim of wrongful discharge, saying "[I]f improper motive could reasonably be
inferred from facts before the court, sworn denials of such intentions do not remove the issue from the case so as to entitle
the party to judgment." Id. at 918. See also P. CARINGroN & B. BABcoCK, Cvm PRocEDUR 551 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter
CARRsooN] ("[Olne possible meaning of a genuine issue of fact is that both sides can present substantial evidence
sufficient to merit jury consideration. But the substantial evidence test [for directed verdict motions] is applied after the
proof is in, and the summary judgment test must be applied on the proof in prospect. Therefore, the summary judgment
test is more rigorous, admitting of even less doubt.").
In their supplements appearing afterMatsushita, Liberty Lobby, and Carrett, the major civil procedure texts generally
restricted themselves to excerpting or noting one or more of these cases but did not characterize these decisions as either
changing rule 56 or as consistent with rule 56. See, e.g., CourN, supra note 11, at 393-403 (1987 Supp.); D. LotsEu ,
G. HAzARo & C. Ta'r, PArDo AsNo PRocrURE 17-34 (1987 Supp.); RosENBuno, supra, at 50-51 (1987 Supp.) (also citing
Knight v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1986),cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987), and noting that the
"message sent in these [Supreme Court] decisions has not escaped the attention of the lower courts.").
279. See, e.g., CotnD, supra note 11, at 772-88; Wviorr, Mnsu & KAE, supra note 17, at § 2725.
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contradict sworn testimony.280 At a minimum, the plaintiff would then likely be
subject to some rather major sanctions pursuant to rule 56(g) for submitting an
affidavit in bad faith when the judge in mid-trial determined that the deposition
testimony governed and granted defendant's rule 50(a) motion for directed verdict.
The accepted federal civil procedure authorities were also uniform in declaring
the standard for directed verdict. A court was empowered by rule 50(a) to grant a
directed verdict for the defendant at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief or for either
party at the close of the evidence when the nonmovant's evidence in opposition to the
motion was not sufficient to support the verdict of a reasonable jury in its favor.281
In other words, a directed verdict was appropriate when no significant admissible
evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury's verdict for the nonmovant. 282
This general rule for the directed verdict is quite different from that enunciated for
summary judgment. Even those commentators who saw similarity in the two
standards and advocated more of a directed verdict approach to summary judgment
recognized this difference.
Although one leading treatise, Wright and Miller, has gone so far as to state that
the directed verdict motion "rests on the same theory" as a summary judgment
motion283 and that the primary distinction between the two motions is one of
timing,284 this work also noted other distinctions and was careful not to treat the two
motions as congruent. 285 One principal distinction the authors stressed was that:
280. See Camfield Tires v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1366 (8th Cir. 1983).
281. See HERR, supra note 18, at 474-75; WIGHr, supra note 17, at 640-43. According to Professor Wright, "the
case must go to thejury if conflicting inferences may legitimately be drawn from the facts," but the concept of a legitimate
inference has proven to be an illusive one. WRIGHr, supra note 17, at 641. The Supreme Court had, prior to 1986, seemed
to favor a broad definition of legitimate inference, one favoring submission of claims to the jury when the nonmovant's
requested inference was not foreclosed by uncontested evidence of record to the contrary. See Lavender v. Kum, 327 U.S.
645, 653 (1946) ("whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different
inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute
by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference").
282. See Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476 (1943); King v. Ford Motor Co., 597 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1979).
283. See WrIur, MauE. & KANE, supra note 17, § 2713.1, at 613. Perhaps the strongest pre-Liberty Lobby
statement in favor of its approach was that of Professor Moore, who stated that summary judgment must be denied when
there "is contradictory evidence, or the movant's evidence is impeached, [or] an issue of credibility is present, provided
that the contradicting or impeaching evidence is not too incredible to be believed by reasonable minds." Moose, supra
note 164, at 56.15[4]. Although this approach tends to equate the summary judgment with a fact-assessing directed
verdict test, Professor Moore's commentary read as a whole suggests that, at least at the summary judgment stage of
litigation, courts find most admissible nonmovant evidence to be within the realm of the not too incredible or
unreasonable. Even courts approvingly quoting Moore's passage have, on the merits, been solicitous of any evidence
preferred by the nonmovant. See, e.g., Russell v. Mid-East Oil Co., 417 F. Supp. 440, 443 (W.D. Pa. 1976). But see
Appolonio v. Baxter, 217 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1954) (affirming grant of summary judgment and acknowledging that it is
conceivable, but improbable, that nonmovant could prove facts to support a reasonable jury's verdict).
284. See Wmor, Muimn & KAn, supra note 17, § 2713.1, at 614.
285. A closer examination of the cases cited in Wright and Miller to support the linkage between summary judgment
and directed verdict suggests that the courts, while in dicta frequently paying homage to the theoretical similarities
between the motions, have usually taken a far more restrictive approach to beth summary judgment and directed verdict
than did the Matsushita and Liberty Lobby Courts. In the majority of the cases cited in Wright and Miller, the courts have
engaged in no evaluation or assessment of the probative force of either side's evidence. Rather, the courts have for the
most part granted summary judgment only when the nonmovant submitted no evidence, not even the proverbial
"scintilla" in support of its claims or in rebuttal of movant's submissions. See, e.g., Bieghler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531
(9th Cir. 1980) (whether nonmovant's evidence is of sufficient probative force is a question for jury; court may not grant
summary judgment even if convinced nonmovant will lose at trial); THI-Hawaii Inc. v. First Commerce Fim. Corp., 627
F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1980); Roberts v. Browning Inc. of Utah, 610 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1979); Charbonages De France v.
Smith, 597 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1979); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. ABC-Paramount Theatres, 388 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.
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On a summary judgment motion the court is not permitted to rule on the credibility of
the material that is presented. When there is an issue whether the testimony of an affiant or
deponent would be credible if presented at trial, the court must deny summary judgment and
leave that question to be resolved by the finder of fact. However, a directed verdict motion
typically would be made after the witness had testified and the court could take account of
the possibility that he either could not be disbelieved or believed by the jury."28 6
1967), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972); Doff v. Brunswick Corp., 372 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1967); Empire Elec. Co.
v. United States, 311 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1962); Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.
1943); Siever v. Beechcraft Mfg. Co., 497 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. La. 1980); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp.
1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Coleman v. Dover Corp., 384 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 508 F.2d
843 (6th Cir. 1975); McKinney v. Armco Steel Corp., 270 F. Supp. 854 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Bass v. Southern Pac. Co.,
196 F. Supp. 763 (D. Ore. 1961); Braughton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Mo. 1960); Riss & Co.
v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 190 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1960); United States v. Daubendick, 25 F.R.D. 50 (N.D. Ia.
1959); United States v. 162 Cases Containing Approximately 415 Proof Gallons of Distilled Spirits, 138 F. Supp. 820
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Myers v. District of Columbia, 17 F.R.D. 216 (D.D.C. 1955); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Ballard,
1 F.R.D. 180 (S.D. Fla. 1940).
A significant number of the cases cited in the Wright and Miller footnote granted summary judgment not because the
court made assessments of the competing evidence but because the legal aspect of nonmovant's claims were rejected as
a matter of law. See, e.g., Taray v. Moldavanyi, 478 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. New England
Merchants Nat'l Bank, 465 F. Supp. 83 (D. Mass. 1979); United States v. Golden Fifty Pharmaceutical Co., 421 F. Supp.
1199 (N.D. fI1. 1976); Cousins v. Yaeger, 394 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Davies v. Collins, 349 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.
Ky. 1972); United States v. Artman, 320 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Tenn. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1374 (6th
Cir. 1971); United Serv. Auto Ass'n v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Miller v. Hoffman,
1 F.R.D. 290 (D.N.J. 1940).
Of the many cases cited in the Wright and Miller footnote, only a few can be fairly read as supporting either a
summary judgment or directed verdict doctrine that permits judges to evaluate competing evidence beyond the court's
obvious need to ascertain that the nonmovant's evidence is not fabricated, self-contradicted, or conclusively disproven by
its variance from known reality. See Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Kern v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 386 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1968); Wolf v. Schaben,
272 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1959); Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn. 1973).
These cases do not provide a firm foundation for the new summary judgment erected by Matsushita and Liberty
Lobby. Wetzel, for example, suggested the type of evidence necessary to withstand summary judgment but found that
nonmovants had not developed such evidence during discovery or shown likelihood of unearthing evidence. Although
Wetzel discusses the directed verdict in its strongest formulation-the notion that nonmovant's requested fact inference
must "reasonably preponderate" over that of the movant (id. at 26)-it also acknowledges that the federal directed verdict
standard since Lavender v. Kum, 327 U.S. 645 (1946), has been highly deferential to jury consideration. Although there
is ample rhetoric comparing summary judgment and directed verdict, the type of directed verdict doctrine envisioned by
these cases is not the aggressive, fact-weighing directed verdict of Liberty Lobby but rather the milder directed verdict that
could not be granted when the nonmovant either put forth submissions to discredit the movant's evidence or submitted
"some opposing evidence" of its own. See Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir.
1943).
286. WucHTr, Mnum & KANE, supra note 17, § 2713.1, at 614 (citations omitted). See also JAEs & HAzAn, supra
note 11, § 7.13, at 355-57 discussing the varied applications of directed verdict doctrine and what this Article terms the
divergent "aggressive" and "mild-mannered" approaches of the courts:
So far as credibility goes, all courts consider it on a motion for directed verdict to the minimum degree of
determining whether testimony is capable of belief by reasonable people or is incredible as a matter of law. No
court will let a jury base a verdict on testimony that is flatly contradicted by indisputable physical facts or laws
of nature, but few, if any courts are willing to go much further than that. The real differences, for the most part,
are in the willingness to find contradiction with physical facts or some other basis for declaring evidence
incredible as matter of law. Even here there is today a fairly uniform reluctance to go very far in taking matters
of credibility from the jury. The apparent differences lie in nomenclature. Some courts call the problem
described in this paragraph one of credibility, others do not. . . . Mhe tendency has probably been in the
direction of allowing the jury greater latitude in drawing inferences, notably in personal injury tort cases.
Id. (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
This passage serves to emphasize two other points already made in this Article. First, courts have traditionally
engaged in more evaluation of witness credibility in deciding directed verdict motions than they have in deciding summary
judgment motions. In that sense, the two doctrines do not "mirror" each other as asserted by the Liberty Lobby majority.
Second, traditional directed verdict jurisprudence gave most courts less authority to weigh evidence than that suggested
in Liberty Lobby.
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One need only conduct a cursory review of the Court's actions in Matsushita and
Liberty Lobby to see how far beyond this "hombook law" the Court ventured in its
zeal to grant summary judgment. In Matsushita, the Court, without the benefit of live
testimony, in effect held that plaintiffs' expert witness affiants and planned trial
witnesses could not be believed by the factfinder as to their conclusions that the
defendants engaged in predatory pricing actions despite a failure to reap monopoly
profits for more than twenty years. In Liberty Lobby, the Court held that the jury
would not be free to disbelieve the defendants' averred absence of malice despite
going to press with defamatory statements based on an unknown source and a
previously disputed article. Although both of these conclusions by the Court may
have been more likely to be accepted by the factfinder than the scenarios proffered by
the Matsushita and Liberty Lobby plaintiffs, one can hardly say that plaintiffs' views
are so unreasonable that no rational jury could agree with them.
The Wright and Miller treatise also noted as one similarity between summary
judgment and directed verdict that in both instances "all inferences are drawn in favor
of the nonmoving party." 287 The Court in fact rejected as too remote the inferences
asked by the plaintiffs in Matsushita and Liberty Lobby. In effect, the Court
determined that it would not allow the factfinder to draw the inference that Japanese
consumer electronics companies wait patiently to reap monopoly profits or that they
have other business motives for selling below cost. The Court also would not draw
the inference that publishing defamatory statements from suspect sources was
reckless disregard of the truth. Although these inferences do not seem all that
unreasonable, the Court found them to be so outlandish that they could be ignored.
This treatment appears to have altered the traditional directed verdict doctrine as well
as summary judgment doctrine and underscores the case-specific errors in these two
holdings.
Commentators suggesting a close relationship between the jurisprudence of rule
56 and that of rule 50 were also unanimous in noting that the judge should not grant
summary judgment even when he or she would be compelled after trial on the instant
record to set aside a verdict for the nonmovant and order a new trial or grant judgment
n.o.v. 288 The inquiry of the judge at the summary judgment stage was to be limited
to ascertaining whether there was any legitimate evidence of record and any rational
287. NVIUGHr, Mna.E & KmE, supra note 17, § 2713.1, at 615. According to Professor Wright:
The correct rule seems to be that the court may consider all of the evidence favorable to the position of the party
opposing the motion as well as any unfavorable evidence that the jury is required to believe. Thus it may take
into account evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent
that this evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.
W~uGrr, supra note 17, at 642 (citing Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1970); Negron v. Ward, 458 F. Supp.
748, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 Mom. L. Rv.
903, 948-53 (1971); and Wiuorr, MainR & KA, supra note 17, § 2529).
288. See Wiurr, Maixu & KIAs, supra note 17, § 2713.1, at 619 (citing favorably Fireman's Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F.2d 359, 363 (5th Cir. 1945) ("Only when the evidence is such that it is clear the jury would
have none to go on, . . . can the motion [for summary judgment] be sustained and a jury trial denied." (emphasis
added))). Courts have expressly recognized that, in effect, the judge's opinion as to the true merits of the case must be
held with greater certainty for a summary judgment grant than for a directed verdict grant. See, e.g., Stanley v. Guy
Scroggins Constr. Co., 297 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1961); Armco Steel Corp. v. Realty Inv. Co., 273 F.2d 483,485 (8th Cir.
1960).
[Vol. 49:95
19881 SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTED VERDICT 151
inferences therefrom that tended to support the nonmovant's claimed version of
events and theory of the case. If so, the judge, even one treating the decision as akin
to a directed verdict calculus, was bound to deny summary judgment. 289
Professor Wright, in his one-volume treatise on the subject, although not
addressing in detail the relation between rules 56 and 50 as in the Wright and Miller
treatise, used language to describe the summary judgment process that implicitly
rejected the complete directed verdict analogy of Liberty Lobby. "On a motion for
summary judgment the court cannot try issues of fact. It can only determine whether
there are issues to be tried. ' '290 He continued: "[though] it may be surmised that the
non-moving party is unlikely to prevail at the trial [that] is not sufficient to authorize
summary judgment against him. "291
Professors James and Hazard, although noting the close theoretical relation
between summary judgment and directed verdict, also treat the two as distinct and
note that the authorities "agree also that summary judgment should be denied if the
evidence at trial stood in the same posture as the material on file upon the motion. "292
Both of these hornbook expressions of a court's required fact deference to the jury
and inference deference to the nonmovant in ruling on rule 50(a) motions seem
disregarded by the Supreme Court's actual conduct in Matsushita and Liberty Lobby.
Even one of the most direct advocates of toughening the summary judgment standard
through rigorous application of directed verdict principles stated that under his
construct "summary judgment can never be granted when the evidence could
reasonably support a finding for either side.' '293
To be sure, the commentators had consistently criticized judicial opinions
suggesting that summary judgment was extremely difficult to obtain, 294 could only be
289. See WsRiHr, Munim & KA E, supra note 17, § 2713. 1, at 619-20. In deciding a directed verdict motion, a court
may take into account evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, if the evidence
comes from disinterested sources. Unfavorable evidence proffered by the movant that contradicts the favorable evidence
on behalf of the nonmovant "must be disregarded." Id. at 573 (citations omitted). Accord Cooper, supra note 287, at
948-53.
290. Wvac;r, supra note 17, at 664.
291. Id. at 668 (citing Hayden v. First Nat'l Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979); Jobson v.
Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1966); Harl v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 317 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
292. JA.ss & HAzARD, supra note 11, § 5.19, at 276 (citing Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620
(1944)). The authors' citation of Sartor for the proposition that summary judgment is improper when the record would
not require a directed verdict, is interesting. For years, the Sartor opinion was viewed as one that, although comparing
rule 50 and rule 56, made summary judgment too hard to obtain by suggesting that it must be denied where the movant's
testimony is interested. See, e.g., Soncnshein, supra note 18, at 802. The Court in Liberty Lobby, however, cited Sartor
to support its thesis that judges could employ the fact evaluating approach of aggressive directed verdict jurisprudence to
summary judgment motions. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).
293. Sonenshein, supra note 18, at 793.
294. See, e.g., Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), criticized in JAMEs & HAZARD, supra note 11, § 5.19,
at 276-77; Wmirr, Manex & KIn., supra note 17, § 2727, at 174-75. A respected district judge was sufficiently
frustrated by the "slightest doubt" cases in the Second Circuit, that he denied one summary judgment motion with the
following, oft-quoted editorial detour.
On these facts we would be inclined to grant summary judgment. But, in this Circuit at least, District Courts
may not rely to any substantial extent on summary judgment predicated upon testimonial proof to avoid a full
trial even though a recovery seems hopeless. . . . Since courts are composed of mere mortals they can decide
matters only on the basis of probability, never on certainty. The "slightest doubt" test, if it is taken seriously,
means that summary judgment is almost never to be used-a pity in this critical time of overstrained legal
resources.
Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (Weinstein, J.). But see Brachtl, Has Summary
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granted in the clearest of cases, 295 or could not be granted if there was the "slightest
doubt" as to the correctness of the decision. 296 In criticizing these cases for taking a
view of rule 56 too hostile to the movant, the commentators never suggested that rule
56 was really rule 50(a). Rather, the prevailing view was that "good" courts would
ignore the overblown dicta of cases taking too narrow a view of the rule and
restricting its use.297 Instead, wise judges would take a hard look at the genuineness
of nonmovant evidence, particularly affidavit testimony, and would be similarly
careful not to consider any trivial factual controversies as creating a genuine issue of
material fact. The legal issue presented in the summary judgment motion guided
courts in determining what was material. 298 In this way, combined with a willingness
to look hard at the legal relevance of opposition to the motion, courts could
effectively employ summary judgment without weighing facts and usurping the
traditional jury role.
Unlike the standard authorities, the reformist commentators299 believed that rule
56 would not become truly effective at eliminating needless trials and streamlining
litigation until it permitted judges more authority to label a nonmovant's evidence
unconvincing, as did rule 50(a), 300 or to account for the burden of persuasion 3ol and
standard of proof at trial3o2 in deciding rule 56 motions. In effect, these authorities
tended to support this Article's thesis that the pre-Liberty Lobby summary judgment
standard never permitted judges as much fact evaluating power as traditional directed
verdict practice and certainly never granted judges the "license to weigh" facts
suggested by the prose and results of Matsushita and Liberty Lobby.
Again, a certain amount of controversy, if not confusion and contradiction, must
be conceded when discussing the commentators' views as to the identity of the
"real" summary judgment, particularly the question of what constitutes a "genuine"
Judgment Been Eliminated in the Second Circuit?, 46 BRooKLN L. Rav. 565 (1980) (practitioner author argues that despite
notoriety of Arnstein and other cases in which the Second Circuit adopted Judge Jerome Frank's restrictive dicta of
summary judgment, most Second Circuit cases since the mid-1960s have followed a more apt approach to summary
judgment, as set forth in cases such as Dressier v. The MV Sandpiper, 331 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1964)). AccordPierce, supra
note 25.
295. See, e.g., United Rubber Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (denying
summary judgment motion although court noted "apparent flimsiness of plaintiff's claim," suggesting that the claim
would be dismissed on the same record at trial). Although the approach of United Rubber Workers may be criticized, as
were the "slightest doubt" cases, it illustrates how courts typically distinguished the showing required to obtain summary
judgment with that needed for directed verdict. See also Forstmann Woolen Co. v. J.W. Mays, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 459,
460 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
296. See, e.g., Tomalewski v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1974), criticized in WaGsr, M eUMI
& KANE, supra note 17, § 2727 at 176-78; Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and
Rules, 3 VAND. L. Ray. 493, 504 (1950) [hereinafter Special Problems].
297. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 18, at 355 (courts, by applying "literal language" of rule 56 rather than "slightest
doubt" dicta, can make effective and frequent use of summary judgment motion); WasuGr, MaixR & KANE, supra note
17, at §§ 2712, 2719.
298. See WFaUHr, Mna.E & KANE, supra note 17, § 2725, at 93-95, cited with approval in Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, -, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).
299. See supra note 272.
300. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 20; Schwarzer, supra note 19; Sonenshein, supra note 18.
301. See, e.g., Louis, supra note 18; Pollak, supra note 272.
302. See, e.g., Actual Malice, supra note 272, at 716-21. Courts deciding summary judgment motions seldom
engage in fact evaluation when deciding a motion, especially when state of mind is at issue, but tend to "deny summary
judgment automatically." Id. at 716, 708-10, 716.
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issue of material fact. As Wright and Miller note, some courts have seen a genuine
issue as "one that can be maintained by substantial evidence, ' 303 while others see a
genuine dispute as a "real" or substantial dispute of material fact. 3° 4 Still others
phrase the test as whether there is any "issue requiring a trial. ' 305 In other cases, the
courts have explicitly used the directed verdict analogy. 3°6
Nonetheless, after wading through this semantic swamp, Professors Wright and
Miller conclude with language that, despite the ambiguity of employing a "reason-
able man" test, makes summary judgment sound different from the directed verdict
and nothing like the Supreme Court at work in Matsushita and Liberty Lobby.
Professors Wright and Miller state:
[A] party moving for summary judgment is not entitled to judgment merely because the facts
he offers appear more plausible than those tendered in opposition, or because it appears the
adversary is unlikely to prevail at trial.... Therefore, if the evidence presented on the
motion is subject to conflicting interpretations, or reasonable men might differ as to its
significance, summary judgment is improper. 307
On a practical level as well, trial judges and practitioners have always viewed
summary judgment and directed verdict as different. 30 8 Those who have clerked for
or appeared before federal district judges and state judges applying similar laws have
heard candidly expressed the greatest disdain for a nonmovant's evidence coupled
with the recognition that the nonmovant has nonetheless entered into the record
nonfabricated evidence conflicting with that of the movant over an important fact.
Lawyers at pretrial conferences and hearings on rule 56 have frequently heard judicial
comments something like this: "Well, Mr. Movant, there certainly appears to be a
factual dispute here, so I don't see how I can grant summary judgment. However,
Ms. Nonmovant, I don't think the jury will be very impressed with your case. I'm not
absolutely sure I would even let it go to the jury unless your evidence looks better at
trial than it does in your motion papers. Maybe you two and your clients could
303. See Wimirr, Mnesa & KAN7E, supra note 17, § 2725, at 103. See also Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461 (Ist. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Fireman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir.
1945) (leading cases, frequently cited within their circuits when setting forth the basic summary judgment tests).
304. See Wmocnr, MIER & KANE, supra note 17, § 2725, at 103 n.32.
305. See Wmiurr, Mesa. & KAra, supra note 17, § 2725, at 103. Cited in support of the school of thought that a
"genuine issue" within the meaning of rule 56 is one "requiring a trial" is Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368
U.S. 464 (1962), a case that, despite the presence of the "trial" language, can hardly be characterized as suggesting that
trial judges have any authority to evaluate the probative value of competing facts on a summary judgment record. Quite
the contrary, Poller, which stated that summary judgment is seldom apt in cases turning on motive or state of mind, is
often cited or criticized as containing language discouraging the use of summary judgment. See supra text accompanying
notes 183-89.
306. See Wmanr, Meas & KANE, supra note 17, § 2725, at 104 (citing Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321
U.S. 620 (1944)). As discussed, Sartor, although it contains language linking summary judgment and directed verdict,
cannot, when read as a whole, support either the language or the results of Liberty Lobby or Matsushita. See supra text
accompanying notes 165-78.
307. WiGHT, Meixa & KANE, supra note 17, § 2725, at 104-09 (citations omitted).
308. See Sandier & Corderman, Winning a Sumnry Judgment, 60 LmoxAToN 15, 17 (1984) ("[practice of viewing
record in light most favorable to nonmovant] comes from the theory that courts considering summary judgment motions
do not actually decide issues of fact. That means the court must give the other side the benefit of every doubt."). See also
Pielemeier, Summary Judgment in Minnesota: A Search for Patterns, 7 WM. Mrrcs a. L. REv. 147 (1981) (practitioners
expect to lose summary judgment motions when opponent places even unconvincing evidence in record in opposition to
motion).
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sharpen your pencils and talk about settlement before we get too much further. For
now, however, I'm denying Mr. Movant's rule 56 motion.' '3 9
Most of the commentators have observed that many, if not most, trial courts take
this type of approach to summary judgment, showing a deference to even seemingly
weak nonmovant evidence that would not exist in the directed verdict context. 310
Often, this observation is presented as a criticism, with the implicit suggestion that
judges treat summary judgment as different from the directed verdict because they are
lazy, timid, or simply misunderstand rule 56.311 Although some of this criticism may
be valid, the critics seemingly eliminate without consideration another possible
explanation-that trial judges appreciate both the literal language of rule 56 and the
differing quality of factual certainty resulting from trial.
Judges such as the one in the above mythical conversation know that some parties'
scenarios do not sound very persuasive in opposition to a summary judgment motion.
So what? Some complaint allegations look like losers as well yet are legally sufficient
to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 312 Prior to 1986, judges
generally refrained from granting summary judgment so long as the nonmovant had
some nonfabricated, colorable evidence supporting its view of events. Those critical
of this approach have not articulated a convincing reason why so many smart federal
district judges would be willing to subject themselves to needless trials if they believed
they could dismiss claims without sacrificing the quality of justice.
Although some summary judgment denials undoubtedly result from oversight or
error or from a desire to heighten uncertainty in the interest of encouraging
settlement, my own view is that most judges intrinsically understand that their own
conclusions, based on even a well-developed pretrial record, are not necessarily the
same as or convincingly more correct than the conclusion of a jury at trial. First, the
judge's orientation, background, and outlook differ from that of a jury. Second, the
facts are more sharply developed at trial. This includes both specific facts and,
perhaps more importantly, the context of events from which the factfinder will make
inferences and conclusions. These comparative advantages of trial facts as opposed
to affidavit facts are more fully developed in subpart II(D).313
2. The Real Summary Judgment: A Rule with Multiple Personality
Although there existed, and continues to exist, some confusion and contradic-
tory statements concerning the "real" meaning of rule 56, most authorities, lower
courts, commentators, and the Supreme Court's own precedents would not go as far
as did the Liberty Lobby language in transforming rule 56 into a "super directed
verdict device" nor as far as Matsushita's implicit permission for trial judges to
309. This mythical conversation resembles statements allegedly made by the district court judge in the Agent Orange
litigation, in which the court did not make pretrial fact findings but hinted at likely trial outcomes to spur settlement. See
Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 337, 360 (1986).
310. See WIGer, Man.E & KasE, supra note 17, § 2727, at 175-78.
311. See, e.g., Louis, supra note 18, at 749, 758; Sonenshein, supra note 18, at 785.
312. See Marcus, supra note 7, at 484.
313. See infra text accompanying notes 386-408.
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weigh facts and theories in deciding a motion for summary judgment. A more
dispassionate, less result-oriented, and more comprehensive review of summary
judgment jurisprudence in the federal courts suggests three more or less separate
strands of summary judgment perspective. On one prong were the many cases
seemingly treating summary judgment as an extraordinary remedy, one that should
only be granted when there was not the "slightest doubt" as to the actual facts. 314
This was the line of cases widely criticized as misreading rule 56 and placing an
erroneous "judicial gloss" on the text of the rule.3 15
On the opposite prong was a group of cases comparing the theory of summary
judgment with that of directed verdict.3 16 This approach was generally viewed with
favor by the commentators, 317 although some thought it did not give rule 56 sufficient
strength to eliminate claims likely to fail at trial.318 While lending some support to the
Liberty Lobby majority, this line of cases stopped far short of equating summary
judgment and directed verdict in all respects. This view of rule 56 recognized the
obvious difference in timing between a summary judgment motion and a directed
verdict motion. This perspective also appreciated other differences: the more
complete directed verdict record; the differing qualities of proof; the contributions of
a jury; the availability and quality of cross-examination; the opportunity to observe
witnesses; and the explanation of documents.3 19 In addition, this view recognized that
despite similarity in theory the directed verdict worked differently in practice from
summary judgment in that the judge deciding the directed verdict motion had at least
some freedom to assess the probative value of evidence according to a "reasonable
jury" standard while the judge deciding a rule 56 motion had no such freedom. 320
314. See, e.g., Tomalewski v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1974); Clausen & Sons, Inc. v.
Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968).
315. See, e.g., Waimrr, Mmuit & KAsm, supra note 17, § 2727, at 176-78; Special Problems, supra note 296, at
504.
316. See WUGHT, Masex & KANE, supra note 17, § 2713.1, at 616 & n.11. However, Wright and Miller also
recognize that, at a minimum, some courts have been more reluctant to grant summary judgment because the motion is
presented at an earlier stage of the litigation than a directed verdict motion. Id. at 617-18. Upon closer examination, the
cited cases stop significantly short of equating summary judgment and directed verdict as did Liberty Lobby. For example,
the leading case cited in the note is Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944). As discussed earlier,
Sartar may contain one shred of dicta equating the two but the overall approach of Sartor reveals something quite
different. See supra text accompanying notes 165-78.
Another case cited is the famous Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). See supra text accompanying notes
250-62. In Arnstein Judge Jerome Frank's "slightest doubt" standard making summary judgment difficult to obtain won
out, at least in the dicta, over the middle level view of summary judgment held by Federal Rules draftsman Judge Charles
Clark. Citing Arnstein as support for the school of thought treating summary judgment as a pretrial directed verdict seems
somewhat like characterizing Caspar Weinberger as America's leading peacenik.
Even those cases that take a strong view equating summary judgment and directed verdict are using a passive directed
verdict standard, one that permits the case to be taken away from the jury only when the claimant has produced no
evidence in its favor on a material point or no evidence that would permit a colorable inference in claimant's favor. See,
e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (an essential element of claim cannot be found
by jury "for want of evidence").
317. See Wrp-str, M usr & KANE, supra note 17, § 2713.1, at 619-20; Currie, supra note 20, at 79; Sonenshein,
supra note 18, at 783.
318. See supra authorities cited at note 272.
319. See, e.g., Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1971); Armco Steel Corp. v. Realty Inv. Co., 273
F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1960); Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951).
320. See, e.g., Briggs v. Kerrigan, 431 F.2d 967 (lst Cir. 1970); Devex Corp. v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 382 F.2d
17 (7th Cir. 1967); Cox v. English-Am. Underwriters, 245 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1957). See also James, Sufficiency of the
Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218, 219-22 (1961). In assessing federal
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The middle prong of summary judgment jurisprudence rejected the "slightest
doubt" cases as both wrong and too restrictive to make rule 56 useful for pretrial
disposition of cases and also stopped short of importing the directed verdict standard
into rule 56. Instead, this school of thought took a stringent view of what disputed
facts were actually "material" to the legal question before the court and also was
stringent in requiring the nonmovant to produce admissible, uncontradicted, inter-
nally consistent material in opposition to the motion, requiring more than mere
assertion by the nonmovant. 32 1 According to this view, rule 56 was effective in
eliminating unsuccessful or meritless claims even when the judge could not assess a
nonmovant's evidence as weak or unpersuasive. 322 Consequently, there was no need
directed verdict practice, Professor James found that courts will not submit a case to the jury unless the court viewed the
claimant's evidence as "sufficient." This required more than a scintilla or small amount of evidence favoring the
nonmovant; evidence sufficient to support the verdict of a reasonable jury was required, and this necessarily placed the
judge in the role of occasionally evaluating the relative probative worth of competing evidence. To James, the stated rule
seemed to be that if the nonexistence of an essential element of a claim was as probable as its existence, a verdict would
be directed. In addition, courts could deem some testimony incredible as a matter of law and some inferences irrational
and impermissible. However, courts in practice were more restrained in directing verdicts and more reluctant to take a case
from the jury. See also HARm, Jsws & GRAY, supra note 94, at § 15.2.
321. See HEn, supra note 18, § 16.1.10, at 355-56. See also Berry v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 273 F.2d 572,
581-82 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 976 (1960) (summary judgment granted in negligence case when defendant had
set forth affidavit and documentary evidence of reasonable conduct and plaintiff responded only with allegations of
negligence; court did not find need to evaluate conflicting facts); American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529, 531-32 (D.C.
Cir. 1949) (summary judgment granted for plaintiff when defendant's answers to interrogatories and produced documents
showed defendant to have violated its own rule for safe flight plans; no fact conflict and no court assessment of competing
facts).
322. A frequently cited empirical study-MeLauchlan, An Empirical Study ofthe Federal Summary JudgmentRule,
6 J. Lu.nA. SrTu. 427 (1977) [hereinafter McLauchlan], provides some support to the Court's contention that rule 56 has
not met the profession's expectations as a case disposition and docket-thinning device. Id. at 458 (summary judgment
motion "is a very weak reed upon which to rely for decreasing much of the workload with which courts are faced"). As
a whole, however, MeLauchlan's data supports the rationale of the pre-Liberty Lobby middle prong of summary judgment
cases. Examining the Northern District of Illinois, McLauchlan found that summary judgment motions were made in only
4% of the cases studied during 1970 (80 of the sample of 1,984) and concluded that this showed the "unimportance of
this motion as the means of disposing of many cases." Id. at 452. Even that low figure may be inflated because it appears
McLauchlan considered rule 12(b)(6) motions in his sample as well. Id. at 427 n.1. If McLauchlan did this with rule
12(b)(6) motions that were not accompanied by affidavits or other materials and therefore converted to rule 56 motions
by the court, McLauchlan's study possesses a serious flaw.
Also, if the 4% figure includes both rule 56 and rule 12(b)(6) motions, it is highly counterintuitive to litigators. Based
on my own brief experience as a federal district court law clerk and an associate in a law firm that conducted a varied
litigation practice, I would estimate that either a rule 12(b)(6) or rule 56 motion for at least partial relief is made in
approximately 75% of all litigated cases. But see Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudicating Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm.
L. REv. 494, 547 (1986) (noting that 40% of federal cases are docketed without any court action). My estimate of the
frequency of summary judgment motions applies to those cases that are sufficiently litigated to involve some court
activity.
Notwithstanding this suggestion and assuming that the court records are either more accurate or more representative
than my own impressions, the MeLauchlan study also suggests that a tougher rule 56 or rule 56 interpretation designed
to make summary judgment easier to obtain is unlikely to rapidly reduce court dockets. Even if Matsushita and Liberty
Lobby have made summary judgment twice as likely to be granted as before, it is unlikely that a terrifically large
proportion of the 96% of cases in which the motion previously went unmade would see the motion and its grant under
the "new" summary judgment decreed by the Court. When the motion is made and denied, one can argue that summary
judgment has increased the time and cost of litigation rather than reducing it. Read as a whole, however, the study argues
against the Court's implicit notion that the motion is too seldom granted due to misplaced judicial reliance on past case
dicta. The empirical study in fact shows that the summary judgment motion, although not made in a large percentage of
cases, is often granted and affirmed, suggesting that prior to Matsushita and Liberty Lobby, federal courts were often able
to employ rule 56 to grant summary judgment so long as the litigants presented the motion. McLauchlan's study found
that summary judgment, when sought, was on average granted half the time and that these grants were on average affirmed
in more than half the appeals. MeLauchlan, supra, at 458. Summary judgment was quite successful in contract, tort, and
real property matters, although less successful in so-called "statutory" matters (a large category of cases consisting of
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to look to the "reasonable jury" standard of rule 50(a) to provide force to summary
judgment as well as the potential mischief of judges acting as juries.
In accepting Matsushita, Liberty Lobby, and Catrett for review, the Court could
have legitimately clarified rule 56 by discussing these three strands of federal
summary judgment practice, articulating its preferred view, and giving guidance to
lower courts through approving citation of the preferred earlier cases. Instead, the
Court announced a summary judgment standard that went well beyond even the most
favorable previous prong by seeing rule 56 as the "mirror" of directed verdict rather
than as merely informed by rule 50. Coupled with the additional rhetoric and the
questionable pro-defendant outcomes in all three cases, the Court effectively rewrote
rule 56 to create a summary judgment doctrine that went beyond what even the
reformers had urged.
3. The Real Directed Verdict: Another Case of Multiple Personality
Had the Court stopped at merely equating the directed verdict and summary
judgment standards, this result would have been divergent and detrimental enough.
In my view, however, the Court did more by also implicitly changing the directed
verdict doctrine to permit judges more fact-weighing freedom than they formerly
held. Generalizing about directed verdict practice in federal courts is nearly as
dangerous as generalizing about the application of rule 56. With this caveat given,
however, it appears that the consensus was that the judge, in determining whether a
reasonable jury might find for the nonmovant, did not actually characterize the worth
of the nonmovant's evidence but rather juxtaposed the nonmovant's favorable and
unfavorable evidence with that of the movant to determine whether the nonmovant
had at least some unvitiated material before the court to support each element of the
nonmovant's claim. 323 A nonmovant's evidence was considered vitiated and there-
civil rights, securities, antitrust, tax, and other cases involving a statutory remedy or right to relief in which 50.2% of the
motions made were granted).
McLauchlan found that summary judgment was granted 73.9% of the time in real property cases, a surprising and
counterintuitive 66.9% of the time in tort actions, and 63.2% of the time in contract actions. Id. at 437. Because the
"statutory" cases were the plurality of the sample, the overall average for summary judgment was near 50% in terms of
affirmed summary judgment grants. However, within the statutory group, summary judgment was granted in a substantial
portion of the antitrust cases. Id. at 439.
Defendants moved for summary judgment three times as often as plaintiffs (id. at 442) and "won 70.0 per cent
outright and 73.9 per cent total of their efforts at summary disposition." Id. at 441. When the parties stipulated to the
relevant facts, summary judgment was granted 90% of the time. Id. at 442. Furthermore, the litigants apparently made
relatively little use of discovery materials to support or oppose summary judgment, relying primarily on the pleadings and
affidavits. Twenty percent of the cases involved consideration of summary judgment without any listed supporting
materials. Id. at 446-47. McLauchlan's use of reported cases as his data sample may have given an inaccurate impression
in this regard if, as I suspect, the courts' opinions often opt not to painstakingly list the items of record upon which they
decide to grant summary judgment.
This data and the other interesting tidbits of information unearthed by MeLauchlan present the picture of a summary
judgment rule that seems to work pretty well when used and certainly works better and more often for defendants,
suggesting that meritless claims are screened by the motion. Despite the finding, which I question, of its infrequent use,
this empirical work hardly supports the Court's assumption that something is sufficiently wrong with federal summary
judgment practice-particularly middle prong cases--to warrant a sharp turn in rule 56 doctrine. Similarly, this empirical
data does not support the current Advisory Committee plans to alter rules 12, 40, 50, and 56. See infra text accompanying
notes 433-50.
323. According to Professor Wright concering the question of what matter the court may consider in ruling on the
directed verdict motion:
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fore not sufficient to support a jury verdict in nonmovant's favor when it was
contradicted by his or her other evidence, or when it was inadmissible, clearly
fabricated, or (occasionally) when it was so at odds with laws of nature or the
overwhelming weight of other evidence in the record. 324 Only in this last instance was
the judge who granted a directed verdict motion arguably evaluating facts, inferences,
or theories to the extent of the Matsushita or Liberty Lobby Courts. In actual practice
as well, the judges applying directed verdict before 1986 seemed to find claims
backed by some nonmovant evidence as insufficiently probative only in extreme
cases.
325
In addition, there was a tripartite division of opinion in directed verdict doctrine
as well. At one prong, some courts took a view of directed verdict decidedly different
from that of the Matsushita and Liberty Lobby Courts, stating that in ruling on the
motion, they could consider only the evidence favorable to the nonmovant. 326 Courts
at the opposite prong took a view closer to the 1986 Supreme Court and considered
all of the evidence of record in ruling on the motion in order to decide whether a
reasonable jury might find for the nonmovant. 327 In the middle were the largest
number of courts taking what commentators construed as the correct view- that the
court should consider all uncontradicted evidence in ruling on the motion, even if it
favored the movant rather than the nonmovant, but that when there was conflicting
evidence, the nonmovant's version of the evidence should be accepted as true and that
all reasonable inferences from the record should be drawn in favor of the nonmovant.
In addition, a nonmovant's testimonial evidence had to be deemed credible unless
directly and conclusively contradicted or impeached. 328
This most widely accepted directed verdict procedure is quite distinct from the
1986 Court's implicit approach of viewing and assessing all of the evidence, and then
The correct rule seems to be that the court may consider all of the evidence favorable to the position of the party
opposing the motion as well as any unfavorable evidence that the jury is required to believe. Thus it may take
into account evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent
that this evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.
WmcGH, supra note 17, at 642 (citing Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1970); Negron v. Ward, 458 F. Supp.
748, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 Meet. L. Ray.
903, 948-53 (1971); and 9 VRInr & Maim, supra note 15, § 2529).
324. A fair reading between the lines of the majority of pre-Liberty Lobby cases seems to me to suggest that the
courts considered a nonmovant's evidence in opposition to a summary judgment or a directed verdict motion vitiated
where the evidence was contradicted by other statements made by the nonmovant or its obvious allies. Thus, when a
nonmovant submitted an affidavit containing admissible evidence in opposition to a summary judgment motion but the
affidavit was contradicted by the nonmovant's own deposition testimony, summary judgment was proper without any need
to evaluate the probative value of the affidavit evidence. See Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Co., 719 F.2d 1361
(8th Cir. 1983). Nonmovant evidence was also vitiated ab initio when it was contradicted by external sources so accurate
and authoritative as to be beyond question. Nonmovant evidence at odds with the laws of nature was also vitiated and
unavailable to create a genuine issue of material fact. See J~lms & HAZARD, supra note 11, at § 5.19.
325. See James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. Ray. 218
(1961).
326. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949); WPn-r, supra note 17, at 642.
327. See Wiuar, supra note 17, at 641.
328. See Wiiairr, supra note 17, at 642. In deciding directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict
motions, courts had often suggested that questions of interpretation are almost always questions of fact for the jury (see,
e.g., Dobson v. Masonite Corp., 359 F.2d 921, 925 (5th Cir. 1966)) and discussed whether the evidence was
"one-sided" against the noniovant only when deciding new trial motions (see, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941)).
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making credibility or plausibility inferences in favor of the movant when a majority
of the justices agree with the movant. The inevitable conclusion is that the Court not
only strengthened summary judgment but also strengthened directed verdict as well
by permitting a good deal of judicial evaluation of both fact existence and fact
interpretation disputes. This combination of explicit and implicit rewriting of the
Federal Rules and rhetorical flourishes praising pretrial elimination of claims brings
a pronounced shift to federal civil litigation practice as well as to the previous balance
of power between claimants and defendants.
HIL. Trm FUTURE PERIS OF LIBERTY LOBBY AND MATSUSHITA
Despite the Court's posture of merely enunciating the status quo in Liberty
Lobby, its holding, dicta, and implicit thrust have already shifted the balance of
power in summary judgment adjudication. Although the profession has yet to
appreciate the full ramifications of Liberty Lobby, some lawyers have already grasped
the decision as a new pretrial weapon and found judges receptive to the greater force
given summary judgment by the Court. Some courts have expressly acknowledged
that Liberty Lobby at least shifted the summary judgment equation. 329 Others have
treated the case as the Court majority did, as only an exposition of the obvious, but
have used Liberty Lobby to grant summary judgment in cases in which their prior
controlling precedents would seem to counsel against it.330 These courts have
received the less express message of the Court majority to begin granting summary
judgment more frequently to trim weak or otherwise disfavored cases from the trial
docket. The observed and coming change in summary judgment jurisprudence bodes
ill for certain classes of litigants, persons interested in the accuracy of judicial
decision making, and the system as a whole.
A. A Change in Procedure as a Shift in the Relative Power of the Litigants
Although it began in England as a tool to provide judgments without trial in aid
of debt collection, summary judgment under the American Federal Rules has long
been viewed as a tool of defendants rather than plaintiffs. Unfortunately, there is less
empirical data in this area than one would prefer. However, the available data tend
to confirm the conventional wisdom. Three-fourths of summary judgment motions
are brought by defendants. 331 Defendants' summary judgment motions are granted
much more often than those of plaintiffs. 332
As various sources have noted, appellate courts usually affirm trial court grants
of summary judgment. Because the circuit courts are often satisfied with the pretrial
grant of summary judgment, most of these affirmances have been without opinion.333
329. See supra note 76.
330. See, e.g., Michelson v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 808 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1987); Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins.
Co., 804 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987).
331. McLauchlan, supra note 322, at 429.
332. Id. at 442.
333. See Final Report of the Second Circuit Committee on Civil Litigation, 115 F.R.D. 260, 262-63 (1987);
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As a rule, the circuit courts are compelled to write at length in reviewing a summary
judgment question only when they are reversing the district court. Consequently,
some of the most prominent summary judgment cases are reversals, many containing
language that might suggest hesitancy to grant summary judgment, a phenomenon
criticized by courts and commentators 334 as creating some reluctance to employ and
grant the motion in trial judges and counsel.
However, this effect has probably been overstated. Trial judges and attorneys,
of course, read the published circuit opinions with care. They also undoubtedly know
their own track records. Trial judges and lawyers must have known that summary
judgment was not as disfavored as some case language might have suggested, since
their own motions for and grants of summary judgment were doing well. Nonethe-
less, the professional myth or "cosmic anecdote" has long held that summary
judgment was difficult to obtain because almost any nonmovant's lawyer could create
some small dispute over some material fact in the litigation. 335 According to the
available empirical evidence, that myth, just like many of the presumed "facts"
underlying the "litigation explosion" myth, was wrong.
Prior to Liberty Lobby, rule 56 had sufficient teeth to it that it was used
frequently and often. This use primarily favored defendants. Inevitably, Liberty
Lobby has shifted the equities and impact of rule 56 even more strongly in favor of
defendants. My question is "Why?" Why take an already effective pro-defendant
rule of civil procedure and make it strikingly more pro-defendant? Did the Supreme
Court have any evidence that defendants were losing at the hands of unreasonable
juries cases that reasonable judges would have snuffed out before trial if only the
judges had authority under rule 56 to deem the nonmovant's existent but weak facts
insufficient to propel the matter forward? No such evidence appears in Matsushita,
Liberty Lobby, Catrett, or legal literature generally. Quite to the contrary, most data
suggests that the presumably "reasonable" judges who will administer the expanded
rule 56 created by Liberty Lobby usually agree with the findings made by juries. 336
For example, one recent survey found that most trial judges disagreed with the jury
verdicts in cases before them less than ten percent of the time. 337 The same survey
also found that judges seldom find jury verdicts to be excessive. 338
Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465
(1983).
334. See, e.g., Michelson v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 808 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1987); Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins.
Co., 804 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987).
335. See Brachtd, Has Summary Judgment Been Eliminated in the Second Circuit?, 46 BRooKLYN L. R v. 565 (1980)
(arguing that despite well-known cases such as Arnstein v. Porter, vast majority of Second Circuit opinions and results
are receptive to grants of summary judgment). The view that summary judgment was difficult to obtain, even if incorrect,
tends to confirm that the profession viewed the summary judgment and directed verdict standards as different, that
summary judgment could be defeated by fact issues that might not prevent a directed verdict.
336. See V. HANs & N. VID.IM, JUDGING m's JURY 50, 156, 245 (1986) (noting differences in perception and
evaluation between individual jurors as well as between juries and judges) [hereinafter HANS & VmAR]; R. HASM, S.
PERmoo & N. P rNmmoroN, I SIDE THE JURY 39-82 (1983) [hereinafter HA=i]; H. KALVEN & H. Zass, THE A.%M3ucAs JURY¢
55-81 (1966) [hereinafter KALvEN & Zasms].
337. See Rosen, The View From The Bench, NAr'L L.J. (August 10, 1987) at S-8, col. 1 [hereinafter Survey].
338. Id.
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Furthermore, even if empirical data revealed a larger percentage of claimants'
verdicts based on weak evidence that would not have prevented summary judgment
under the Liberty Lobby and Matsushita standards, the existing devices of directed
verdict, judgment n.o.v., and new trial were readily available to prevent or erase the
verdict and see justice done for the defendant. If, then, a substantial number of juries
were acting unreasonably, an increase in rule 50(a), rule 50(b), and rule 59 motions
should reflect this. Again, comprehensive empirical data is absent. At a minimum,
however, there appears to be no such relative upsurge in successful use of these
motions. 339 If there were, this would tend to indicate perhaps too many meritless
claims proceeding through trial.
In other words, my rhetorical question to the Court is: "What was so broken
about rule 56 that it had to be 'fixed' by turning it into a stronger rule 50(a)?" My
own answer is nothing, at least nothing that was properly in the record upon which
the Court could base its revisionist action. Even those who find the Liberty Lobby
opinion not to be radical must acknowledge that it is political. 34° By making summary
judgment easier to obtain, the Court implicitly bestowed a political favor (and greater
judicial power) on litigants who can make most use of the motion. Defendants use the
motion more than plaintiffs. Defendants are disproportionately comprised of society's
"haves": banks, insurance companies, railroads, business organizations, govern-
ments, and government agencies. 34 1 Plaintiffs are disproportionately comprised of
society's "have nots": individuals, business sole proprietorships, and smaller
entities. 342 Although these are rough categories, they have meaning as organizational
339. See McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of Civil Procedure: Directed Verdicts and Judgments Notwithstanding
Verdict, 2 J. LEGAL. Saru. 459 (1973). In this study of approximately 2,000 reported cases, Professor McLauchlan
concluded that the "Rule 50 shortcut mechanism is commonly not allowed to operate." Id. at 468. His data, however,
suggest that trial courts grant directed verdict motions approximately two-thirds of the time and that half of these grants
are affirmed on appeal. Id. at 464-65. Defendant corporations are the most frequent movants. Id. at 465. McLauchlan's
data, then, suggest that the directed verdict, even under the pre-Liberty Lobby "mild" doctrine, was not so flaccid as to
require major overhaul.
340. By "political," I do not mean "overtly partisan" or "intending to aid a particular organized interest or party."
Rather, I define as political those rules or systems that act to affect in a significant manner the distribution of social welfare
and power in society. Viewed this way, the federal court system and its rules are inherently political, not a shocking
assertion in light of the federal judiciary's status as a co-equal political branch of the national government. In narrower
fashion, a given federal rule of civil procedure has political overtones to the extent that it operates to the net advantage
of some definable segments of society and to the disadvantage of others. All rules are probably inherently political.
However, alteration of a rule in favor of certain classes of litigants, as occurred in Matsushita and Liberty Lobby, is
obviously political. In addition, a shift in decision making authority from juries to judges can have more partisan or
obvious political impact depending upon the judge's political/judicial philosophy and its divergence from that of the jury.
See Note, All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 Coum.
L. REv. 766 (1987) (empirical study of reported cases finds patterns of voting for or against particular claims, litigants
depending on whether judge was appointed by Republican or Democratic president).
341. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'v
REv. 95 (1974) [hereinafterHaves]; Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan & Friedman, Do the "Haves" Come OutAhead? Winning
and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 L. & Soc'y REv. 403 (1987) [hereinafter Wheeler]. "Haves" as the
tern is used in Professor Galanter's article and in most literature on the topic are those parties to litigation who are relatively
wealthy, organized, knowledgeable, and experienced in litigation. The paradigmatic haves are large business or government
organizations with lots of money, experience, and access to legal resources.
342. See Haves, supra note 341, at 97-98; Wheeler, supra note 341, at 412-15.
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constructs and are supported by the available empirical dataM43 as well as theory 344
and "common sense."
This is not to suggest that have nots deserve to win more than do haves. My
point is only that a rule that makes it easier for haves to succeed by a pretrial motion
works to the aggregate advantage of some groups and to the disadvantage of others,
irrespective of the merits of their claims. Since rules of procedure are, insofar as
possible, supposed to be neutral in their impact on litigants, a change in any
procedural rule should be justified by evidence that the rule needs to be changed to
correct an unfair imbalance or that a current neutral balance is unwise. No such case
was made prior to the Liberty Lobby holding. Defendants and the constituent groups
comprising defendants appear to have been doing quite well under the old rule 56.
B. A Change in the Role and Authority of the Civil Jury
The negative Realpolitik of the Liberty Lobby decision is exacerbated both by
the way the change was effected and by the decision's shift of power from juries to
judges in derogation of the seventh amendment. If the Court had acknowledged that
a merger of the directed verdict and summary judgment standards constituted a
change in rule 56 and determined to approach this change through the amendment
process established under the Enabling Act, the groups affected by the change in rule
56 would have possessed far greater opportunity to register support, opposition, or
specific suggestions. Most important, from the perspective of a civil rule's allocation
of power among litigants, the have nots could at least have been given a forum for
argument through suggestions to the Advisory Committee and lobbying efforts in
Congress. 345 As the change in rule 56 unfolded in Liberty Lobby, the have nots were
essentially "represented" only by a right-wing libel plaintiff and Justice Brennan sua
sponte.
The seventh amendment provides that the right to jury trial shall be preserved.346
Traditionally, the Court has taken a historical approach to the amendment,347
combined with elements of a functional approach as well.3 48 If the claim presented in
a case or its historical analogue was one "at law" in 1791 ajury is generally available
to the claimant as of right. 349 If the claim or its historical cousin was one "in equity"
in 1791, a jury trial is not required under the seventh amendment,350 although the
judge may impanel an advisory jury.3 51 When the claim and relief sought mingle what
343. See supra note 342.
344. See Haves, supra note 341, at 98-100.
345. For example, the American Trial Lawyers' Association, comprised largely of plaintiffs' personal injury
lawyers, is reputed to have considerable lobbying clout with Congress, due in substantial part to the grassroots contacts
of its membership. By contrast, this group has relatively little clout with the elite business law and law school
establishment that tends to dominate the Advisory Committee process.
346. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
347. See Jhirs & HAzkm, supra note 11, at § 8.2; WIUGr, supra note 17, § 92, at 612.
348. See JAEs & HAzkRD, supra note 11, at §§ 8.3, 8.11; Wmo-r, supra note 17, § 92, at 612; Kane, Civil Jury
Trial: The Case for Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HAs-ros L.J. 1 (1975).
349. See Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 1835 (1987).
350. Id.
351. See FE. R. Civ. P. 39(c) ("In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury .... ").
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was historically legal and equitable, a frequent consequence of the merger by the civil
rules of law and equity in the federal courts, the claimant ordinarily has a jury trial
right at least as to the legal or "legalesque" aspects of the case so long as providing
a jury trial is not impractical or does not vitiate the essential character of the action.352
Since the Court's noted 1959 decision, Beacon Theatres v. Westover,353 the federal
courts have generally shown a preference for granting a jury trial in close or doubtful
situations. 354 To some extent, Liberty Lobby, Matsushita, and Catrett mark a
departure from that line of cases and perhaps the end of an era in seventh amendment
jurisprudence.
As previously discussed, prior to Liberty Lobby, judges possessed more
authority to remove a case from the jury when facing a directed verdict motion than
they did when deciding a summary judgment question. In deciding summary
judgment motions, the judge was constrained to deny the motion only when there
were nonfrivolous differing versions of material fact or when key material facts were
subject to different interpretation by the factfinder. In ruling on a directed verdict
motion, the judge in practice had greater latitude and could eliminate a claim or case
supported by nonfrivolous factual assertions or interpretations that the judge
concluded were nonetheless insufficient to convince a reasonable jury to find for the
nonmovant.
The rule 50(a) test, especially as formulated in Liberty Lobby, allows more
bench intrusion into the jury's role, suggesting possible seventh amendment difficulty
since the judge deciding a directed verdict motion is weighing facts and assessing
their ultimate persuasive value, conduct suspiciously akin to the jury's exclusive
province in cases at law pursuant to the seventh amendment. The summary judgment
inquiry, at least prior to Liberty Lobby, was directed toward merely ascertaining
whether there existed disputed or multi-interpretable facts for the jury to evaluate.
Taken together and read in context, the precedents sustaining devices for
terminating a case before verdict or overturning a verdict 355 rest essentially on the
352. See WFuGur, supra note 17, at § 92.
353. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
354. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); JAws
& HAZAR, supra note 11, at §§ 8.2-8.5; Wpirr, supra note 17, at § 92. But see Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety
and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (jury trial not available against government enforcement of "public
rights" created after 1791 with no strong historical analogue); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) (jury trial not
available in bankruptcy proceedings).
355. In Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943), the Court held that a grant of directed verdict did not
violate the seventh amendment. In Galloway, the suit was against the government, which was protected from adverse jury
verdicts by sovereign immunity in 1791. The directed verdict was constitutional in all civil cases according to the Court
both because there appeared to be a similar procedure for cases at law in England and some colonies prior to 1791 and
because the right to a jury trial only attached when there existed in a case at law fact questions requiring the assessment
of a reasonable factfi'der. Id. at 388-93. If the trial judge did not see in the record sufficient evidence to support a
claimant's verdict, then it followed that there were presented at trial no fact disputes that required jury consideration and
invoked the seventh amendment.
In a vigorous dissent joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy, Justice Black attacked the result as an unconstitutional
intrusion upon the jury's power to weigh evidence. Id. at 396 (Black, J., dissenting). To Justice Black's historical
analysis, the framers intended that only the motion for a new trial be available to set aside a jury verdict.
Id. (Rule 59 empowers the court to order a new trial when the judge finds the verdict to be against the weight of the
evidence, or excessive, or produced by improper influences. See WraGirr, supra note 17, at § 95. The court may also
condition the grant of a new trial upon remittitur, in effect telling the verdict winner that a new trial will be ordered if the
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following rationale: when one party has no, or next-to-no, material evidence to
support its claims, the judge may rule against those claims without violating the
seventh amendment because the absence of such material evidence leaves no
acceptable task for the jury. In other words, there is then no legally legitimate fact
conflict for the jury to resolve or fact inference for the jury to draw. When the nature
of summary judgment and directed verdict (and by extension judgment n.o.v.)
practice is changed, however, so that it involves a judicial assessment of the
correctness of competing questions of fact existence and fact inference, the rock on
which these cases was built begins to crumble. If the judge is making evaluations of
fact, the judge is therefore engaging in conduct that was traditionally regarded as a
jury function. When this occurs in "cases at law," however that phrase is defined,
winner does not accept the lower verdict seen by the court as reasonable. These powers are substantial and enable courts
to eliminate "bad" jury verdicts, at least until the court tires of ordering retrials. Justice Black argued that this was ample
legitimate control over juries and that the seventh amendment precluded anything stronger, including the judgment n.o.v.
motion. His views, although not accepted by a Court majority, have ample logic in their support. If the verdict exceeds
the bounds of reasonableness, the court can eliminate it with a new trial order rather than a complete reversal of fortune.
If a second or third jury continues to give a certain verdict, perhaps the court should accept the verdict as reasonable,
unless the court is prepared to indict its own jury selection procedures.) On a functional level, Justice Black viewed the
new trial motion as consistent with the role of the jury in modem litigation since the motion if granted did not ultimately
deprive the litigant ofjuy consideration but only of the benefits of a verdict reached after unfair proceedings or rendered
against the clear weight of the evidence. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 405 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
The dissent found particularly pemicious a court's ability to grant a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. in the face of
conceded evidence favoring the verdict winner but to deem that evidence insufficiently "substantial" to support the
verdict. Id. at 407.
The directed verdict was held constitutional in Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362 (1850). There, the Court found
the procedure not to violate the seventh amendment when there was no evidence to sustain the verdict favoring the
nonmovant. Id. at 372-73. In Schuylkill and Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1871), the
Court approved of a directed verdict when the evidence offered by the nonmovant was too insubstantial to support a
reasonable jury's verdict in its favor. Id. at 447-48. The Court construed the seventh amendment to convey a claimant's
right to only a reasonable jury's consideration; thus, the claimant lacking enough evidence to convince the reasonable jury
was not entitled to deliberation. Id. The Galloway dissent criticized this development as an unconstitutional erosion of the
right to jury trial in that it pernmitted too much judicial weighing of the evidence, a function supposedly committed to the
jury by the seventh amendment, in the course of detersining the "substantiality" of the nonmovant's evidence. Galloway
v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 407 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black also criticized the more recent case of
Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90 (1930), which stated that the judge might grant a directed verdict when, after balancing
the evidence offered by movant and nonmovant, the judge determined it was in the "overwhelming" favor of the movant.
The grant of a new trial has been easily sustained against constitutional attack, with Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Yeats, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941), perhaps the most cited case. Unlike the cases upholding the directed verdict and
judgment n.o.v. motions, there was no dispute that the grant of a new trial when the verdict is against the clear weight
of the evidence does not violate the seventh amendment. Like Justice Black, the Yeats Court also found historical authority
for the new trial and concluded that a grant of the motion can eliminate not only a tainted verdict but also permit the
nonmovant ultimately to obtain jury consideration of its claims. When the new trial motion is based on the weight of the
evidence, the judge is admittedly assessing facts and acting within the supposed realm of the jury. Nonetheless, courts
have found this consistent with the jury's status as of 1791, a result with which even Justice Black, a staunch proponent
of the jury, agreed.
The challenge to the summary judgment rule presented in Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. U.S. to Use of
Smoot, 187 U.S. 315 (1902), was easily disposed of by a sizable Court majority. The Court held that a jury was not
required in a situation in which a grant of summary judgment was appropriate because this absence of genuine dispute of
material fact meant that there were no facts in conflict to be evaluated or weighed by a jury; the facts were conclusively
established on the record. Id. at 320. See also WaiGHr, Marim & KANE, supra note 17, at § 2714. This view is both
conceptually cleaner and has been less subject to criticism than the rationale upholding the "substantial evidence"
directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. in that it permits no judicial assessment of the probative worth of the nomovant's
facts. Instead, the judge checks merely to see if the material facts are at odds or if more than one inference is possible
from undisputed facts. When this is so, the summary judgment was traditionally denied, preventing any close question
of the judge's assumption of traditional jury functions.
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it would seem that these new summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment
n.o.v. ground rules violate the seventh amendment.
In addition to posing substantial problems of constitutional doctrine, Liberty
Lobby and Matsushita would seem to affect the merits of litigation outcomes as well.
Most studies of judge and jury disagreement, in both civil and criminal cases, have
suggested that jury determinations are not that different from those made by a judge
but that there is a significant amount of divergence. 356 Most scholars suggest that, at
a minimum, the process by which jurors reach conclusions differs from that of
judges357 and that the jury introduces elements of flexibility and equity in the
application of otherwise rigid rules of law.358 Logically, this must mean that the
Court's recent revision of summary judgment (and by implication directed verdict and
judgment n.o.v.) entails the potential for a substantial shift in substantive law and a
major redistribution of political and judicial power between the bench and the laity.
Generally, the jury is regarded as exercising its powers of flexibility, equity, and
nullification in favor of plaintiffs. 359 If that adage is correct, Liberty Lobby and
Matsushita are then clearly pro-defendant and anti-plaintiff decisions. 360
This assumption, however, is open to question. One study has found that the
average judge's concept of proof sufficient to constitute persuasion by a preponder-
356. See HANs & V m.%, supra note 336, at 245; HAmE, supra note 336, at 40-65; KALvEN & ZEsEL, supra note
336, at 59-82. Most authorities have concluded that jury determinations of both fact existence and fact inference differ
in some respect from judicial determinations. At a minimum, the process by which jurors reach conclusions differs from
that of judges. See HARPER, JAmEs & GRAY, supra note 94, at § 15.5; J. FRANK, CouRrs ON TAL (1949); L. GREEN, JUocE
AND JURv (1930); C. Jowme, Cvn. JusncE Am mia JuRY (1962); Kalven, The Jury, The Law and the Personal Injury Damage
Award, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 158 (1958); Marston, Is the Jury Ever Right?, 9 FLA. L.J. 554 (1935).
357. HA=i, supra note 336, at 83-120; KALVE & 7=3, supra note 336, at 182-305.
358. As Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, jurors "will introduce into their verdict a certain amount-a very large
amount so far as I have observed-of popular prejudice, and keep the administration of the law in accord with the wishes
and feelings of the community." 0. HoLms, Coucrmo LEGL Prms 237 (1921). Put more charitably, the jury introduces
elements of flexibility and equity in the application of otherwise perhaps rigid rules of law. See Higginbotham, Continuing
the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 Tax. L. REv. 47, 56-59 (1977); Kalven, The Dignity
of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. Rev. 1055, 1066 (1964); but see HANs & vtmAR, supra note 336, at 156, 245 (although
perhaps differing in perception from judge, jurors appear to follow judge's instructions and are not incompetent,
prejudiced, or at war with disfavored legal rules). See also G. CA.LsREsi & P. BoBBrrr, TRAoic CHoicEs 57 (1978) (jury can
in private make decisions not easily debated in public because of charged political, social, moral, religious content of
choice or because all options entail consequences that society as a whole is hesitant to acknowledge).
359. See HARm, J&.trs & GRAY, supra note 94, § 15.5, at 374-76; Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile
Accident Litigation, 3 LAw & Conee. PRoas. 476,476 n. 1 (1936). One might also logically posit that juries are also more
favorably disposed to find plausible plaintiff's theories of the case or claimed inferences in cases involving judicially
disfavored causes of action such as antitrust and shareholders' derivative suits. According to Harper, James, and Gray,
"[a]ny rule of substantive law or procedure that enlarges the jury's theoretical sphere tends to extend liability, and
conversely any rule that restricts thejury's sphere tends to restrict liability." HARuPE, J.m's & GRAY, supra note 94, § 15.5,
at 379.
360. This Article does not suggest that expansive liability rules are automatically preferable to restrictive liability
rules or that jury determinations are superior to those of judges. Rather, this Article sets forth the proposition that recent
changes in summary judgment and directed verdict jurisprudence effect a significant change in substantive law, the role
of the jury, and the relative balance of power between litigants. These sorts of legal changes are of sufficient magnitude
to merit legislative involvement rather than judicial policymaking in the guise of interpreting a procedural rule.
Limitations on liability and restrictions of claims should, for the most part, proceed by substantive legislation rather than
judicial decision. I also note that some authors have suggested that the civil jury is only a pseudo-democratic device and
is in fact a smokescreen for oppression of the masses by a judicial and business elite. See, e.g., R. KDDER, CosNNCrNno
Lw & Sociarv (1983); W.J. Qmuss & R.B. Snm. tt, LAw, ORDER & Powi, (1971). This critique is beyond the scope
of this Article which presumes, correctly I think, that civil juries do in fact reduce any hierarchical ordering of judicial,
economic, or political power in the nation.
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ance of the evidence is an assessment that fifty-five percent of the proof favors the
plaintiff. The average juror finds the preponderance threshold met only when it is
seventy-five percent likely that the claimant's version of events is true. 361 If this is
correct, one can argue that juries have historically and intrinsically required claimants
to prove their cases by clear and convincing evidence even when the law requires only
that they prove them by a mere preponderance, hardly an unduly pro-plaintiff
approach to rendering a verdict. Of course, there is in a sense no such thing as an
average judge or juror. Surveys of the bench show that judges differ substantially in
their notions, expressed as a percentage of probability, of what constitutes proof by
clear and convincing evidence and even what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.362 Under these circumstances, the notion that vesting greater fact assessment
power in the bench will bring more consistent judgments seems open to a good deal
of question.
Regardless of whether jury decisions differ from those of judges, the jury
determinations of fact existence and fact inference serve other values as well: the
infusion of community standards into litigation; promoting public confidence in the
judicial system and fairness of litigation results; maintaining democratic values of
participation; and citizen access to the system. 363 All of these traits enhance the
legitimacy of unelected article HI courts. Revised rules of summary judgment,
directed verdict, and judgment n.o.v. that reduce jury participation undermine these
values and consequently diminish the system as a whole.
Under Liberty Lobby, the judge now has greater license to eliminate the jury
prior to trial. Previously, the judge had to wait until at least mid-trial before her
excursion into what many regarded as jury territory could begin. By deciding, before
full development of the record at trial, that the nonmovant's side of a disputed factual
story is not sufficiently probative to support a verdict by a reasonable jury, the judge
can more easily eliminate not only claims that she finds unpersuasive in the instant
case but also legal rights with which she is unsympathetic. Although delineating the
unreasonable claim from that which is merely unpersuasive can become something of
a philosophical exercise, there is a difference. 364 Any individual can reject a given
assertion and be quite convinced that his or her conclusion is absolutely correct. This
361. See R. Swox, THE Juev AND rm DEFENSE OFINS Amry (1967); O'Connell, Jury Trials in Civil Cases, 58 I.. B.J.
796 (1970); Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof, 5 LAw & Soc. REv. 319 (1971).
362. See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (survey of judges of Eastern District of New
York bench finds judges' percentage assessment of what constitutes clear and convincing evidence to vary from 60 to 75%
and also finds variance in percentage notion of what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Underwood, The
Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YAuE L.J. 1299, 1311 (1977) (finding
variance among judges of between 80 and 100% as to reasonable doubt standard and between 50.1 and 75% for
preponderance of the evidence standard).
363. See Clark, The American Jury: A Justification, 1 VAL. U.L. REv. 1 (1966); ligginbotham, supra note 358, at
53; Kalven, supra note 358; Project, With Love in Their Hearts But Reform on Their Minds: How Trial Judges View the
Civil Jury, 4 Cotrm. J.L. & Soc. Poas. 178 (1968); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 Hasv.
L. REv. 898 (1979).
364. As the late Justice Potter Stewart said in terms of defining pornography, "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). In similar fashion, I suggest that persons hearing matter with
which they disagree distinguish between arguments they find unpersuasive and those deemed unreasonable or ludicrous.
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feeling of certainty does not, of course, cast the assertion irretrievably into the outer
darkness of the "unreasonable."
The trial judge's power under Liberty Lobby includes not only authority to find
insufficiently convincing nonmovant evidence in a particular case but also power to
covertly enter judgment against particular litigants or claims that the judge disfavors.
Although this could also occur under the traditional rule 56 approach, it will occur
more often after Liberty Lobby, especially when the judicial hostility to a party or
claim is subconscious rather than overt, and it will be harder to correct through
appellate review. Presumably, the trial judge's determination that given facts lack
sufficient probative value will be subject to de novo review rather than the "clearly
erroneous" test upon review. 365 The net effect of Liberty Lobby nonetheless permits
judges to reduce the role of juries and to more easily substitute their conclusions for
those of the juries. This can occur both by chance and design. Appellate correction
of errors made under the Liberty Lobby standard will also be more difficult because
of the de facto deference given to trial courts, even when the standard of review is
plenary. 366 The composition of the bench suggests that the new, fact evaluation
summary judgment could be both arbitrary and directional in its impact. Judges are
disproportionately drawn from upper middle class backgrounds, 367 and also dispro-
portionately white, male, and Protestant.3 68 In a recent survey, they described
themselves as more conservative than liberal. 369 This demographic aspect of the
bench also carries political impact. By comparison, the juries in most jurisdictions are
more representative of working class, minority, female, and liberal components of
American society. 370 To the extent that judges have more opportunity to influence
results since Liberty Lobby, it is not unreasonable to expect over time that the results
will please the upper middle class, men, whites, Protestants, and conservatives more
than they did prior to Liberty Lobby. A change in the rules with this potential for
shifting judicial political power should only occur under the more open and
participatory procedures established under the Enabling Act.
365. Trial judges' determinations of fact are generally reviewed only to determine if they were "clearly erroneous"
rather than completely correct or wise. A district court's fact determination is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court,
after viewing the record as a whole, is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. See United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
However, in ruling on a summary judgment motion, the trial court is said to have made a determination upon a mixed
question of law and fact or upon a pure question of law. Both are generally subject to plenary appellate review, with no
deference given to the trial court decision. See Howard v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 649 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981);
Silverstein v. United States, 419 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1041 (1970). Proposed Amended
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 40(b) would treat pretrial determinations of fact as subject to plenary appellate review.
Although this approach would reduce the risk of district court error, it does not alleviate the evils of a Liberty Lobby
approach to summary judgment and would increase the risk of appellate court dismissal of disfavored claims, as occurred
in Matsushita and Liberty Lobby.
366. See Wheeler, supra note 341, at 437-38 (most appeals-60%--unsuccessful in large survey of state supreme
court decisions).
367. See H. CHAsE, FEDE.RA Jut Es: THE Arronmiso PRocEss 113-15 (1972) [hereinafter CwAE]; J. ScBDAusRs,
JuDos AND Jusnc~s: THE FEDERAL. srmxAE JuoicRY 50-104 (1979) [hereinafter SaowmHusER].
368. See Survey, supra note 337, at S-18.
36?. See id.
370. See HAMN & Vm.t, supra note 336, at 53, 81; HAsrE, supra note 336, at 106-08, 129-53; KAL v & Z=s,
supra note 336, at 70-85.
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Matsushita, unless it proves to be the Court's sui generis means of disposing of
a big and troublesome case, holds as much potential as Liberty Lobby for permitting
judges to make deep incursions into adjudicatory territory formerly reserved to the
jury. The majority's holding in Matsushita essentially was a declaration that certain
allegations of defendant behavior and motivation could be rejected by the trial court
as a matter of law prior to trial. The unusual, "hard case" status of Matsushita and
the narrow, five-four decision marked by a strong dissent suggest caution in reading
Matsushita as a case with likely widespread ripple effect. 371 If, however, Matsushita
can be taken for what it said and is read with Liberty Lobby, trial judges now have
Supreme Court approval power to weigh and judge a nonmovant's facts as present but
insufficient to persuade reasonable jurors. When this does not permit the judge to
throw out the case, he or she may then examine the allegations made by claimant
upon this admittedly conflicting record and deem the allegations and claimant's
interpretation of defendant's conduct "implausible." A resourceful judge who wants
to trim a difficult, time-consuming, distracting, or perceptibly weak case from her
docket now has all the tools to do it. Even when the appellate court finds the district
court has gone too far in excluding evidence or theories of the case, as occurred in
Matsushita before the Third Circuit, there remains the possibility of review before
those devotees of summary judgment, the United States Supreme Court.
This expanding definition of what constitutes a question of law (as opposed to
a question of fact) found in Matsushita also operates, as does Liberty Lobby, to shift
the prior balance of power among classes of litigants. 372 This area of litigation lacks
371. Matsushita's status as a complex antitrust case makes its assessment more difficult. One author has posited that
courts are less willing to send a weak antitrust case to a jury because the consequences of the jury's acceptance of weak
plaintiff's evidence is the severe treble damages penalty for defendant. See Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to
Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equiliberating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 Gro. L.J. 1065 (1986). Recent
cases seem consistent with this trend. See, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 252-56 (2d Cir. 1987)
(evidence of parallel conduct alone is insufficient to permit inference of conspiracy; to permit jury to consider conspiracy
allegations, antitrust claimant must also show evidence of other facts that are at least as consistent with concerted action
as with independent but parallel conduct). In Apex, the court found the "ambiguous" evidence in addition to the observed
parallel conduct would not permit a reasonable inference to be drawn in the claimant-nonmovant's favor and that summary
judgment was therefore appropriate as to three of six defendants. By definition, ambiguous information is capable of more
than one meaning or inference. In characterizing requested inferences from ambiguous evidence as "unreasonable," the
court was in effect saying that it found the claimant's requested inferences less plausible or likely than those of the
defendants, in effect removing from the jury its historic power to decide questions of fact inference. The Apex opinion
reads as though it is based more on antitrust law and the range of reasonable inferences permitted under that law than it
does a generalized summary judgment opinion. It draws its authority to reject claimant's requested inferences from
antitrust precedent, in addition to Matsushita (see id. at 252). The interesting trend to watch will be whether courts utilize
Matsushita to extend this approach to cases other than antitrust claims. See id. at 252 (Supreme Court has encouraged use
of summary judgment in complex cases). See also Minpeco v. Conticommodity, No. 81 Civ. 7619 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17,
1987) (applying Apex test to antitrust claim but denying summary judgment because in court's view claimant's evidence
was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to conclude that defendant participated in conspiracy). See also Circumstantial
Evidence, supra note 27 (viewing Matsushita as open to conflicting interpretations but that better interpretation is linked
to substantive antitrust law).
372. The Supreme Court has candidly observed:
A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles through which it was deduced. At some point,
the reasoning by which a fact is "found" crosses the line between application of those ordinary principles of
logic and common experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of fact into the realm of a legal rule
upon which the reviewing court must exercise its own independent judgment. Where the line is drawn varies
according to the nature of the substantive law at issue. Regarding certain largely factual questions in some areas
of the law, the stakes-in terms of impact on future cases and future conduct--are too great to entrust them
finally to the judgment of the trier of fact.
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empirical research even more than the question of who benefits from summary
judgment. One can logically posit, however, that parties to a lawsuit bringing claims
based on a theory of the case or an interpretation of behavior not readily apparent to
the trial judge are often those litigants bringing novel claims designed to modify or
extend existing law. It is in these test cases that theories of cause and effect or
rethought interpretations of a statute, constitution, or rule are most likely to meet their
demise under the "new" summary judgment, when the judge finds the suggested
chain of events too improbable. Previously, such claims were more likely to
withstand summary judgment.
Although the possibility of early elimination of novel claims is most unaccept-
able in cases in which a jury would be impaneled at trial, it has negative consequences
for bench trials as well. The trial judge who first viewed a novel theory of the case
and statutory interpretation with skepticism when raised at the pretrial conference
may find the claims more plausible when outlined by human witnesses who have
experienced the problems alleged in a complaint and when rebutted ineffectively by
defense witnesses who seem to have something to hide. To some extent, this is what
trial is all about. Without this characteristic, the federal system could be made truly
"efficient" by providing for disposition upon a record composed of only filed
discovery documents or summary statements made under oath by the parties' counsel
(something of a return to the oral code pleading of England in the 1600s).
The implicitly increased power of the bench to assess the persuasiveness of facts
and to treat fact-related determinations as matters of law could bring particular
mischief to adjudication if, as has been suggested, judges currently are inconsistent
and overbroad in incorporating extra-record matter into their decision making.373
Although Federal Rule of Evidence 202 permits judicial notice of adjudicative facts
that are capable of accuratc and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned and requires that the parties be heard
before the court judicially notices facts, 3 74 a court may unwittingly be determining
facts or matters of law through a process of de facto judicial notice without so stating
or so informing the parties. The greater authority to conduct fact assessment in
general vested in judges by Liberty Lobby can only increase any incidence of abuse
of de facto judicial notice already present in the system.
Although courts are technically required to determine adjudicative facts only on
the basis of evidence of record and that which can be judicially noticed, courts have
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984). Although Justice Stevens'
statement is probably a realistic assessment of what triggers courts to deem a question one of law rather than fact, thus
solving a definitional problem the Court has found "vexing" (see Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,288 (1982)),
it is hard to square this legal realist proposition with the officially articulated domains and power balance of factfinders
and law interpreters. When the factfinder is a jury, serious seventh amendment and antidemocratic concerns arise as well.
Equally troublesome in cases such as Bose, in which the Court has overturned fact findings, is the Court's reliance on
English practice. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502-03 n.20 (1984). England
has no seventh amendment and has for all purposes eliminated the civil jury and the grand jury. England hardly provides
an absolute yardstick for measuring American judge-jury/fact-law divisions. See JA._.s & HAzARD, supra note 11, § 6.7,
at 299-300; Higginbotham, supra note 358, at 952.
373. See, e.g., Davis, "There is a Book Out... ":An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100
-ARv. L. Rsv. 1539 (1987).
374. FED. R. Evm. 202(b)(e).
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significantly more freedom to engage in legislative fact finding. 375 The classic
definition of legislative as opposed to adjudicative facts states that facts which inform
the courts' decisions on questions of law or policy are legislative facts. 376 Professor
Peggy Davis has persuasively argued that many courts have taken inappropriate and
overbroad approaches to adducing legislative facts. 377 To the extent that Matsushita
permits more pretrial determination of cases based on an expanding notion of what
comprises a question of law or matter of policy, it permits greater judicial discretion
less subject to control than did the more confining case law prior to 1986 and thus
diminishes the traditional role of the jury.
C. The Questionable Efficiency of the New Summary Judgment
The notion of "efficiency" and its relationship to justice require a word. The
dictionary defines efficient as "productive of desired effects; esp. productive without
waste,' '378 and defines efficiency as an "effective operation as measured by a com-
parison of production with cost (as in energy, time, and money). ' 379 The concept of
efficiency, then, considers and balances cost, speed, and output. Too often in the
current debate about the perceived need for procedural reform to meet the emerging
"litigation explosion/crisis" those advocating procedural amendments designed to
ease the barriers to case termination assume (or at least talk as though) any change that
makes adjudication faster or cheaper in the aggregate is more efficient and therefore
"better.' '380 Discussion of the quality of the judicial product under the advocated
streamlined system is almost nonexistent. 38' Viewing the current fashion in procedural
375. See Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLuM. L REv. 945, 982-83 (1955); Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HAv. L. Rv.
269, 270-71 (1944).
376. See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAsv. L. REv. 364, 402
(1942) (court finding "facts concerning the immediate parties-what the parties did, what the circumstances were---" is
finding adjudicative facts; when court "wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legislatively, . . . and the
facts which inform its legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts.").
377. See Davis, supra note 373, at 1593-1604. See also Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. Rsv. 477 (1986) (suggesting inconsistency and
problems in court use of social science data and proposing that studies be treated by courts as legislative fact). In her
article, Professor Davis notes that in Bulova Watch Co. v. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), the court
"relied heavily on its own research into the history and structure of multinational corporations in general and Japanese
multinationals in particular" but did not "exclude the parties from its investigative and decision-making process," a
means of legislative factfinding of which she generally approved. See Davis, supra note 373, at 1598-99. By contrast,
the Matsushita Court appeared to be relying upon its extra-record notion of how businesses, particularly Japanese
businesses, behaved.
378. WEsns's Nnm NEw CouLzmiAT DicnoNARY 397 (9th ed. 1983).
379. Id.
380. Posner, The Sumsary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary
Observations, 53 U. Cma. L. REv. 366, 388-89 (1986) (advocating incentives for settlement and barriers to court access
but not addressing questions of quality of decision making and social need); Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985)
(concluding that many of those suggesting streamlined litigation, such as Chief Justice Burger, seek increased speed and
lowered costs without regard to reforms' impact on quality).
381. See Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and The Importance of Analyzing Legal Doctrine, 85
COLtrM. L. Rsv. 1378, 1386 (1985).
[11f one myopically focuses upon the administrative dangers caused by docket size, one is likely to accept most
judicial attempts to curb those dockets, for the very reason that they have that effect. A critical examination of
the development of specific judicial doctrines affecting the scope of the courts' jurisdiction, however, highlights
the existence of values other than docket reduction and underscores the reasons for the provision of federal
jurisdiction in the first place.
Id. at 1386. See also Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, in LAw, EcoNo~acs AND Pimwsowm 123 (M. Kuperberg & C. Beitz ed.
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reform, it seems that many of the proponents of change have their priorities improperly
reversed. One would expect the Court, when confronted with a proposed amendment
or reinterpretation of a federal rule of civil procedure to first ask whether the change
will improve the accuracy of court determinations or otherwise make adjudication
more just. The Liberty Lobby summary judgment test will probably reduce the ac-
curacy of trial court determinations. Of course, it remains possible that many meritless
claims are given a full trial but do not result in claimant verdicts because most juries
are reasonable and recognize the weaknesses of such claims. If this is the case, the
cost to the judicial system is not ultimate error in the result but the cumulative resources
spent adjudicating these hypothetically poor claims from the denial of summary
judgment through trial. To state the obvious, no one knows whether and how often
this occurs. No credible attempt has been made to place a price tag on the time spent
on trials resulting in defense judgments in cases that the judges, if aggressively
applying Liberty Lobby, would have eliminated prior to trial. The Court and others
urging the tougher summary judgment doctrine assume the costs are not only sub-
stantial but also that they outweigh the value of any tendency in pre-Liberty Lobby
summary judgment to permit claims as to which the judge is skeptical to proceed to
a claimant's verdict that withstands post-trial motions and appeal.
In changing rule 56, the Court implicitly has decided that the economic gains of
the change are worth any reduced accuracy and justice to some claimants. My
criticism of the Court stems in part from its failure to conduct this decision openly and
upon a factual record rich enough to permit reasoned decision. In addition,
suggestions that more widespread use and granting of summary judgment will lead to
faster, less expensive adjudication (irrespective of the accuracy of outcome) overlook
several considerations militating against such anticipated benefits.
First, a summary judgment takes time to prepare and support. Although perhaps
not so time consuming to counsel and client as trial preparation, the differences may
not be particularly significant. Second, whatever the time and cost savings to
litigants, the motion requires more judicial time than otherwise consumed by pretrial
procedures. The judge deciding a summary judgment question must along with her
law clerks read, research, reflect, hold a hearing, read and research some more, and
often must draft, revise, and issue a lengthy written opinion as well. Although
presiding over a jury trial takes time, it may not take any more of the judge's time
than does consideration of the summary judgment motion. While jury trial proceeds,
the law clerks are usually free to perform other tasks and the judge, although unlikely
to admit it, may be reading orders, pleadings, motion papers, and draft opinions
while on the bench. With the average cost of an hour of judicial time estimated at
$600 per hour,382 one can argue that use of summary judgment may exact a higher
total cost to the system than it saves the system and its participants.
1983); Gross, The American Advantage: The Value oflnefficient Litigation, 85 Mic. L. REv. 734 (1987); Horwitz, Law
and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HomnA- L. REv. 905 (1980) (arguing that efficiency is not an independent concept,
it exists as "a function of a particular distribution" of wealth or power).
382. See Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RurcEs L. REv. 219 (1985) (considering costs of
salary, staff, benefits, and facilities, one hour's use of a judicial chambers costs the government an average of $600).
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Third, and most obvious, the summary judgment usually saves time only when
it is granted and terminates a case or is sufficiently partially granted to streamline trial
of a case. Ordinarily, when the motion is denied, it has merely added more pretrial
work without reducing the work required at and after trial. Even the suggestions that
summary judgment motions serve to "educate the judge" 383 or increase the chances
of a directed verdict at trial do not refute this essential truth. Until one has more facts,
the claims that a Liberty Lobby approach will save time and money are only claims
and theory, not even compelling theory at that.384
Although restrained use of summary judgment has been criticized as permitting
too many needless trials and thus expending more judicial and legal resources than
necessary, the same criticism can easily be made of the "new" post-Liberty Lobby
summary judgment. Perhaps this is why so many trial judges stopped short of
employing summary judgment as aggressively as they might directed verdict. As one
commentator assessed the practical shift in litigants' costs brought on by Liberty
Lobby:
The party with the burden of proof would be committing legal suicide by opposing a motion
for summary judgment by resting on inadmissible evidence. Thus, Anderson augers more
than trial by affidavit. It may require total development of a claimant's case prior to trial.
This is counterproductive. Why require a plaintiff to take needless depositions when he or
she could call those witnesses at trial? This expense is avoidable. An attorney would be
bordering on malpractice, in light of Anderson, if he or she failed to muster all the evidence
in support of the essential elements of the client's case on the motion for summary judgment.
A prima facie case may not convince the court that the "quantum" of proof necessary to
reach the jury exists. 385
D. Confidence in the Reliability of Judgments
The Supreme Court's new attitude toward eased summary judgment also permits
more case disposition based upon an incomplete, possibly inadequate, or sometimes
fraudulent record. In the celebrated asbestos 386 and Dalkon Shield 387 cases, for
383. Many practitioners seem to believe it worthwhile to make a summary judgment, or any motion, even if it is
unlikely to be granted so that the motion may "educate the judge" to the fact and law arguments of the parties as well
as the movant's theory of the case. See HeR, supra note 18, § 3.6, at 41-42; § 16.1.2, at 344. However, this tactic can
obviously be abused and wasteful, especially when the motion requires a good deal of time and effort to make and
prosecute. In addition, "a motion made and lost before the court may only prejudice the judge against your asserted facts
and legal argument at trial." Id. at 344.
384. See infra note 449. Even the most thorough studies of the courts have failed to conclusively determine court
time saved when a matter is tried to a jury. See, e.g., H. ZEsrI., H. KALvEN & B. BuCHuoLz, DELAY m arm Courr 71-86
(1959) (concluding thatjury trials take longer than bench trials but that types of cases tried to bench not strictly comparable
to jury docket; the authors also concluded that prospective time savings did not justify curtailment of jury trials). Studies
such as the University of Chicago jury project have not focused on the time saved if a matter slated forjury trial is resolved
by summary judgment or directed verdict. Court studies to date have tended to focus upon time spent at trial and ignored
the total resources, private as well as judicial, spent on adjudication, particularly pretrial activities. For a discussion of
the difficulties presented by empirical study of the courts, see Hazard, Book Review, 48 CAL. L. Rav. 360 (1960).
385. Vaio, supra note 74, at 25.
386. See D. HsLEs, ASsaros N Ta CouRts: THE CeH.AusGE op MAss Toxic TORTs 24 (1985). In cases involving
alleged harm from exposure to dangerous substances when the claimed condition has a long latency period, beth summary
judgment and expeditious trial may result in inaccurate deterainations of causation because good epidemiological studies
are not yet available. Perhaps the judicial system would best adjudicate these cases by permitting claimants to toll the
statute of limitations with a notice of claim until such time as the claimant is prepared to file suit on the basis of
subsequently developed evidence.
387. See M. Miruz, AT ANY Cosr: ComrOsE GREn, WomEN, m Ta DAmxoN Sru (1985) [hereinafter Muis].
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example, defendants fared well initially. Subsequently, redoubled discovery efforts
resulted in unearthing new evidence that ultimately carried the day for plaintiffs. In
light of A.H. Robins', maker of the Dalkon Shield, shredding or concealing relevant
documents requested by the opposition, 388 the cases provide striking examples of the
wisdom of refraining from a rush to judgment in the name of efficiency. Although
avenues for attacking a wrongfully obtained judgment exist, they are not always
effective389 and are frequently costly and cumbersome for the party who did nothing
wrong.
Even absent fraud or the need for additional time, a rule making summary
judgment too easy adversely reduces the accuracy of court decisions. Inevitably,
summary judgment is granted or denied based on a record less informative than that
achieved through trial. Consequently, one should always be less confident in the
result obtained through summary judgment than that obtained at later stages of trial.
A comparison with the confidence associated with probability theory or sampling data
patterns is instructive.
In announcing a finding based on sampling information, a researcher rarely
speaks simply of the conclusion she has reached, but rather of that conclusion as an
important part of the researcher's findings. A statistician, for example, will often
describe findings in terms of "confidence intervals" or "statistical significance. ' 390
A finding based on assessment of a sample is said to be statistically significant at, for
example, the .05 level, when there is, according to the methodological calculations
accepted in the field, less than a five in one hundred chance that the observed sample
result (e.g., votes for Reagan versus Mondale, preference for Colgate versus Tom's
Toothpaste) occurred because of random chance that in any given sample, a given
response pattern would emerge. Although the researcher can never be sure that the
observed results are "correct" in the cosmic sense, he or she can know the likelihood
that the observed results were an accident or coincidence rather than an actually
existing pattern.
388. See id.
389. Rule 60(b) provides that a judgment may be set aside on various grounds, including fraud, newly discovered
evidence, or "any other reason justifying relief." However, virtually all of these motions must be brought within one
year, the outer limit of what most courts consider a "reasonable time" as provided by the rule absent unusual
circumstances. See HEn, supra note 18, § 24.3.
390. A confidence interval is the range within which the actual answer lies. For example, if a public opinion poll
on the eve of the 1984 election shows that of the committed voters, 56% favor Reagan and 44% favor Mondale and the
poll has a "sampling error" or confidence interval of plus-or-minus 3%, the range of the confidence interval in the Reagan
vote is from 53% to 59%. The survey researcher is said to be "confident" that if the election had been held that day, the
Reagan vote would fall between these parameters, despite the difference in his sample size (e.g., 2,200 respondents) and
the total vote. The sample taken of the electoral result may also be said to be statistically significant to the degree to which
its results are likely to have occurred through random chance or sampling error. See R. Werium & W. HAYS, STA'mScs:
POBABLt-y, INtEucE, AND DEcisioN 400-03 (2d ed. 1975); T. WoNNAcorr & R. WoNNAcoTr, ImnTeRv SrATSTIcs FOR
BusiEss AND Eco;o~ics 141-47, 193-96 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter WoNNAcorr]; Cohen, Confidence in Probability:
Burdens of Persuasion in a World ofImperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 385 (1985) [hereinafter Cohen]. Professor
Cohen notes that in civil litigation the factfinder making an assessment of what actually "happened" in a dispute is not
only determining whether the preponderance of the evidence-more than 50%-weighs in a claimant's favor but that the
factfinder "also must have a certain level of confidence that the true probability, based on all possible evidence, exceeds
that 50% threshold." Cohen, supra, at 399. In other words, a finding for claimant implicitly means that the factfinder has
found that the entire confidence interval of the factfinder exceeds the 50% threshold.
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Generally in the social sciences and statistics, one obtains statistically significant
results at the .05 level whenever one surveys a very large sample (which will produce
a result likely to be nonrandom even when the observed relationship is small) or when
one observes a very large relationship in even a relatively small sample. 391 As a
general rule, the precision of the experimental results and, therefore, the scientists'
ability to speak confidently about a finding increases with larger data bases. When
one makes an observation at the .01 or .05 level, the finding is relatively reliable for
even "weak" relationships. 392 One can transfer this approach by analogy to the civil
trial system and begin to appreciate the wisdom of the civil jury system.
For example, a finding by one person that the defendant was eighty percent
negligent in causing an automobile accident would instinctively be viewed by most
of us as unreliable to show that the defendant was more than fifty percent negligent.
The person making the finding may or may not be a good (or even representative)
factfinder. However, if one thousand persons find the defendant fifty-one percent
negligent, most of us would accept this "verdict" as reliable and true despite the
lower magnitude of the negligence finding in our second case.
The instinctive view is supported by statistical methodology. If instead of ad-
judicating negligence, the one person were flipping a coin twice and obtained heads,
this would not be a very strong indication that the coin was unfair. If, however, after
one thousand coin flips we obtained six hundred heads and four hundred tails, we could
confidently conclude that the coin was unfairly biased to come up heads more than
half the time. According to standard statistical methodology, the two coin flip sample
has no statistical significance or meaningful confidence level. The one thousand flip
exercise, on the other hand, is statistically significant at the .01 level (only a one in
one hundred possibility of occurring by random chance rather than reflecting a real
pattern in the coin flips), suggesting little room for error. 393
391. See Cohen, supra note 390, at 401 ("At any particular confidence level, the interval [estimate of probability]
gets smaller as the quantity of data from which the estimate was derived increases."); WoNNAcorr, supra note 390, at 147.
392. A .05 level of statistical significance is a confidence level or interval of 95%. In other words, when a social
scientist accepts a sampling observation as being statistically significant at the .05 level, she is confident that 95% of the
observations in the sample bracket the actual mean or average observation of the population. See D. BA.sS, STAncs As
PRooF 235-36 (1983); WoNAcorr, supra note 390, at 141-47.
For example, for sampling preferences for the Reagan-Mondale presidential race, the sampler is attempting in the
sample poll to have a response from those sampled that reflects the electorate's actual voting preference. Based on the
sample size, the sampler, through a mathematical formula, constructs an interval that brackets the sample mean. If,
therefore, 55% of the sample of 2,000 voters say they will vote for Reagan and the sampler wants to speak with a 95%
confidence interval, then she will construct an interval around the 55% sample mean, a "plus-minus" figure (e.g., 3%)
that will encompass the true mean of the electorate's response 95% of the time. In this hypothetical case, then the
researcher is 95% certain that the actual preference for Reagan in the electorate as a whole lies between 52 and 58%.
However, in performing similar surveys for 100 presidential elections with similar samples, the actual electorate
preference will lie outside the opinion poll's confidence interval in five of those elections. In addition to changing voter
sentiment between the survey date and election day, this is why the Gallup and Harris Polls are occasionally perceived
as "wrong" in showing voter preferences that differ by more than a point or two from the actual election results.
Thus, an interval estimate of any sample (like the presidential preference poll) tells one how precise is the sampler's
"guess" by also describing a range of values within which one has a particular level of confidence that the true value lies.
If we have a sample, mean, and interval estimate with .05 significance, we are 95% confident that the real answer lies
within the range posited from the sample and reasonable inference. See Cohen, supra note 390, at 399-401.
393. Saying that the chances of a fair coin coming up heads is .5 is itself an estimate of probability.
[]f one had perfect information about, say, the placement of a coin on the flipper's thumb, the mass distribution
of the coin, air currents, and the force exerted in flipping the coin, one could predict with certainty whether a
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As Professor Cohen has demonstrated, the process of adjudication is essentially
a determination of probability. The factfinder determines that a given event or cause
of an event was more probable than not and then finds for the claimant asserting the
probable fact or theory.394 Although the standard inquiry is phrased as though the
flipped coin would turn up heads or tails and would not need to resort to the use of probabilities. To state that
the probability of heads from a particular flipped coin is 0.5, then, is to concede a certain amount of ignorance.
Cohen, supra note 390, at 397 n.74; see also Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Fac#inding Process, 20 STAN. L. Ray.
1065, 1066 (1968).
In addition, Professor Cohen extrapolates from this observation an analysis that underscores the Supreme Court's
error in Matsushita.
In the legal context, an analogy can be made to the distinction between circumstantial evidence and "smoking
guns." If the factfinder has incontrovertible evidence that a particular event occurred-a smoking gun, so to
speak-the probability that the event occurred is 1.0. In the absence of a smoking gun, however, we are left
with circumstantial evidence from which only probabilistic judgments can be made.
Cohen, supra note 390, at 397 n.74.
Recall that in Matsushita, the Court majority declared that an "implausible" theory of the case could not support a
claimant's judgment on circumstantial evidence alone but required direct evidence-a smoking gun, so to speak. In other
words, the Court required the Matsushita plaintiffs to prove their claim with evidence establishing a 100% chance that the
claimed events occurred. However, under the law, a civil claimant need only prevail by a preponderance of the evidence,
more than 50%. If the Matsushita approach were taken on a widespread basis, litigants pressing claims disliked by the
judge could be permitted a jury trial only where they in effect had a confession or videotape of the defendant committing
an unlawful act. In the realm of discrimination, antitrust, securities violations, and commercial fraud, such evidence is
seldom available, suggesting that continued use of the Matsushita approach could extinguish jury trial for certain judicially
disfavored claims, a result at odds with the seventh amendment. See also Dawson, Probabilities and Prejudice in
Establishing Statistical Inferences, 13 Jhmmcs 191, 192 (1973) (indirect evidence as well as direct evidence tends to
establish a proposition).
394. See Cohen, supra note 390, at 399-400. Professor Cohen describes a simple factfinder assessment of
probability (e.g., more than 50% of the proof favors the claimant) as a "point estimate." An assessment that the claimant
has proven its case by something between 50% and 70% of the evidence is an "interval estimate." According to Professor
Cohen:
An interval estimate goes beyond the "best guess" provided by the point estimate. It tells us how precise that
guess is by describing the range of values within which one has a particular level of confidence that the true
value lies. The point estimate, which does not indicate its precision, gives the user who is not aware of its nature
a false sense of exactitude.
Id. at 400.
Based in part on this observation, Professor Cohen argues that a claimant should succeed only when the entire
confidence interval in its proofs exceeds 50%. If, for example, the factfinder's confidence interval straddles the
preponderance of the evidence line, e.g., say a sense by the factfinder that the weight of the evidence is somewhere
between 40 and 60% in favor of the claimant, the judgment should be for defendant. According to Professor Cohen,
judges and juries may do this implicitly in most cases (id. at 418-19), a conclusion with which I agree, with one
qualification.
My own view is that both juries and to a lesser extent judges occasionally forgive a claimant that part of the
confidence interval that falls below the preponderance of proof line when there are mitigating circumstances in claimant's
favor. One example would be when plaintiff has suffered a crippling injury and defendant will not be substantially affected
by an adverse judgment, even a large one. Another might be when there is a sense that not all of the evidence has been
unearthed and much of the "real" knowledge or proof is within defendant's control. According to L. Jonathon Cohen,
spoliation of evidence or its possible concealment is a fact to be considered by the adjudicator in deciding a case. In other
words, the factfinder should, and often implicitly does, take into account the likelihood that a party has attempted to better
its presentation by altering, destroying, fabricating, or merely legitimately failing to diselose evidence. See L.J. ColeN,
THE PRoeABsE AND rmE PRovABLE (1977). But see Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard:
Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FouND. Ras. J. 487; Kaye, Book Review, 89
YALE L.J. 601, 608-10 (1980) (contending that factfinder should account for a party's failure to produce evidence likely
to exist and within its control in deciding whether to accept or reject claim based on probability inferences from evidence
of record). In such instances, it seems to me, the factfinder is implicitly making a judgment that claimant is boosted over
the preponderance line by policy factors deemed even more important than strict decisional accuracy or confidence. My
own view is also that the judicial system should tolerate such silent occasional "fudge factors" as an inevitable occurrence
in a system that serves multiple goals (e.g., compensation, deterrence, public perception of access, justice) in addition
to accuracy and consistency. See Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?, 98 Hsv. L. Rv. 1357, 1359 (1985) (arguing that
trials should not aim primarily to generate mathematically precise results as to produce socially acceptable decisions);
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1367-77 (1971) (arguing
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factfinder were merely deciding whether the claimed occurrence was more than fifty
percent likely to have happened, the trier actually is probably doing something more
sophisticated, determining that it has confidence that the entire range of possibility
surrounding its assessment of what "really" happened exceeds fifty percent. 395 That
is, the trier determines that the probability of the existence of the claimed event or
explanation is somewhere above fifty percent and that even accounting for the
possibility of error in the analysis, the probability of the occurrence likely does not
fall below fifty percent.
Even though adjudication does not so much resemble repeated data of the same
nature on the same point but rather resembles a variety of evidence directed toward
the existence of the point,396 this analogy can be carried to the differing reliabilities
of adjudication by summary judgment, directed verdict after plaintiff's case, directed
verdict after the close of the evidence, trial, or judgment n.o.v. At the summary
judgment stage of litigation, even after extensive discovery, the data base upon which
a court decides can be defined as "X." Even if X is good, it gets better as the case
proceeds. After plaintiff's case, the court has added to the data base any additional
discovery, counsel have sharpened their analyses of the evidence as trial approaches,
and the judge has heard live witnesses testify and discuss documentary, real, and
demonstrative evidence. The data base at the first directed verdict juncture can thus
be defined as "X plus something," often quite a significant something.
After the close of the evidence, the judge has heard additional testimony and
explanation, including defendant proofs directed toward plaintiff's actually presented
evidence. The data base is "X plus something plus something more." When the
factfinder, judge or jury, retires to review the evidence and argument and to reflect
on the issues in the case, more is added to the data base, which then becomes "X plus
something plus something more plus something more." 3 97 After the trial result, even
if the judge is appalled by the jury verdict, the verdict is at least informative to her
as the verdict loser presents ajudgment n.o.v. or new trial motion. The judge not only
has the jury verdict as input (supplemented by the length of their deliberations, whether
and what questions were asked, whether the answers to jury interrogatories were
internally consistent, etc.) but also reflects again on the record in light of the verdict
and newly refined arguments of counsel. A court's decision on the judgment n.o.v.
or new trial motion stems from a data base of "X plus something plus something more
that trial outcomes involve some values even more important to society and judicial system than strict accuracy of
factflnding).
395. See Cohen; supra note 390, at 399, 403-04. See also Johnston, Baysian Fact-Finding and Efficiency: Toward
An Economic Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. Rav. 137, 150-63 (1987) (suggesting defendants
dertermine apt level of care by estimating likely proportion of adverse verdicts based on given quantum of evidence
available for trial; implicitly posits that potential defendants use a confidence interval approach to estimating likely jury
result).
396. See L.J. CoHEN, THE PsoBABuE a ma PovABLE (1977).
397. According to James and Hazard, the quality of the records at summary judgment and trial differ for several
reasons: (I) cross-examination at trial may expose error or cast a different light on documents or testimony; (2) the
summary judgment record lacks demeanor evidence; (3) the possibility that "persons who are willing to perjure
themselves in an affidavit and even in the informal atmosphere of a deposition may be impelled by the formal trappings
of trial and the personal presence of the judge to tell the truth." JAsES & HAzoto, supra note 11, § 5.19, at 274-75.
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plus something more plus more still.' '398 At each stage of the enlargement of the data
base, the confidence in the correctness of the result should increase. 399
Viewed this way, the judgment n.o.v. or new trial, despite overturning a jury
verdict, is less problematic than the directed verdict or the post-Liberty Lobby
summary judgment that acts as a directed verdict clone. A judicial decision
overturning a jury verdict after trial and deliberation is based on a far more extensive
data base than a grant of summary judgment that precludes a jury from ever hearing
the case. Thus, our confidence in the correctness of the result in the judgment n.o.v.
or directed verdict context exceeds our assurance that a court correctly decided the
summary judgment motion and provides greater justification for overturning a jury
determination than for precluding the jury determination.
Interestingly, the largest increase in the data base and its reliability occurs
between summary judgment and directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case.
Liberty Lobby, by changing rule 56 to the directed verdict standard, thus permits
courts to conclude a case as though they did so upon a much richer data base than
actually possessed. In that sense, Liberty Lobby is bad science and probability theory,
as well as bad law.
The problems in this approach are not assuaged when the summary judgment
record is largely or even exclusively documentary. Although some jurists have
suggested that documentary evidence can be or should be as easily reviewed by an
appellate court as by a trial court, this view was rejected by current Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52400 as well as the Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, N.C. 401 Today, the rule is that a trial court's factual findings based
upon documentary evidence are to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard
as would trial court fact findings based on witness testimony. The theory, as declared
in Bessemer City, behind applying the clearly erroneous rule to district court fact
findings based on documents as well as findings based upon testimony rests on
efficiency and respect for district courts. 402 De novo appellate review of documents
would be time consuming and expend substantial judicial resources for little
perceived improvement in the accuracy of case decisions. It also would tend to
denigrate the deference ordinarily paid the trial court regarding fact finding.
There is one additional drawback of de novo appellate review of documents that
the Bessemer City Court and the Advisory Committee Note concerning rule 52 failed
to mention: it is usually a poorer quality of fact finding than that conducted by the trial
398. Cf. Cooper, supra note 323, at 903 n. 1 (arguing that directed verdict is advantageous to judgment n.o.v. in that
it saves time of closing arguments, instructions, and jury deliberations and does not require invalidation of verdict already
reached but suggesting that judgment n.o.v. is nonetheless a necessary adjunct to directed verdict).
399. Professor Moore's slant on the comparative advantages of summary judgment and directed verdict is somewhat
different from that of Professor Cooper. Moore observes that neither motion saves time when it is reversed on appeal and
that "[live trials before the trier of facts, who can observe the demeanor of witnesses should be had where there is any
reasonable doubt as to the facts." See MooRE, supra note 164, 56.02[10].
400. See FED. R. Cv. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility
of the witnesses.").
401. 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
402. Id. at 575.
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court. At trial, the documents are not merely heaped before the trial judge, poised to
give her eyestrain and boredom for days or weeks to come. Even in cases with less
than stellar trial counsel, the documents are ordinarily introduced through live
witnesses who not only authenticate the document but also explain its contents and
significance, pointing out specific passages, illustrating and elaborating as the
document is discussed. The judge's attention is both drawn to the document, even
when it is turgidly written, of poor legibility, or unduly boring, and rewarded with
explanation and memory reinforcement.
By contrast, an appellate court reviewing this same documentary evidence will
receive it as part of a designated record or joint appendix. The appellate record may
or may not contain a transcript of the witness's description and interpretation of the
document. Even the most diligent circuit panel will not be as well equipped to
determine facts from the document as was the district court. Realistically, most
circuit judges will lack the energy and will to give the document the same
consideration that the trial judge was forced to give to the paper in open court through
a live witness and counsel. In the same way in which the trial court is better suited
than the appellate court to weighing documentary evidence, the trial court at trial
probably reaches more accurate conclusions about documents than does the trial court
reviewing a summary judgment record. Even with the aid of well-prepared briefs, the
court deciding a summary judgment motion faces an essentially "cold" paper record
similar to the appellate record. The judge may simply miss facts contained in
documents attached to one of many affidavits or misunderstand the documents. 403
This problem is obviously exacerbated when counsel fails to highlight portions of the
record favorable to its position on the merits. This may have been what happened in
Catrett.4 4
When a judge has a predisposition on the case, particularly a desire to end the
case by granting summary judgment, he or she may inadvertently grant too much
403. See Bergman, Ambiguity: The Hidden Hearsay Danger Almost Nobody Talks About, 75 Ky. L.J. 841 (1987)
[hereinafter Bergman] (hearsay statements contained in documents, including authoritative documents, are frequently
ambiguous and their precise meaning cannot be delineated without cross-examination or other exploration). Accord
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,425 (1918) ("A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used");
J. MAmy & B. GAW, PERSONAL AND IMs'ERPSsONAL CO.sanMMCAMON 110-11 (1975) (most effective means of resolving
ambiguity or vagueness is to ask follow-up questions); Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Hiv. L. Rey. 957, 966-69
(1974) ("role of cross-examination with respect to ambiguity is particularly important").
Professor Bergman also observed that persons viewing documents tend to fill in the interstices of missing information
according to their own expectations of what usually happens in such situations. Bergman, supra, at 861-63. This tendency
also underscores the possible impact of a shift from jury assessment to judge evaluation if in fact the judges interpret or
"fill in" ambiguities in documentary records in a manner distinct from that of the juries. In addition, the fact inferences
and legal conclusions drawn by judges may differ from those ofjuries. As Bergman observed, "[c]ircumstantial evidence
leads to a conclusion only by means of an underlying premise. By choosing different premises, one can draw opposite
conclusions from the same piece of evidence." Id. at 854 (citation omitted). For example, theMatsushita Court's decision
clearly involved the Justices' underlying premises about the business world, forming their universe of permissible
inferences and the degree to which they mentally completed any gaps in the record. See supra text accompanying notes
80-98.
404. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, , 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2556, 2558-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(contending that evidence in record prior to filing of summary judgment motion showed exposure of plaintiff's decedent
to Celotex asbestos product).
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credence to documents set forth by the movant. 4o5 When these documents do not have
witness exposition, cross-examination, and focused consideration, there is less with
which the nonmovant can expose the self-serving, unreliable, or unpersuasive
character of the movant's documents. In a case alleging an antitrust conspiracy, for
example, a defendant may move for summary judgment based on a letter to
salespersons instructing them not to compare prices with competitors. On its face, the
document seems to show that defendant wanted to avoid even the possible appearance
of collusion with others.
At trial, however, the witness through which the document is introduced (or
another witness) may admit under cross-examination that the letter was part of the
company's smokescreen and was mailed to the sales force one day after they met at
corporate headquarters to plot the price fixing plan. A less Perry Mason-like scenario
would see the factfinder, perhaps especially a jury, finding the document not to ring
true in the context of all of the evidence shown at trial (e.g., expense records showing
salespersons from all fourteen widget-maker defendants stayed at the same hotel and
ate meals together for three days prior to defendants' announcements of congruent
prices during the ensuing two weeks).
Because a court acquires more information after the summary judgment juncture
does not mean that a court can never grant summary judgment. It should mean,
however, that courts will not grant the motion unless the nature of the record allows
confidence in the correctness of the result similar to a social scientist's confidence
that research findings were unlikely to have resulted from random chance. In my
view, the traditional rule 56 better accomplishes this than does the post-Liberty Lobby
approach to summary judgment.
Another comparison between adjudication and social science "proof' is
instructive. Because adjudication, like sampling, is to some extent an assessment of
probability, the adjudication process can produce two possible errors. One error is
wrongfully finding liable a defendant who is not in fact liable. This is "false
inculpation" or "Type I" error according to social statistics terminology. The second
potential error is wrongfully exonerating a defendant who is actually liable. This is
"false exculpation" or "Type H" error in social statistics language. 40 6 When the
judicial system adopts a standard of proof for a claimant and any explicit or implicit
confidence interval that must be satisfied to meet that standard of persuasion, it
determines how often the system will produce Type I and Type II errors. For
example, adopting the standard social science requirement of a ninety-five percent
405. Those endorsing the purported greater accuracy of findings based on documentary rather than testimonial
evidence (see Cooper, supra note 323, at 934 n.93) appear to overlook that trial provides the factfinder with both types
of evidence rather than documentary evidence alone, as does summary judgment. Logically, the quality of trial
determinations should exceed that of summary judgment absent the presence of prejudice at trial. While prejudice
undoubtedly occurs at trial, it can exist as easily in pretrial determinations.
406. See Cohen, supra note 390.
When we express a particular level of confidence in a probabilistic determination, we are making a statement
about the risk of Type I (false inculpation) error associated with that determination. The relationship between
the two concepts is direct: the risk of Type I error . . . is equal to one minus the confidence level. Choosing
a confidence level of ninety-five percent is thus the equivalent of accepting a five percent risk of Type I error.
Id. at 410-I1.
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confidence interval means that the system will accept a five percent risk of Type I
error. Using this standard in litigation would probably mean that five percent of the
defendants found liable were actually not in fact liable. Once the confidence level
required of a claimant is set, it determines the risk of Type II error as well. Although
this cannot be done with mathematical precision without knowing much, often
unknowable, information, there is authority suggesting that in some contexts
requiring a ninety-five percent confidence level for claimants results in as much as a
fifty percent chance of Type II error.4o7 In other words, requiring the confidence level
normally associated with social science proofs may mean that half the defendants
found not liable ought in fact be found liable to the claimant.
A discussion of the "right" confidence level to require for civil litigation and the
means to operationalize it lies beyond the scope of this Article. As Professor Cohen
has noted, social scientists have distinct reasons for adopting the required confidence
interval at a level that errs in favor of wrongfully rejecting a correct theory in order
that an incorrect theory not be wrongfully accepted and enshrined. In civil litigation,
however, we probably do not want to err so far in this direction since the consequence
of a Type I error is only the "unfair" judgment against a defendant or group of
defendants rather than the systemwide adoption of an incorrect theory or world
view.40 8
In the context of summary judgment, a judge's greater freedom to evaluate the
quality of evidence seems to me likely to increase the likelihood of Type HI error in
civil adjudication. Prior to Liberty Lobby, a judge was constrained to allow a case to
proceed to trial when the nonmovant's case was supported by some admissible
evidence. Now, when the judge applying Liberty Lobby deems that evidence too
weak to sustain a reasonable jury's verdict, she implicitly declares that the claimant's
evidence of the probability of the truth of its assertions falls below the required
confidence level. Because this determination is made on the basis of less data than is
available at trial and because the increased use of summary judgment, on a practical
level, inures to the benefit of defendants, the functional result of all this means a
greater proportion of defendant victories than prior to Liberty Lobby. Because a given
percentage of these defendant victories will be erroneous, the proportion of Type II
407. See Dawson, Investigation of Fact-The Role of the Statistician, 11 FoRurm 816, 907-08 (1976) (employing
statistical model of employment discrimination cases).
408. See Cohen, supra note 390.
It is conventional in both the physical and the social sciences to use the ninety-five percent confidence level in
hypothesis testing and in constructing confidence intervals. This convention reflects nothing more than an
arbitrary balancing of the disutilities or "regrets," of Type I and Type I1 errors. It represents a value judgment
within the context of those types of research as to the relative costs of incorrectly proclaiming a result on one
hand and incorrectly deeming a result not to have been demonstrated on the other. Researchers in these areas
have chosen to accept a relatively high risk of Type II error (that of failing to reject the null hypothesis, and,
therefore, of not accepting a proposition that is in fact true) in order to minimize the risk of Type I error (that
of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis, and, therefore, of accepting a false proposition). Although this
conservative balancing of risks may be appropriate for deciding when to accept a scientific hypothesis, it is not
necessarily appropriate within the legal context. Before accepting this or any other convention for the legal
standard of proof, its balancing of the risks of Type I and Type II error---and, therefore, the relative disutilities
or regrets implicitly assigned to therm-must be examined to determine if that balancing reflects appropriate
social judgments in the context of civil litigation.
Id. at 412.
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errors in the system will increase. Since the proportion of Type II errors already
probably exceeds the proportion of Type I errors, the "new" summary judgment
shifts the system's results in favor of defendants and against claimants as well as
permits this shift to occur upon a less rich data base. Once again, I question whether
the Court has set forth a compelling reason for this shift. I do not take a position as
to what interests should be most protected by the judicial system's tolerance of Type
I and Type II error. I do argue, however, that any change in the pre-existing balance
of these chances for error should be accomplished through amendment of rule 56 and
only after a strong showing of a need for change.
The "old" summary judgment prevented elimination of a claim so long as the
nonmovant had a nonfrivolous side of the story to present to the factf'mder at trial.
This restriction on the grant of summary judgment operated to prevent the
extinguishment of claims unless the record provided a considerable confidence
interval for the view that the claim lacked merit. Under the post-Liberty Lobby
summary judgment/directed verdict rule, a court may eliminate a claim when the
judge finds the nonmovant's supporting facts and their interpretation sufficiently
unpersuasive. The judge can now act to extinguish a wider variety of claims on the
same body of information previously thought too prone to error.
Under the "new" rule 56, our confidence in the correctness of the trial court's
summary judgment decision falls. Whether and how often it falls below an
"acceptable" level of confidence (however that is defined), I leave to those
examining the issue in greater detail. My own view, based on instinct and the
preceding discussion, is that aggressive use of the "new" summary judgment will
result in a percentage of erroneous dismissals of claims too high to be permitted by
a federal system that purports to "do justice" and derives its legitimacy from the
public perception that it reaches the "right" result in the vast majority of cases.
Certainly, the new rule 56, whatever it gains the system in efficiency, will throw out
more meritorious claims than did the old rule 56.
IV. PRETRIAL CASE DISPOSITION AT THE CROSSROADS
A. Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, the Court, and the Rules Enabling Act
As previously discussed, Liberty Lobby was no mere clarification or refinement
of federal summary judgment practice. Rather, Liberty Lobby effected a major
change in federal summary judgment doctrine. In essence, the Court amended rule 56
to replace the words "genuine dispute of material fact" with words akin to "facts
presented by the nonmovant of sufficient weight to convince the trial judge that he or
she would not grant a directed verdict for the movant at trial." As previously noted,
these phrasings and formulations of summary judgment are vastly different.
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934409 sets forth the procedures by which the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be amended, abrogated, or replaced. Custom,
informal practice, and Supreme Court orders have added to the system established by
409. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)).
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the Enabling Act. Today, the process works (or is supposed to work) as follows: the
Federal Judicial Center maintains an Advisory Committee; the Advisory Committee
is typically composed of leading academics, judges, and experienced practitioners;
the Chief Justice selects a Chair of the Committee, usually a respected judge, and a
Reporter for the Committee, usually a noted academic; the Committee itself examines
the Rules to ascertain whether any amendments are needed and also solicits
comments both as to suggested changes and the merits of Committee proposals. 4 10
Unfortunately, the Committee proceedings are often not well-publicized and the
comments solicited are representative of only a rather narrow segment of the
profession. 41' Nevertheless, significant commentary is received and amendments are
altered or deleted in response. The Committee eventually issues a final proposal on
which comment then can be received as it is transmitted to the Supreme Court for
review. Normally, the Court adopts the Committee proposal, which the Court
promulgates as amendments to the Rules. 412 These are then, pursuant to the express
language of the Enabling Act, reported to Congress. Congress has ninety days to
delete or amend the proposed changes, or to delay the effective date of the changes.
If Congress does not act within the ninety-day period, the amended rules become
effective with force of statute. 413
Since its passage in 1934, the Enabling Act has been widely hailed as an
efficient and effective procedure, combining the best notions of protecting judicial
expertise and prerogatives with democratic oversight through the elected legislature
and its more visible deliberative process. 414 The Enabling Act, passed after nearly
thirty years of off-and-on debate and reformist push, 415 is viewed as a wise
compromise between the view that rules of procedure are best or exclusively made by
courts, the judicially independent bodies that must apply the rules, and the position
that rules possess the force of statutes and must be enacted by the legislature to be
legitimate.
Under the Enabling Act, the body politic and legal profession ostensibly get to
have it both ways. The Court, with the aid of the Advisory Committee, brings its
410. See Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. Am. JuocAnnr Soc'y 250 (1963)
[hereinafter Federal Rule-Making]; Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis,
27 STAN. L. REv. 673, 674-77 (1975) [hereinafter Contemporary Crisis]; Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A
Time of Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975) [hereinafter Lesnick]; Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over
Judicial Rule-making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1958).
411. See Contemporary Crisis, supra note 410, at 676-77, 682, 685; Lesnick, supra note 410, at 579-82. A
significant revision of the Enabling Act, entitled the Rules Enabling Act of 1987, has been proposed as Title H of H.R.
2182, a general bill amending the judicial code. See CoNG. Rac. H5333 (daily ed. June 22, 1987). The provisions
concerning the Enabling Act would require all Advisory Committee meetings to be open to the public and also require
sufficient pre-meeting notice and the presentation of majority and minority reports regarding any proposed amendment to
the Federal Rules. The bill was passed by the House on June 22, 1987 and referrred to the Senate Judiciary Committee
on June 23. As yet, the Senate has taken no action. See Status of House Bills, 2 Cong. Index (CCH) (1987-88).
412. See supra sources cited in note 410.
413. Section 2072 provides that promulgated "rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress
by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day of May, and until
the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
414. See Federal Rule-Makng, supra note 410, at 254-55; Contemporary Crisis, supra note 410, at 673-75. But
see Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States Dist. Courts, 374 U.S. 861, 865 (1963) (Black &
Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
415. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. R v. 1015 (1982) [hereinafter Burbank].
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expertise to bear upon the matter, ensuring that the Rules and amendments are written
in first instance by those experienced in their use and who must work under them in
the future. Transmittal to Congress allows review by a group that is theoretically
more demographically diverse as well as popularly elected. 4 16
In practice, the Enabling Act has been something less than a perfect panacea.
The Act governs all federal rules-civil, criminal, evidence, bankruptcy, appellate-
with separate committees for each. For the most part, Congress has not aggressively
monitored or altered the rules reported to it by the Court. This has been particularly
true with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which seem to engender less passion
than the criminal rules and less confusion than the bankruptcy rules. For the most
part, then, the Act ushered in a prolonged era of Court rulemaking, perhaps more
properly called Advisory Committee rulemaking, relatively unaffected by Congress.
To some extent, that has changed in recent years. In 1975, Congress suspended
the effective date of the reported Federal Rules of Evidence and then rewrote the
Rules extensively after a good deal of scrutiny. 417 In 1974, Congress played a
substantial role in revising reported amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure
governing discovery. 418 Some commentators viewed this change in the traditional
rubber-stamping pattern of Congress as evidencing a breakdown of the Enabling Act
system and viewed the problem as stemming largely from the insular and closed
nature of the Advisory Committee process and the Court's failure to adequately
review the Committee's work.419 Although these criticisms and their suggestions for
a more open Committee process and sharper Court scrutiny have much merit, 420 they
perhaps minimize one positive aspect of these episodes-the showing that Congress
can play a legitimate and active role as final backstop to any rules changes. Far from
being broken, the Enabling Act system shows itself to be working well when
Congress does not invariably endorse all aspects of the product of Committee and
Court.4 2 1
The history of the discovery and evidence rules demonstrates that having the
Enabling Act rather than complete Court rulemaking power does make a difference.
416. Although the socioeconomic backgrounds of representatives and senators can hardly be called a reflection of
the United States as a whole, (see Perry, supra note 192, at 574 n.73), they are probably more diverse than those ofjudges
orjustices. Most judges are from decidedly upper-middle class backgrounds, are white, are male, and have other indicia
of elite prestige by virtue of being professionals, usually with high status schooling and pr-court work experience. See
CHAsE, supra note 367, at 113-14; SctemHAusm, supra note 367, at 41-104; Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. Rv.
661, 664, 669-70 (1985). Congresspersons as a group have similar characteristics but exhibit greater diversity in income,
education, race, geographic background, sociological background, and, obviously, occupation and prior work experience.
See U.S. GOV'T PRtMO OMCe, Co. No eSSlOA. DRCORY 1987-88, at 4-231 (1987) (biographical sketches of Senators and
Representatives); M. BAsos. & G. UnRFsA, ALANAC OF A.,smucAN Pouncs (1981).
417. See Lesnick, supra note 410, at 579.
418. See Contemporary Crisis, supra note 410, at 67742.
419. See, e.g., Lesnick, supra note 410; Contemporary Crisis, supra note 410, at 685-86.
420. Both Professors Lesnick and Friedenthal urged more open Advisory Committee drafting activity designed to
elicit greater comment from more diverse segments of the profession and the public. Professor Friedenthal attributed much
of the perceived problem to insufficient Supreme Court involvement in the process as well as Committee redrafting after
the time for reaction was passed. Professor Lesnick further advocated that the Advisory Committee be more diverse and
that the Chief Justice's authority to appoint Committee members and establish procedures be reduced and decentralized.
Professor Lesnick went so far as to suggest that the Court's role of "promulgating" the rules be eliminated to minimize
conflicts of interest when the rules are later challenged in litigation.
421. See Burbank, supra note 415, at 1106-20.
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This demonstration was, however, seemingly overlooked by the Liberty Lobby
majority. Had the majority candidly acknowledged the opinion's major alteration of
rule 56 in light of the commands of the Enabling Act, it should have realized that
increasing the burden of the summary judgment nonmovant to require a demonstra-
tion of capacity to survive a directed verdict motion was a sharp departure from rule
56 understanding and practice as of 1986. A revision of a rule or statute is best
accomplished by following accepted revision procedures. For the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, these procedures are set forth in the Enabling Act. They may be
implemented by the Court with relative ease should the Court believe a revision
desirable. The Liberty Lobby majority made it quite clear that it viewed the equating
of summary judgment and directed verdict as wise. What is unclear, even mystifying,
is the Court's refusal to acknowledge its actions and its reluctance to seek to
accomplish its goals through the Enabling Act.
The subterfuge of the Liberty Lobby opinion, whether accidental or intentional,
vitiates many of the benefits presumed to flow from the Enabling Act. Since the Court
acted as though it were merely declaring the law rather than altering it, the Act's
process for ensuring heterogeneous contributions to rulemaking was regrettably
missed. No one doubts that Supreme Court justices are intelligent. Some of them
even have practical litigation experience, although few on the current Court can be
said to have either the seasoned litigator's or the trial judge's exposure to day-to-day
summary judgment practice and the consequences of any real or imagined litigation
explosion. The Court has able law clerks and staff; it receives the benefit of the
briefings and arguments of counsel in a hotly contested case such as Liberty Lobby.
Nonetheless, these attributes fall far short of the contributions to rulemaking provided
by the Enabling Act.
When rulemaking proceeds by Enabling Act process rather than judicial fiat, a
substantially more diverse cast of characters participates. The Advisory Committee,
although it has been rightfully criticized as being composed of too narrow and elite
a segment of the profession, 422 has significantly greater experience and diversity to
apply to the task. The Committee roster contains trial judges, appellate judges,
practitioners, and law professors. 4 3 This group has both more recent experience in
litigation as well as greater interaction with the profession than the relatively isolated
Supreme Court justices. 424 Recently, the Committee Reporter has actively sought
comments on amendment drafts from persons not on the Committee. The response,
422. See Lesnick, supra note 410, at 581.
423. For example, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as constituted May 1, 1986,
was comprised of three law professors (Reporter Dean Paul D. Carrington of Duke University School of Law, Maurice
Rosenberg of Columbia University School of Law, and Arthur R. Miller of Harvard Law School), four appellate judges
(Joseph F. Weis of the Third Circuit, Frank M. Johnson of the Eleventh Circuit, Charles E. Wiggins of the Ninth Circuit,
and Michael Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court), three district judges (John F. Grady of the Northern District of
Illinois, Mariana R. Pfaelzer of the Southern District of California, and Walter Jay Skinner of the District of
Massachusetts), a Justice Department lawyer (Dennis G. Lindner), and three private practitioners (W. Reece Bader of
California, Arthur L. Liman of New York, and Larrine S. Holbrooke of Washington). The Deputy Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, James Macklin, serves as Committee Secretary.
424. The justices must to some degree avoid too much mingling with the profession and the public, both to avoid
questions as to their impartiality (see 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982)) and because of their geographic concentration and
isolation while having to manage a crushing workload that leaves little time for anything else but Court business.
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particularly from law professors, has been significant though hardly massive.425 The
Committee can expand this input substantially by holding public hearings and
soliciting comment on an even wider scale. The Committee, to a much greater degree
than the Court, has the capability to assemble and assess empirical information
pertinent to the status of federal litigation and the impact of proposed rule changes. 426
After this internal and external process, the Court has the opportunity to review
the Committee product and further revise any rule changes. Comparing the
information base available to the Court from the Committee with that presented to the
Court in an isolated lawsuit underscores the advantages of revising rule 56 through
the Enabling Act rather than through the Liberty Lobby opinion. Making the revisions
by case law rather than formal amendment gives the Court the same opportunity to
participate that it would have under the Act. Under the Act, however, the Court both
proceeds against a richer information backdrop and is subject to congressional
review.
The congressional review is key. Without it, there simply cannot exist the
cross-section of views necessary to ensure that the rules sufficiently account for the
interests of all segments of the profession and litigants. Under the current system, the
Advisory Committee is appointed by the Chief Justice and neither the Committee nor
the Court is required to heed suggestions from outsiders. Although congresspersons
also possess a good deal of independence, they are generally subject to pressures
likely to make them responsive to elements of the profession and public that may have
been ignored or rejected in the Committee and Court process. Congresspersons must
be re-elected. Even with the majority of seats, particularly House seats, considered
the "safe" property of one political party, 427 re-election normally requires the
member and staff to at least listen to constituent groups. Thus, when rule amendments
are reported to Congress via the Enabling Act, the plaintiff's bar, the defense bar, the
insurance industry, subject matter interest groups such as the "civil rights lobby,"
state and local officials, and elites of the profession willing to press disagreements
previously presented to the Advisory Committee may make their cases to the
Congress.428 This serves the valuable function of expanding information as well as
425. For example, in response to requests from the Reporter, 22 persons, 18 of them law professors, made
comments and suggestions to the Advisory Committee. See Advisory Committee, Working Draft of Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 225 (July 1987).
426. During the years of the Enabling Act, the committees have assembled data, usually court cases and commentary
on them, but have created little or no data of their own. With proper planning, the committees could commission or
themselves undertake to conduct empirical research concerning the actual impact of the Rules. Quasi-experimental data
gathering could permit a comparison of the effects of different rules or versions of a rule. Armed with this additional data,
the committees would presumably produce a better product, or at least a product whose ramifications can more accurately
be predicted. Although the Federal Judicial Center frequently conducts studies on civil procedure, undoubtedly with an
eye to items under Committee consideration, this outsider's view is that the Committee could work more directly with the
Center in improving the information base upon which the Rules are built.
427. See generally M. BARo.ss & G. UnvusA, THm ALmNAc or A, .cAN Porcs 1982 (1981) (most Senate and House
seats, particularly House seats, change upon retirement or death of incumbent); but see id. at xxvii-xxxiii (Republicans
gain control of Senate in 1980 election as six Democratic incumbents defeated) and xxxviii (Republicans capture 37 House
seats held by Democrats). See also F. SoRAur, PARTY PoLmcs ni AM, wCA 33-35, 140-60 (2d ed. 1972) (American
identification with political parties, although not absolute, is highly stable, reducing turnover of elective posts).
428. For example, the plaintiffs' bar has access to Congress through the American Trial Lawyers' Association and
various state trial lawyers' associations. By contrast, the current Advisory Committee seems to lack a member with a
strong plaintiffs' attorney background in either personal injury or traditional plaintiffs' commercial work such as antitrust
1988]
186 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:95
the structural political objective of preventing rulemaking from becoming entirely the
prerogative of a judicial "in group.'"429
In addition, many of the congresspersons and staff are non-lawyers, providing
a substantially greater amount of lay input than can conceivably be achieved under the
current Committee process, exclusively a lawyer's domain. Review in the legislature
permits one final opportunity for those not steeped in legal groupthink to say "what
about... T" in response to the reported rules. The congressional perspective,
although undoubtedly laced with its own self-interest and that of the most electorally
powerful interest groups, nonetheless acts as a partial antidote to any self-interest or
oversight of the profession or a segment of the profession unduly influential with the
Committee or the Court.
When, for example, a perceived litigation explosion exists, is regarded as
severe, and thought composed of a substantial number of unmeritorious cases, those
adversely affected (such as judges facing more cases) are logically motivated to draft
the rules in a manner that will make their lives easier, even at the expense of other
participants in the system (such as certain classes of litigants). At a minimum, this
tendency must exist on a subconscious level for Committee members and the Court.
The congressional perspective will be somewhat different. The House and Senate will
not have to work longer hours conducting trials if a summary judgment rule
occasionally results in trials of claims that look unmeritorious in retrospect. 430 This
neutral, or least non-judicial, perspective is an important advantage of following
rather than avoiding the Enabling Act. This and the other advantages of the Act were
lost when the Liberty Lobby majority undertook to rewrite rule 56 on its own.
The foregoing is not to suggest that the Supreme Court lacks power to change,
even change radically, its previous interpretation of a statute or the Constitution that
it comes to view as erroneous or seriously flawed. Rather, this Article contends only
that the Court must be candid in its interpretative conduct and should reinterpret a rule
in a new and divergent manner only when it has a compelling basis for believing that
its previous views were wrong. When the issue is doubtful or the Court is divided,
the matter should be submitted to the Advisory Committee to begin the determina-
tion, pursuant to the Enabling Act, of whether an amendment is in order.
Furthermore, this Article posits that radical rule re-interpretation should occur less
or shareholders' derivative suits. The insurance industry and the defense bar have similar organizations and can also
approach Congress directly rather than attempting to catch the ear of the Committee indirectly. There are also various
environmental groups, victims rights groups, and civil rights groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, who are active in Congress. By contrast, those with avenues of communication to the
Committee generally come from a different segment of the bar and its constituent interests, usually either large corporate
law firms or prestigious law schools.
429. Professor Friedenthal contends that the Enabling Act is at its best because Congress does not have the primary
responsibility for revising the Rules. He posits that the access by interest groups to Congress is likely to diminish the
wisdom of any resulting rule drafted exclusively or primarily by Congress. See Contemporary Crisis, supra note 410, at
673-74. He does not, however, suggest that Congress is a bad supervisor, only that it is a poor drafter. My own view is
that the access by interest groups and individual members of the electorate is vital, especially so in light of the essentially
closed nature of the Committee and Court work to these groups.
430. Congress may have to fund more judges and support staffs to process any significant increase in litigation
resulting from a particular rule, but this delayed and attenuated connection to a particular rule such as the hypothetically
liberal summary judgment rule should not provide significant incentive for Congress to favor restrictive rules of
procedure.
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often than radical statutory or constitutional re-interpretation because the Court can
itself amend a rule and need not effect substantial change through the less open
process of reinterpretation. 431 The Liberty Lobby Court had within its grasp the ability
to openly change rule 56 in a manner involving those with the affected reliance
interest and with a delayed effective date during which the affected persons could
adjust to the change but chose not to exercise this option.432
B. The Current Advisory Committee and Pretrial Disposition
The current Advisory Committee has responded to the Court's 1986 trio of
cases, but has done so in a manner that exacerbates rather than alleviates their
mischief. The Committee did not assemble convincing data suggesting substantial
problems with traditional summary judgment jurisprudence and then proceed to
address these shortcomings through amendments tailored to any demonstrated
431. Judicial reinterpretation without legislative revision obviously has a legitimate and important role in a common
law system. For example, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court reversed a venerable previous
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (interpreting what is now codified
as 28 U.S.C. § 1652). On an issue over which first-year civil procedure students, lawyers, scholars, and judges continue
to struggle, see generally, WmGHr, supra note 17, §§ 54-60; Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693
(1974); Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARv. L. Ray. 741 (1974); Ely, The Necklace, 87 H.Rv. L. Ray. 753 (1974);
McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884 (1965), the Court overruled Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which held that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply federal common law
as the substantive law governing the case. In Erie, the Court held that the federal court sitting in diversity must apply the
substantive law of the state with the most apt choice of law nexus to the controversy. In Erie, which serves as a good
example of the "right" approach to changing statutory interpretation (regardless of one's feelings about the wisdom of
the Erie holding), the Court acknowledged that it was not only overruling a precedent but also altering its construction
of the Rules of Decision Act. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938). The Court then presented "new"
historical evidence as to the meaning of the statute Id. at 72-73 (citing Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HRv. L. REv. 49 (1923)), and explained how the additional data changed the proper view of
the statute. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-76 (1938). Swift held that the word "laws" as used in the Rules
of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), which requires that the "laws of the several states ...shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply," referred only to state
legislative enactments and not to state common law. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842). Erie agreed
with Professor Warren's view that Swift had misinterpreted the Act and that ample evidence showed that Congress had
in 1789 intended that "laws" as used in the Act include the judicial precedent of the states. The Court also presented
constitutional and prudential problems posed by the Swift v. Tyson precedent and contended that these difficulties were
resolved by the new statutory interpretation. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 34 U.S. 64, 74-78 (1938). For example, the Erie
opinion pointed out that the Swift rule had allowed forum-shopping to the advantage of non-resident plaintiffs and to the
detriment of residents of the forum state, and that Swift allowed for differing legal rules and decisions in the same locale
depending upon whether the litigation was in state court or federal court, creating an equal protection problem.
In addition to presenting a forthright description of what it was doing and a detailed rationale of why, the Erie Court's
action seems substantially more justified than that of the Liberty Lobby Court because of the nature of the law under
re-interpretation. Rule 56 has the force of a statute but unlike a statute the process of revision can be instituted and shaped
by the Court through the Enabling Act procedures. The Rules of Decision Act by contrast has been in its basic form since
the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Act can only be amended by action initiated by Congress. Both rule 56 and 28 U.S.C.
section 1652, as interpreted in Swift v. Tyson, had engendered substantial reliance in bench and bar. Changing the law
or re-interpreting it in a manner tantamount to change surely would disturb to some extent these reliance interests. The
Erie Court, however, took pains to explain and justify its disturbing of these interests.
432. The Erie Court, by contrast, faced a more difficult task in changing the legal landscape. Viewing Swift v. Tyson
as greatly in error, the Court could have rendered the Erie decision as it did or used Erie merely to cast doubt on Swift
and invite Congress to amend the Rules of the Decision Act to make state law the governing substantive law in diversity
actions. If the Erie Court had chosen the latter course, it would have heightened rather than reduced the uncertainty of
those who had relied on Swift and would have permitted this state of uncertainty to last as long as Congress failed to take
the hint, perhaps forever. By instead rendering a strong and explained change in the interpretative meaning of § 1652, the
Erie Court achieved a more predictable result. This is not to suggest, however, that the proper application of the Erie
doctrine has always been clear or easy, quite the contrary (see W',rurr, supra note 17, at §§ 55-60), only that the Erie
rule itself was openly and plainly stated by the Court.
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problem. Instead, the Committee has proposed massive revision of rules 56, 50, 40,
and 12(b)(6) that adopt and arguably accentuate the approach to summary judgment
taken by Liberty Lobby and Matsushita.
The Committee draft current as of this writing begins by abolishing the rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Instead, the new rule 12(b)(6)
motion that would be available under the Committee proposal would be a motion
asserting that the defendant is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law as provided
in rule 56(a)."1433 Rule 50 motions as historically known are also eliminated and
replaced by a shortened rule 50 that states only: "A motion for a directed verdict or
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict shall be treated as a motion for
judgment as a matter of law and shall be decided in accordance with Rule 56."434
The rule 56 to which litigants would be referred is not the rule 56 that the
profession has lived with since 1938. The Committee has renamed it "Judgment As
a Matter of Law" and proposes that the "heart" of summary judgment formerly
contained in rule 56(c) be relocated to rule 56(a) and revised to read:
On motion, the court shall render judgment with respect to any claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim, if it finds that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
established facts. In rendering judgment, the court shall establish the law and the material
facts in conformity with Rule 40.435
The remainder of the proposed amended rule 56 deals with primarily technical
rather than substantive changes, except to the extent that it incorporates by reference
the rather substantial revisions proposed in new rule 40.436
The proposed amended rule 40 is in fact a new rule 40 that has essentially taken
away from current rule 56(c) and 56(e) the task of defining and establishing the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Current rule 40, dealing with assignment
of cases for trial, would be eliminated and replaced by a rule devoted to "Establish-
ment of Fact and Law." In particular, new rule 40(b) would explicitly confer upon
a court authority to decide disputed fact questions prior to trial by providing:
To secure a just and inexpensive disposition of an action, the court may also at any time
after the close of the pleadings establish facts on which the final decision on a claim,
counterclaim or defense may depend. A fact may be established by the court only if there
is no evidentiary basis on which the fact might be rejected by a reasonable trier of fact.437
433. See Advisory Committee, Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 27 (July 1987) [hereinafter July
Draft]. The Advisory Committee Reporter has subsequently redrafted portions of the proposed amendments for the
Committee's April 1988 meeting. Unless the subsequent pending draft differs in significant fashion from the July draft,
this Article will cite to the relevant portions of the July draft.
434. Id. at 64-65.
435. Id. at 66-69.
436. Id. at 69-70. The proposed amended rule 56 expands the time available to respond to the motion for "judgment
as a matter of law." The opposition would have 30 days (versus 10 under current rule 56(b)) to file and serve an opposition
memorandum and supporting papers while the proponent would have seven days to reply (versus the current three days).
Proposed amended rule 56(c) clarifies the language concerning conditional new trial motions made during the course of
a court's ruling on a motion forjudgment n.o.v. New rule 56(d) would specifically empower a reviewing appellate court
to order a new trial even when that question was not presented to and decided by the trial court.
437. Id. at 38-39.
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The remainder of rule 40(b) deals with the operational means by which these facts
would be placed before a court for determination. Although these provisions might be
termed largely technical or operational, they give context to the substantive change
proposed by the Committee in adopting the "reasonable trier of fact" standard for
summary judgment.
For example, proposed rule 40(b)(2)(B) provides that a movant seeking pretrial
establishment of a fact may do so by affidavit or declaration "which reveals evidence
which will be available for trial and which cannot be effectively contested.' '438 Rule
40(b)(2)(D) permits establishment of fact when the movant has produced "evidence
presented at trial which was not genuinely contested." '439 Rule 40(b)(5) states that
"establishment of fact [under the Rule] shall be entered as an order of court, [and]
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law, and shall be modified only to prevent
manifest injustice." 440 In other words, rule 40(b)(1)'s admonition that a court
establish fact only if there is no evidentiary basis for the fact to be rejected by a
reasonable trier should not be taken literally. What the rule, read as a whole, and
Committee Note suggest is that a court can establish facts when it is unpersuaded by
the evidence offered in opposition to the alleged "fact.' 441
The Committee Note states that new rule 40 is designed both to streamline trial
and to curb to some extent the observed trend toward increased court requirements of
fact pleading rather than notice pleading 442 and also to integrate rule 56 with rule 50
into "a single method of adjudication of cases without trial.' "443 The Committee Note
further states that the "reasonable trier of fact" standard to be used in summary
judgment decisions is "fundamentally the same" as the directed verdict and
judgment n.o.v. standard as set forth in Catrett and Galloway.444 In other words,
courts establishing fact for purposes of ruling on a rule 56 motion for judgment as a
matter of law will be entitled to examine the nonmovant's evidence in opposition to
the motion and decide whether it is sufficiently "substantial" 445 and whether the
438. Id.
439. Id. at 40.
440. Id. at 41.
441. Id. at 71-73.
442. See Marcus, supra note 7, at 435. Professor Marcus argues that the evils of a return to fact-pleading can be
avoided through more frequent and aggressive use of rule 56. Marcus begins by noting that summary judgment, unlike
the rule 12(b)(6) motion, is a two-way street in which plaintiffs as well as defendants prevail, failing to note that, as an
empirical matter summary judgment is primarily a defendant's tool. In addition, he approvingly cites Matsushita without
closely analyzing the impact of the Court's approach to that case and the danger that courts applying Matsushita-Liberty
Lobby summary judgment have as much opportunity to strike down disfavored claims as do judges subjecting complaints
to a fact/code pleading analysis. Marcus correctly highlights the often overlooked or misguided use of rule 56(0, which
permits postponement of the summary judgment decision to permit further nonmovant discovery. Id. at 484-91.
443. July Draft, supra note 433, at 72.
444. Id. at 42.
445. Id. at 43 (citing Cooper, supra note 323, at 955-68). The Advisory Committee Note's citation of Professor
Cooper's article is puzzling in this context. To be sure, Cooper concludes that directed verdicts may be granted when the
nonmovant offers no substantial evidence in support of its case, but he, like Professors Wright, Miller, and others, takes
the view that in determining what is "substantial," the court must draw all inferences in favor of the nonmovant when
the evidence or cor,clusions therefrom conflict. As discussed, this approach differs from the Court's concept of directed
verdicts employed in Liberty Lobby. In addition, Professor Cooper displays in his analysis a respect for the benefits of
jury trial (at least in certain situations) that seems absent from the Court's 1986 cases cited in the draft Advisory
Committee Note. Cooper, however, in a portion of the article cited in the April 1988 Reporter's Draft, argues that
"[f]ederal courts may legitimately accord greater factfinding and law applying freedom to juries in some areas than in
1988]
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inferences made by nonmovants from the record are "sufficiently plausible that a trier
of fact could base a finding or verdict on the inference. '" 4 46
If the current Advisory Committee proposal is adopted, a court ruling on a
summary judgment motion would be expressly permitted not merely to ascertain
whether the parties' facts and suggested inferences are in conflict but would also be
empowered to evaluate the facts and determine that the claimant's facts are
insufficiently substantial or that the claimant's preferred inferences are insufficiently
plausible to satisfy the judge. In essence, the proposed new Rules would expressly
allow judges to weigh differing facts and inferences before trial according to whether
the court thought facts were "effectively contested" or "genuine," the same
semantic swamp that spawned the Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy. The
Committee proposes not to correct the problems raised by Liberty Lobby, Matsushita,
and Catrett but to codify them.
As a check on judicial abuse of this expanded court authority and shift of power
from juries to judges, the Committee relies on appellate review by providing that a
court's fact and inference determinations be treated as questions of law subject to
plenary review rather than questions of fact that can be set aside only if clearly
erroneous. Yet the Committee then waters down this plenary review standard by
stating that rule 40(b) pretrial fact determinations should be set aside only if necessary
to avoid "manifest injustice." Reading between the lines, proposed amended rule
40(b) looks suspiciously like the clearly erroneous standard of review. 447 It also
assumes too much that is contrary to the realities of appellate review. Circuit courts
undoubtedly perform a vital quality control supervisory power over district courts,
but they are unlikely to vigorously re-examine the record below concerning a court's
determination of fact despite any instruction of proposed amended rule 40. The trial
determinations made may be matters of law, but they will come to the appellate court
infused with fact-based determinations and a presumption of correctness that busy
circuit courts are unlikely to examine anew and overturn in any but the most
egregious of cases.
The Advisory Committee Note to proposed rule 56 also reveals the extent to
which the Committee has adopted the rationale of Liberty Lobby that summary
judgment and directed verdict are synonymous, citing as authority those who had
advocated this change in the law.448 Unlike the reformers who sought to merge law
and equity, establish discovery, and supplant code pleading with notice pleading, the
others, depending on the strength of the desire to keep pure the legal rules involved and on the nature of the consequences
of jury error" without violating the seventh amendment. The Reporter's Note and cited authorities thus are ambiguous
as to the power of judges and juries under the new rules. The profession has a right to ask exactly what the proposed
amended rule 40 would do in reality. My own view is that adoption of the proposed amended rule would, because of the
Court's recent pronouncements, be interpreted in an aggressive manner permitting too much judicial assessment of the
weight of conflicting facts and inferences.
446. July Draft, supra note 433, at 44.
447. Id. at 47-48.
448. Id. at 71 (citing Sonenshein, supra note 18, and Currie, supra note 20). In the April 1988 draft, the Reporter's
Note cites these authorities and concludes that the "several devices [of rule 12(b)(6), summary judgment, directed verdict
and judgment n.o.v.] can be unified without change in the principles applied to the cases." For reasons previously stated,
see supra text accompanying notes 80-328, this Article disagrees.
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summary judgment revolutionaries prevailed without firing a legitimately debated
"shot" in a conflict conducted under proper Enabling Act procedure; they won their
victory through two Supreme Court decisions, one by a one-vote margin, with the
rulemaking process following the Court rather than the other way around.
Certainly, some litigants who lose on summary judgment when they would have
won had the matter proceeded to trial may be said to have received less justice under
the new regime. In making policy and rules for the greater good of the aggregate
federal civil litigation system, however, the participants (the Supreme Court, the
profession, Congress, the public) are entitled to adopt rules permitting some
individual injustices in the service of net gains to the system. If, for example, the
Liberty Lobby summary judgment test resulted in few more "wrong" results (Type
II errors) but substantially reduced the aggregate delay and cost attendant to litigation,
it could defensibly be adopted.
Unfortunately, no one knows whether the new rule 56 will have any such
minimal impact on accuracy. Similarly, no one knows how much time and money
will be saved the system because of this bigger, stronger version of summary
judgment.449 The nine justices of the Supreme Court, quite removed from daily trial
court activities, ordinary litigation, and the public in general, are an especially
ill-equipped group to conduct alone the cost-benefit analysis that should have
preceded any substantial change in summary judgment jurisprudence. Revision
through Enabling Act proceedings, coupled with extensive empirical study by the
Federal Judicial Center and others, would produce a richer data base upon which to
make the decision as to the future of rule 56.450 Rather than making this contribution
449. Matsushita and Liberty Lobby, by providing judges more discretion to evaluate evidence and dismiss claims,
also will likely increase the number of directed verdict motions made by litigants, particularly defendants. The time-saving
arguments made in favor of a stronger directed verdict rule are weaker than those raised on behalf of increased summary
judgment. The directed verdict motion is made either after claimant's case-in-chief or at the close of all the evidence. Even
in the former instance, the trial is well under way, with intense pretrial preparation and discovery already completed.
Except in the largest cases, a grant of directed verdict at mid-trial will not save a large portion of judicial and litigant
resources. A grant of directed verdict at the close of the evidence conserves even fewer resources. Granting the motion
also entails the not insignificant risk of appellate reversal, which would necessitate a new trial and a net increase in time
and costs. Consequently, most trial judges would lean toward denying all but the clearcut directed verdict motion,
allowing the jury to render a verdict resulting in a judgment less likely to be disturbed on appeal or that the judge can alter
through grant of a motion for judgment n.o.v. or new trial.
The discussion of summary judgment as a time-saving device contained in McLauchlan's otherwise stimulating
article misdefines the issue. McLauchlan elects to measure whether the motion saves time by comparing the elapsed time
between filing of the complaint and final disposition of the case according to whether a summary judgment motion was
made and finds the average case required 365 days for disposition while those with a summary judgment motion required
approximately 240 days for disposition. See McLauchlan, supra note 322, at 454. This approach totally overlooks the
proper measure of time-saving-whether the use of summary judgment reduces the judicial, counsel, or litigant hours
spent in resolution of the case. For example, a case terminated 240 days after filing may have consumed 8,000 person
hours and $1 million. A case terminated after 365 days may have consumed 400 person hours and $38,000. the length
of time between filing and disposition bears no relation to the time and cost invested in a case. The earlier disposition of
a matter does not necessarily free the court to consider another case, either, since open docket files vary in the extent to
which they require court involvement during pretrial. A case "on the books" for six years may involve no more judicial
time than one open for 180 days. In short, the limited available empirical data camnot support the purported time-saving
nature and efficiency of a stronger summary judgment rule.
450. Earlier editions of the Advisory Committee have been persuasively criticized for taking no action to amend
Federal Rule 15 concerning amendment of pleadings for nearly 20 years during which inconsistent interpretations, many
arguably erroneous, mounted in the courts, culminating in the Supreme Court's arguably flawed pronouncement in
Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986). See Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and its Lessons
for Civil Rules Revision, 85 Mic. L. Ray. 1507 (1987). My criticism of current Advisory Committee intentions is,
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to the profession, the Advisory Committee seems to have begun with the presumption
that its task was merely to codify the Court's fait accompli in Matsushita, Liberty
Lobby, and Catrett. My suggestion is that the Committee instead begin its summary
judgment inquiry at dead center and independently determine whether summary
judgment must "mirror" the directed verdict to be effective. My fear is that it is too
late, that the Committee's inertia will continue to carry its ill-conceived suggestions
forward, that the Court will report them, and that only strong congressional
intervention, such as seen with the Federal Rules of Evidence, can avert a major
mistake.
CONCLUSION
Marked restructuring of summary judgment doctrine nearly fifty years after its
inception and three decades of settled construction is inherently risky business. To be
properly done, the task should be performed with maximum information and public
access, 451 following the procedures established for amendment of the Federal Rules
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. Instead of taking this approach, the
Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee seem committed to creating newer,
tougher, more pro-defendant summary judgment and directed verdict rules as
expeditiously as possible.
The criticisms set forth above of Matsushita, Liberty Lobby, and their ramifi-
cations are not intended as a prediction of "Apocalypse Soon" but rather as a call for
correction and reflection. The Supreme Court and other federal courts can and should
minimize the damage by taking a restrictive view of Liberty Lobby, limiting it insofar
as possible to defamation actions and cases in which the trial judge has a high level
of confidence based on the record in the accuracy of her conclusion that a
nonmovant's case is so clearly unmeritorious that no reasonable factfmder would
render a decision in its favor. In the meantime, the Advisory Committee should begin
a serious examination of the comparative merits of traditional summary judgment
doctrine as compared with Liberty Lobby summary judgment doctrine, including the
obviously, somewhat different. Professor Lewis faults the Committee for doing nothing in response to festering error and
inconsistency in the lower courts while I criticize the Committee for doing too much in response to two Supreme Court
decisions. Both problems perhaps stem from an insufficiently defined mission for the Committee. Rather than being
frequently passive, waiting for key cases or waiting to hear proposals from parts of the profession, the Committee should
perhaps be conducting more affirmative study and survey to determine what federal roles, if any, need amendment. A
more passive stance probably means that only those with access to the elite Committee structure will have their voices
heard. One group with substantial prestige, the Federal Courts Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, has proposed an altemative draft of amended rule 56 that does not alter the substantive heart of the role because
of its view that substantive revision of the rule is unwise until further decisional evolution is allowed to occur at a
reasonable pace.
451. See Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Ce. L. REv. 306, 336 (1986)
("ease-by-case development is the law's way of engaging in exploratory behavior--of discovering problems and trying
out approaches to solve them. Codifying rules and statutes come later, after greater understanding has developed").
Accepting this approach, as did the Federal Courts Committee, one might ask why I suggest that the Advisory Committee
do anything substantive at all. One could argue for a "wait-and-see" approach to the ramifications of Matsushita and
Liberty Lobby. Unfortunately, matters have progressed too far to permit this approach. Both decisions were themselves
not experimental but declaratory, leaving too little room for lower court departure from them. Furthermore, the Advisory
Committee seems determined to rewrite rule 56 rather than leaving it intact so that the Court could gracefully pull back
from Matsushita and Liberty Lobby on a case-by-case basis.
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gathering of facts concerning any alleged savings of time and cost. The Committee
should be a wise and courageous advisor to the Court rather than a mirror of unwise
Court decisions. Only through this process can the judicial system's goals, including
the currently trendy drive toward efficiency, be fully served.
As the story goes, a drunken man was seen on his hands and knees for some time.
A passerby asked about his conduct. "I'm looking for my lost wallet," said the man.
When asked why he continued to crawl about the lamp post after it became obvious
his wallet was not there and why he had not looked elsewhere on the street, he replied
"because the light is so much better here." Enlightened summary judgment doctrine
requires the Advisory Committee and the profession to look behind and beyond the
light reflected in the distorted mirror of Matsushita, and Liberty Lobby.

